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INTRODUCTION
l'NTHODUCTI{)H
On  April  11.1951,   jJresident  llarry  S.   Truman  dis-
charged  G€nertil  of  the  Arffly  Douglas  REacArthur,   thus
relieving  him  of  his  varlaus  po8t8,   including  that  of
Supreme     rfullied  Corm&nd®r   in  the  Far  E;&8t.     Tile  action
provoked   ®rtorEBouB   puhlic   €cntrov®r8y  81ne®  }*acArthur  wag
one  of  the  greatest  cand  mo@t  popular  military  her®e8  in
AfB®rlcan  hietoryi   wh®reaa  Truman  was   an  unp®pulcar
Pre8id®nt,
As  in  fflost  ptiblic  controv®r8ieg.   the  mEj®r  facts
and  isftueB  have  been  gubRIerged  by  the  emotio}ial  outcries
of  rtrotest  against  and  8tiprtort  for  Trunan'g  action.
Even   today  the   Tru"n-A.£&cArthur   di&put®   concerning  Korean
War  policy  ar®uge3   bitter  corttr®VerBy,   gencrdited  moBtly
hy  8ubjectiv®  attflchm®ntS   to  either  Truman  oi-fflacArthur®
rn  most  cages   the  real  f&ctg  are  ignored.     Extremefflly
complicated,   they  have   rL®t,   ca&   yet.   been  preg®nted   to
the  public   in  a  major  tTork  caito®d  at  Bt&rveyin&  and
aintllyzing   the   i®Su®s.
This   study,   motivated  hy  ray  d®gil`e  to  &cqu&int
myself  i*nd  my  readers  with  tile  r@cal  facts  of  the  Truman-
isacArthur  controversy.  Qtt®mpta  t®  sot  forth  and  to
®xamin®   th®Be   fact ff ,   not   to  r®&ch  &riy   c®nclu8ions  as   t®
whether  Truman  or  M&cArth`2r   advocated   the   wlfl®at   H{?i.®&n
policy.    Thlg  queatlon  will  be  answered,   1f  at  all,  hy
history.  not  by  ath®sis.  the  flllesed  }iurpo8e  of  which
iB   to  analyze.  not  to  p-s8  judgement.
In  five  chcapter  divisions  I  intend  to  an&1ya®  the
personflliti®8  tirid  r]oliticfil   philoSorihi®s   o±`   the   two  men
involved.   to  furv®y  tl`ie   policy  of  the  United  Stat®B
toward  Kor€&   from  thtg   close  of  World  War   11   to  the  re-
call   of   seacArthur   in   1951,   &Iid   to  afijalyze   the   cauffiati.vS
|V
factors  of  tl`is  disT`ute.
I  have  relied  heavily  upon  origirial  material  froin
three  major   8ourc®s:      the   Second  volume  of  Truman'a
memoirs , Y®ar€   of  Trial  dnd
I      ___  ____  ___             _   ____        ==_______i        I__    ___i Easi The   N®w   York  Time__  I__  ___+        _        _   _       _                                                I_I__
an{]  the  minutes   of  the  Congre.t591onal  hedrlng8   conducted
by  the   Senate  Armed  S®rvic®8   and  F`oreign  }t®lationB
colrmltt®e8  concerning  ttacArthur'8  recall.     Although  I
hfiv®   obtained  much  of  my  information  from  Truman'8
m®moira.   the  r®&der   ie   c4.Lutlon®d   to  remember   that
G®n®ral   MacArthur  vi®w®d  Tru"an's  ni®moir8  a8   follows:
I  llad  sincerely  hoped  that  ln  his  memoir  ntlr-
ration  of  the  Korean  War  and  the  facts  and  clrcum-
Stances  Burroundlrig  "y  rolief  i.ron  command  in  the
Far  East.   I{r.   Tr`im{`fi  would  be  anlmit®d  by  a  high
selise  of  dedication  to  the  historical  record ....
I  will  not  b®  8o  bold  a8   to  attempt  to  dlagmoge
tile  animating  imr.uls®s  w]]1ch  have  led  liim  liito  such
a  labyrintli  of  fancy  and  fiction.   di8tortiora  €ind
mlsreriresentation.     Suffice  it  to  say  tl`r`t  a  "®11-
known  quotation  may  provide  a   clue  to  the  an8ver:
'Lfverything  looks  y®1lov  to  the  jaundlc®d  eye. '1
It  is  indeed  unfortunate  that  General  tiacArthur
has  never  published  hi.  memoir8.
Although  this  the.is  18  bag®d  prim-rily  on  origin-
al  'aources,   I  do  wish   to  thank  Hr.  Alfred  St®1nberg  for
his  ®xc®llent  blograit}iy  of  ltorry  Trunian.     I  found  it  most
helT]ful  4.ince  many  of  his  ob6ervatitina   of  Trunen  Were
based  on  }`i8  personal   contact  with  Trumt`n   during  hl8
pr®8idency.
I  tfould  a.i8o  like   to   thank  my  adviser.   Dr.   Max
Dixon.   vhos€   encouragement   and   8ugge8tion€   1]av®  been
invaluahle.  and  the  Wake  Forest  Ctill®ge   library  ®t8ff
wliich  was  !tloBt  cooperative   in  helping  m®   to   locate
research  materials.
]Excerpt   of  statement  by  I)ougla8  MacArtliur  ape
nearing in  Tlio   New   York  Times 9  February.1956.   p.   25.
C]RA>TEn   I
"8  Pfi£SIPBZ€T
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Tf¥#    i`,it!:..Jlj'F+ACT
tin  the  st¢raein#  of  t}ctober  6,1950.   prr®aidont
Ilarry  4¥.   Trurmlt  wa&  c®nfrortted  with  a   p®r8®nctl   cri#1B.
Chflrll€  fit)a8.  his  pr®fig  a®¢retcar}r  and  lifelong  rri®nd.
tread  dl®d  Sudd®ftly  of  th   I+ot!rt  attack  l&t®  ®n  the  tift®r-
caoon  ®f   t:}ctob®r   5.     Truman  had  root   L>®®n  able   to  retlr€
aLlon®  wl€h   hie   grl®r,   b¢cftyus®   t}f  the  pr®Sfling  coenpll€a-
tlolte  ®f  the  H®rcon  War.     At   thcat  pr®clee   tl"e  the
British  grrim®  "1ItiHtar  Clement  Attl®e  w&®   in  the  United
Stflt®®  for  talkg  uith  the  I;r®*id®nt  &hout  tli®  military
centcadtropha®  fflcln#  the  United  Notit+ns'   forc®8   in  Korea,
€re{it®d   by   tine   rc€8nt  fltggr®&3ioae   of   the   ft®d   Chinesee.
8e8pit®   th®&®   flQrioue   prot3l®fflB,   fuow®ver.   'r`rum.n
wtl8  caor®   cam€®rn®d  ab®ttt  thri  tirtlcl®   in   tire  Wa8lii)}gton
E:P=E.     Whell  he  r€ftd  t}i€  artlcl®,   *ils   Btot®   or  mind
cZ"»g®d  from  grief  @ttd  cocaetcrn&tion  t®  ®xtr®"e  indigna-
tion.     Tn€  esrticle,   "#1tt®n   t]y  tr'&Sriin&t®n  ±;±£±  nrm$1c
critic   P&ul   I]iune,   r®vi®wtstl   tli®  i]r®vi®ua   ®v®nlng.a  r®-
citfll   at   Con®titutiDn  Hchll   I.y  armrjgchr®t  Trun!ian.   the
I:raflid®nt's   dau&htGr.      In  pcart,   tlic  cauHtic  r®vi®v
8 t €t t ed a
.   .   .   arisa  Trtim*m  cthnnot   Bin#  vary  well.     Sli®
i8   fleet  a   ffootl  d®&l  of   the   tico®--rtyor€   le*Bt  night
than  fit  anytiffi®  v€   hcav®   heflt.a  her ....      Sh®  hcag
l®flrfi®d   €htrt   Bh®   racust   tporte   ies   ard®r   t®  t!iak®   Bomo-
thl"S  of  ht!r  voice.     Ttut  gn®   Still   cannriot  $1ng
¥£3.ii  ®nythln8  ftpprouching  I?rof®®#lontll  rlt`iah.
Sl.a   €ormunlc&t€B   stleno4St   nQthirig  of   the  fflu8ic
She  pr®faent8.      Schumftnii.   +qcinh®rt,   and  FToa2art
were  on  her  progrfim  laSt  night.     Y®t.   the  perform-
ftnc®   of  "uj.ic   hy   th®fl®   ciompoa®rS  v«8   no  coore   than
a   carlc&tur®   of  wh"t  it  *oultl  t}®   if  gun#  by  flny
2
one  of  a  dozen  aertlet8   today.
And  €till   the  public   #o®B  and  pays   the   B8m®
price  lt  would  for  the  world's  fine.8t  einger3.
It   is   extrememi`y  un!ileaB&nt   to  record   Such
unhappy  facts  about  Bo  honest.Iy  appealing  a  p®r8on-
ality®     F}ut  tlf!   long  a8  Miss  Truman   continueS   to  $1ng
ag   sll®   has   for  three   years.   aiid   {loes   toddy.   w®  8eem
to  have  no  rectjur8®  unl®.qB  lt   i8   to  omit   comment
on  her  progri3mg.I
After  Truman  had  road   the  review,   he   lmf!iedi®.t®ly
wrote  a  d®nunciatory  letter  to  I]urlc.     It  read  as  follove:
I  have  Just  r®Bd  your  lousy  review  buried  in  the
back  pa&eg.     You  Sound   like   a   fruBtr€it®d  utnn   that
n€Sver  made  a   gucc®s8.   &n   ®iglit-ulcer   man   on  a   four-
ulcer  job.  and  all  four  ulcers  working.
I  n®v®r  in..t  you,   but   if   I   do  yt]u'll  need  a  new
rlo8e   ftnd  r]lenty   of  bt]ef'8t®sik.   and   p®rzi<ip8   a   Supporter
below.     Westbrook  }3®g1®r.   a   gutt®r8nlpe.   is  a   gc)itle-
man  compared   to  yoti.     You   can   tithe   that  a8  r4iore  of
an  insult  tl`an  a  refl®ctlon  on  your  a.iceff try.2
The   letter  vac   slm(7ly   Blgned  I).   S.   T.     At  1`ir8t,
Hume  was  not   8ure  that  Truman  had  Written  it.   but  When
h.hit®   l]ou8®   aids   adr*`ilted   th€tt   he  fi&d.   the   1®ttor  wag
vid®ly  publicized.     Many  ®ditoritll8   denounced   the  Pr®8-
ident's  lack  of  propriety.   but  what  8hock®<]  most  people
was   Truman's   cr`}de   ver`bal   u8ag®.
Noverth®lesle.   to  rsiany   p®oiTl®.   Truman's   letter
did  not  come  fig  a   guri.rise.   since  Truman  w{iB   famous  for
his   brut&11`rankne38.     ]1®   hi"8ell`  admlt8   in   the  rireface
to  his  book,  ±. Citizen:
Since   I  am  given  to  plain  9p®aking.   especially
on  matters  whore  I  f®el   lt  neceB8ary   to  point  up
]F*xcerpts   from  review  by  I.`aul  Hum®  ap|>oaring  in
The
•          _____      _
New  York  Tin]es .   9   D®cembor,1950®   p.13.
8Lett®r   by  l{arry  S.   Truman  appearing  in  The
T= __ i _  _
New   York  Times .   9   December.   1950.   p®   1.
&n   i#.qu®,   th®r®  are   fl®m®  pa&Stl8ee   ln   this   b®®k   that
"tty   h®   int®rpr®ted  ctE   lithratr   t®   c®rtis±n   indivlt'lu®las®5
Trunfln'#   1¢tt®r   to  HuRI®,   h®w®v®r.   wct®  not  the  on-
ly  letter.  fircauaing  public  rtiror,  th€it  li®  wrote  during
jiie   Precaitl®ncy.      tin  oti®  occma£Qn  h®  wrote  ®   bli#terin8
l®tt®r   to  Berlitird  t3#ructi  tfliicll   €]o  1mfuritit®d  th®  latter
thtit  ii¢  [tltbllcly  d®nt}uncQd  Truman  as   '1&   rud®.   unot}uth
I"td   igrior&nt  mrsl"n4     0m  &n®Lha®r   occ&Bion,   Colarcad®
Stfite   5;®nca&or   &+.    BiEhtip.*   £LSro#o®dsl   tl*cat   John   L.   Lqwifl
b®   aiTi>®iittad  A"h®t}8ad®r  to   th€   5®Vi€t   union   r!rorm}}ttSd
i`rumalt  to  wrlt8   thcat  I't®   would  t`cv®r  rs&"®  Joiin  I.   L®"1a
to   t!}e   F}®®iti®n  of   Clog  afitcfatSt".5     Trtunthn  even   inaulted
the  pri{l®   of  the   t!nltG!d   States  ftytArlti®  Corps,   cctlllfig  lt
IIthe  #&vy.8  police  f®rc®.N6     |n  Still  finoth®r  l®tt€tr.
in  r¢apon#c   t®   an  caF`p®€&l   fr®ca  fa®preti®Itt8\tlv®   Edheftrd
lI®rb¢rt  of  L®uigitlna.  }3ropoaln#  that  the  churchBS  Eat
&Sid®  a   dffly   ®f  }'*ra¥®r  for   #uidancG   thr#u#h  the  ®rl8ib
pr®8cnt®tl   hy   €i*c  Cllin®¥e   lnt®rventi®n  ln   K®r®tl,  Truman
S i tl t a a S
I  stm  ®xtr¢eseRIly   Sarry   that   tt]c   8®ntlm®rLt8   ex-
pr®SH®d   in  your   l®ttel.   w®ra   not   tht}itasfit   of   b®for®
#ovt3mher   7.   when  the   caemqutllgn   in  yt}ur   fl€atc.   Utah.
a3orth  Cfirollnca.   IIEln®iB.   tina   lndi®n4*  tf®fl   carrl®d
on   ln  a   rmuner   t)i&t  ume  &31ow  n*   I.vey   €v®it   s*c®n
#}td   I've   b®®#t   in   t)`±S   ff&th®   $1n€€   190&.7
nfirdf*e:'#to.;-g8o:£a::gT":6£#:
r®rr®d   t®  "s   Trufflfin. G i t i p- ® n ,
Citir,en   {"®w  T®rkg   i}#r-
p.    L¢.      I!Gr®*`.tft®r   rG-
fuE=tfttem®nt   toy   H®rltfflrd   Pa*``icli   a|`}!ieffirlrig   ±n  £±±±
New   York  Times
_       :      _T         _:I   .-         ._     .          _    _    __.+___I_
.    9   n®o®entS®r.    1950,   ]}.    13.
York :    ::I:T®|iu¥:::i:e;#iE¥9g#.
Fr®ffl   Pii8Sourl    {#®w
p.   395.
6St&ten®n±   toy  |torry  £.   Truman  fip|`Bcarins  in  =±g
New   Yorlt  Ti"G& 9   »®c®fflly#r.    1950.   I..   i.
7Ea€cer}at   fr®"  tl   1®tt®r   t*y   i{arry  S.   Trtunan  clt®d
b}+   `St®inh®rg,   p.    395.
4
Many  Scholars  were  not  ®s  upset  with  what  Truman
aaid.   as   they  were  witli  the  w€.&y  ln  which  he  said  it.
It  was  difficult  for  many  Americans  to  accept   the  fact
thtlt  a  man  With  no  college   ®duc&tion  and  with  Such  an
extr®memly  limited  vocat}ul€iry  could  be  elected   t®  tll®
office  once  held  by  Such  m&8t®rs  of  the  English  laliguage
as  Thomas  JerfGrson  &nd  Atjrahfi"  Lincoln.
Not  only  in  emphatic   d®nouncementB.  but  also  in
slnc®re   Social  and  T>olitic&1   corregpondance  w&8  T`ruman'8
verbal  inc€ap&city  evldeiit.     In   ltj52  Truman  invited  tll®
lt®put}licfln  Pre81d®nti©l   momin®e,   Dwlght   D.   Ei8cnhower.
to  thca  Wllit®  House   for  briefings   to   iiigur®  n   continued
bl-rycartis&n  approcach   to   foreigri   p®11cy.     F,i.qeli!`over   s®iit
a   court®ouE  reply,   hut   declln®d   the  invitation,   g&ying
thai t
ln  my   cur£`®nt   }io8ition   &g   gtfind&rd   -oe&i-¢r   of   the
Republican  party  and  of  ®tri-er  America)iqq!.who  wa]±t   to
bring  &b(Jut   &   change   in  tile   Nati®nfil  Guv®rrimant.
.   .   .   I   tllilik  it  would  b®  unwistE  arid  r®Sult   in  con-
fugi{]ri  ln  the  public  mintl  if  I  were   to  attend  tj}e
=l:::in£®:a   the  be.hite   r!{>use   to  which  you  hflv®   in-
Thou.qh  Truman  wtis   dlBappoint¢d,   Ill.9  reply   to
Eiselth®tfer  wa@   c®urt®ous.   yet   go  very   plain  and  siunpl®
for   one  who  h{]d  occupit.d   the  FIrG8idency  more   than  a¢ven
yetir.q.      £t®   wrote   in   lQfi&haend3
Dear   Ike:
I  am   sorry   if   I   caust9d  you   any  'emb&rragEment.
W}iat   I.v®  always   had   ln  mind  was   and  i8   a
flExcerpta   from   telGgraffl   by  I}wigi±t   lh   t€£isenhow®r
cited   t}y   l{nr`ry   S.   Truan&n.
ERE.   Voi.   £   (
ff©moir8!      Y®&rs   of  `rrial   flntl
fiard€n  City.   evew   York: [}oubleday  f*n
E~d-in-F-€*ny,1956),   51£.      [¥®roafter   r®f©rped   to   ®8   Truraifin.
Yecars .
5
continuing  for®igri  r}olicy.     You  lmow   thett  i®  a  fact
because  you  }ic{d  a   r}art   in  outlining  it.
rarti9an  ijolitic8   Should  stop  at   t!`e   boundaries
of   the   United  Stat®8.      I'm   ®xtr®m®mly   sorry   thl']t  you
have  allowed  a   bunch  of  ecrevba.lie   to   come   between
u8,
You   llave  made  a   btld  migtak®.   and   I'm  hoping  lt
won't  lnjur.a  this  great  lteptiblic.
There  hog  never  b®®n  one   like  it  and   I  want  to
see   it   continua  regardl®.cas   of   tli®  man  who   occupio8
tile  onost  im|tort€`nt  position  in  the  hiStory  of  the
world,
May   God   guide   you   and   `nglve   you   li&l]t®
From  a   man  Who  h®8   alway&   been  your   friend  and
always   lnt®nded   to  be®
c., i ri c e r e i y .
II&rry  a.   `rru"n9
THE   Tl`tuHAN    IH^GF,
Whether   it  was  l`is  fihocking  frank]i®8s,   his   limited
vocabulary,  hl8  ruddy  five-foot~t®n-inch  fraiiie.   or  per-
haps  his  folk®y  ways   (if  tilixing  tJith  p®opl®.   the   1`act
remains   thf`t   l[arr.y  S.   Trun&»  VaB   all  unpopul{``r  }>re8id®nt
t/bile   ln  office.     Furtl`®rmor®,   he   was   consid®r®d  by
many   to   be   a   13r®8id®nt   by  accidt7nt.      I-crhap8,   hoha.ever.
the  most  deva8tdting  factor  of  his  unpor)ularity  was
th&t  he   could  iiot   project  €i   favorthbl®   image   to  the
puL]lic.     E±±p±  magazine   d®plcted  him  ae
9Te|egram   by   Harry  =;.   `'}.`ruman   cited   by   Trum®n®
Years.   r7.   512.
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®   .   .   a   professional   little  nian,  with   t.h®
&dmit`ers  'who   llk®   t}lo   little  man'8   t`,ourflg®.   with
:::¥.£5itic8  Wlto  d®gpiso  a   little  man.8   iiiacl®qu®-
Itl  am`ilyz;1ng  Trunan'€   unfavor{ibLe   image.   ,`+|fred
St®iriberg.   his   biograr+her.   }ta®   88id:
Truman  had  an  enormous   faculty  for  attrt.toting
loud.   often   coarg®   8upporter8   €`nd  hangers-on.
h7hericver   his   old  vtir  Dates   of  World  War   I   showed
up,   li®   immet]iately  r®vert®d  to   t}i®  role  of  Captain
l!arry   of  Battery  D.      L}own   the   street  hc  ni&rcli®d
in   t}leir  rtarad®H  with  long.   Jaunty  strides--not
as   Pr®©ident  Trumalt.   but  aa   one   of  the   boys.
Neither  his  ®Ii®mi®s   nor   his   friends   could
forget  tlrat  he   once  lost  l`i®  aliirt  in  the  hal.®r-
dfi6hery   business.   th¢*t   i`ie  wd@   th-i3rodinct   of  a
liefi`rious  political  mchi[iti.  arid   thnt   h®  had  been
®l®vat®d   to  the  nationfil   Bo®ne   1`rom  a  minor  r7olltlctll
office.     This  was   t}1e   ilidelible   iniat5e   they  used  a8
rot`er®nce   ln  Judging  ]`i".1l
Thus,   when  Tr.un.an  r®liev8d  f.eneral  HacArtl`t`r  of
his   Far  EastLbrn  Comm&nd.   national   sympatliy   8id®d.with
#t`cArthur  largely   h8cauBe  Truman  was  unable  to  present
an  image  that  could  be   tru8ted.     If  Mac,Arthur  had   ''d®-
fied"the  autllority  of  a  President  who  projected  a   trusted
'Ifather   image,n   8ucri  a8   Franklin  ltoo®evelt   or   nwlght   D®
rfisenliower,   perhaps  his  removal  would  h£`v®   been   greeted
with   the  i.T!ioleh®f]rt®d   Bu|iport   of   the  American   p®opl®.
{jrie   incident   thtlt   illustrates  tl`®   unfavoratole
re.'`ction   of   the  Ameri.,an   peoi`1e   toward  1`rum&n,   f`ft®r
L°wThe   Little   M&n  to'ho   Dcared,.'   I:±=.   LV:[I   (i\IJril
23.1951).    2£1.
||Steint}er-q,   r„   1{,"
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his  remc.v&1   of  Mac/`rthur  occurred  cat  a   baseball   game  at
Griffeth   Stadium  in  Wa#tlington.     T'ruman  and  i.iB  wife
att®)ided  tli®   game   in  order   to  ti&rtlclpat®   in  the  annual
tradition  of  tile  13re8idont.s   throwing  out   the  first  ball®
At   the   end  of   tile   eighth   inriin8.   a   loud8p®ak®r  anliounce-
m®Iit   r®qu®sted   ttic   crowd   to   remfiin   8eat®d  until   the
r'resident  had  lt3ft  tl]e   p&rk.      Immediately   the   crowd  be-
gan   to   boo  TruB`an,   Who.   With  Ills   wi£`e.   va8   force{l   to
sit  through  a  h+`lf  irining  of  constant  jeering. 12
When  Truman  I.ft  ofl`ice   on  Jtinufiry  20,   1953,   t,lie
G&llup   l<oll   reported  that  only   tl`irty-two  |ierc®rit   of   t.ho
people   interviewed  thoutEht   that  Truman  tLad   done  a   sood
joL}.     Truman'8  Fopulfrlty  index,   in  comparison  vlth
rfiB®nhower's   index   of  sixty-on®   percerit   ta`I{en   the  day
after  the   1960  ®1®ction.   is   an  extremely  low  fi{{ure. 13
In  &ddltion   to  the  p`iblic'g.   cond®sc®nding  at-
titude   toward  hilil.  Trur[ian  suffered  tJie  wrath  and
liumiliatlon  of   both  political  o`ppolients  find.   occasion-
ally.   fr`ient!^tg.      Ii`or   instance,   ±n   19`1'+.   }irior   to   his
nominfltion   forvicc+I+`r®8ide]`t.   Ii®   had   been  ca   S®riator   for
ten   yerirgi   nevertheles^g.   when   fJresid®nt   Roo8ev®lt   told
Admiral  Will.iam  D.   Leahy   that   he   had   decided  on  Truman
for  his  running.  mate.   Leahy   looked  asto]ilshed  and  &sked,
'.t``'no   the   hell   is   Trum€`n}'' 14
±2wnragf   r},iSndg   €irid   i}{tos.N   :I:±±:I:,    L\'IJ    (April
30'   1951),   27.
L5The   KS'Loxv||]e   News   S.Iitlnel .   10   November,
19bo.   p.   1£.
[4.i;t,*tcrltent   by  Willif3m   1).    L®ahy   cited   i>y   *tein-
ber.g,I,.   15.
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h``h®n  Hooeevelt   died   on  A})ril   12.   1945.   I,tart   of
tl.i®   emotional   shock   ®xperienc®d  by   th.  Amerir,tin  r}®ople
8t®toln®d  from  their  Sudden  realization  of  who  had  Buc-
ceedocl  him.     L}ut  the.  main  problem  thflt   confronted  Tru-
man  wag  not   the   Support   o£`   the  p®<)I.il®   (the   Gtillup
Poll  8how®d  his  popular  gut>r!ort  to   be  very  high]5)'
but  the  growing  hogtillty  ot.  men  within  the  Roosevelt
Adminl8tratlon  who  considered  Truman  too  sin.!`ll   for  the
job.     Years  later.  When  .|8ked  about  this  ho.tllity  he
had  faced  from  the  ltoog®velt  ^dministrBtlon.   Truman
r®pli®d3
Y®8.1t'&   true.     Ttler®  was   some   of   thi]t.   but
it   iB  only   to  be   expected  when  there  i.  8   8ud{]en
chant=®.     I   took  very  little  notice  of  lt  bec&u8e
I  understood  exactly  how  people  who  were   close  to
f{oof9evelt   felt.     They  had  lost  th®1r   Ledider  and
they  were   down  in  the   du"pB.     They  were  probably
afraid  that   the   country  Would  go  to  tli®   dogB  with
a   new  man  whom   they   thought   didn't  know  much  about
trh€jit   to  do.     But  After   they  found  out--tliat   is.
the  vast  majority  of   them~-tli£`t   I  vac   going  to
carry  out  tlio  poiicl®8  and  idL.al8  of  Franklin
}toosevelt  to  their  logical  conclusion.   they  b®-
gen  to  feel  differently.     I  never  I`eld  a   grudge
against  any  of  tJi®m,   not  even  those  Who  were  ill-
::;::::i  ::a:gnp::L¥:i;:L8hoir  mlBglvingB  or  dig-
The   dlplomatlc  fmBter.   h'`in8t®n  Ctiurchill.   col]-
feg8®d   to  Truman   in  January.   1952!
1`Jie   last   time  you  and   I   eat  acro®g   the   con-
fer®nce   table  was  at  r{.t8dadi,   }`r.   I]r®8iitent.
L5Trumani
16Truman.
YO&rs r`.   177.
C i t i rJ a n .'"   185.
I  mtiBt   corif®s®®   .$1r,   I   held   you   in  very  low
;:g:::1:h£:::ge:e±::#ed  y{'u  t.aking  the  place  of
ln  1948.   Truman's  mother-ill-law.   mrg.   Madge
tiate`S  Walljace.   told  her  friends   in   llld®r.¢nd®rice,   F¥is-
go`iri,   that   it   wits  ca   sheer  wFi8tG   of   tifl[}®  and  effort
for   him   to   camrj€`i&n  against   Tom   D®wey. 18
Perh&pg   one  of  the  reasang   that  Truanan  tJaB  so
underestimated   by   ev®ryon®   w&S   tlii±t  mti&t   r.eopl®
think  of  the  Presidential  o1.i`1ce  aB  being  filled  with
a  man  more  exalted  than  the  av®rtige   {]®rg®n.     Harry
TrLiman  tfa8  not   that  kind  of  person.     I.te   did  mat  feel   I,t
bene€ith  liim   to   talk   to   the   iH&n   irL   tz.i®   3tr©€ta.     Thle
informality  i8  further  attested  to  by  Alfred  Steinberg.
who   stfites:
lie   ct>`+ld  welcome   ISrinc®ss   F,]iEcat}eth   of   EI}gland
with  hoftrtfelt  dignity  when  9h¢  vigited  the  United
hti;t&te8.     Yet   a   few  hourfl   later  he  could  titrow  his      ,
h®&d   back  find   laugh  uT*ro@rlouBly   &t   a   baudy   fltory.
IJ®   inSi8ted  th€it  the  pomp  flttending  t,he  Pre8id®ncy
b®  maintained  to  the  hilt.  alid  tli®  militflry  band
greeted  him   in  the  rsliorriimg  with   ''Hflil   to   tll®  Chief."
Yet  at  nig¥l`t,   once  he  was  away  from  the  limelight
find  tfitliiti  hl8   otfn  quarters,   his  vfllet   8om®times
could   filld  tiim  washing   out   lii8  otfn   Bock8   arid
underwear .19
Although   Trufflcan.   while   I*r®8id®nt,   woe   congt®ntly
underejgtim&ted  by  both  friends  and  enemies   a|ikf!.   tlzrd
although  he  lef t  office  with  the  con£`1dence  of  only
L7st&tem¢t"   by  W|ngt®n  Churchill   cl*.ed   by   L}t®in-
ber8.   pp.   11~12.
]SsteintoL`rg,   p.   12.
L9ERE.,  p.13.
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thirty-two  |iercent  of  the  Am®ric{in  people.   a  m®-qt
unusutil   thing  tiag   happ®n®d  to   the  Truman   irma£;a   flince
he  has`  returned  to  prlv&t®   life.     Host  historiali@  &gr®e
that  it  i8  8tlll  difficult  to  tell  whflt  v®r{]ict  liistory
will  reach  concerning  l]tlrry  S.  Truman.     It  is  intereBtlng
to  note.  however,   thnt  within  Truman'8  own  lifetlriie,
onany   of  tile   hi8torlthn€  agr®®  that  he  must   b€  rtink®d
t€ith   t±ie   strongest   o±-Afa®rlcan  Presidetit8.     The   INew
:_         _                          _            ___      ____
Torts  'rim€S recently  polled  8®v®rity-flv®   hiBt,orithmB
&s   to       air  opinions   coricerning  the  United  r`+t&ttes
PreBidentg.      They   r&t®d  Tr.un€an   @g   a   "n®e*r   #reatfl
PreBidelit.   one   coming  eefter   the   "tfr¢atst',   Ahr€`ham
Lincoln.   {ieor#e  h`'&ahirigton,   ha`oodrow  Wilson.   Thomas
JGr£`©r8on,   and  Frfinklin  itoo8evelt.20       Hcad   this  poll
been  publiflhed  dur-ing  Truman'B  IJfe8idency,   it  tpould
proh8bly,have   t}een  considered  &n   exflg,q®ration  of
Truman'3   Capacity.
How  mucl]   faith   can   be   7)1cac¢d  in   thl3   i:itJll   is
anotti®r  !v.rohlemi   but   it   does   Sh.®w   that   the  Trudmn
lmag®   hGg   become   more   f&v®rBijl®   a8   the   years   !]&sg.
Truman'®   changing   imtige   c€«n  be   ge®n  not   only  in  poiig,
but  ftlso  in  new8|Iapers  arid   in  mag&zin€s.     In  1951.
I:jE±  mag¢L%ine   described  Trumar`'B   fild"ini§trdition  as
f a 1 `i a w a i
llflrry  Truman.   camp.Ieting  his   sixth  year  ®s
Preflident.   Iasit  week  h&{]  written  fl  record  of
courrJ:g®   in  criSeg--in   entinci+-,ttirig  the  Trucaan
lrtoctrin®   tlgains}t   tll¢  CommnniatB   in  fireece  and
Turkey.     ill  liiE   firrm®8g  over   the  Berlin
20"our   r'r®gidGlits3      A   ft€]ting  by   75   }Ilstorians,"
The
____            _
New   York  T3.meg__  _  _I       __.    __    _  _        ___==i     _i *iaga3bi.re.   26   {July   29,1962).13.
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blockfl{]e,   in   the   wfiy   h®   rEAlli®d   hlB   |'>arty   €]nd  w-on
the  19!!8  election.   c±nd   in  his  quick  dccifion  to
ct)unt®r   the  Kor®tln  agre68i{.n.     But  the   six  years
had  provided  lncr®a8ing  t.vl.deric®  of  Shabby  rjolltlcking
€.md  corruptioli  in  his  dtiy-to-day  adhalnistration.
of  doubtg   about  his  State  l}®partm®nt.   and  c`imulcative
di.t€ist®   for   }`iB   car®le83   gov®rnm®ht   by   crony¢22l
W''hen  Truman  wee   rjr®Bid®nt,   h®  vac   admired  for
his   courtige,   but  considered  coarse,   w®iik,   alid  in  many
way   lncomp®tent.      8y   1960,   however,   |>eoT7l®   r®m€mbered
only  Ills   coura€.e.     ±±£±  magazln®.   which  had  b®®n  mostly
antl-Truman  While   he  vaf]  Pr€8idont.   sk®tch®g  hig   Fost-
Prosidentifil  image  a8  follows:
From  his   burdens,   froffl  clio  loyal   but  rutlil®s8
or*poBition.   the  ofl`1ce   g&ina   Strength,   I.tnd   for  more
often  thtlr`  not,   8o  does   the   office  holder.     O)ic®
1`®  served,   then  history  in  a   tender  1.orgetfulnesB,
wraps  ii  kind  of  cloak  around  hint
.    .    .   IIQrry  S.   Truman   gte|ti.ed   down   in  .1955   ami{l
i)1ttern®98   and   cries   of   sc{indal.      But   t,heae  f&d®
a+.ay   into  wry  m®morie8.  w}ille  recollections  r®maln
£:r:;::i¥r]:I:n?e:::13::lil: #:::i;:h:n:t£:r::?8£  the
'l`lIE    TItliMAN   }>]IILOSOI'}lY
Truman's  philosophic  roots.   as   ig  commonly   the
case.   lie  firmly  entr®ncll®d  within  his  rural  falnily
soil.      Born   in   Lcam&r.   MIH8ouri.   on  May   8,1884,   lie  was
denied  a   college   education  bec&u®o  of  hi®   father's
fintlnci&l  rtlilures,   which  rieces8it&ted  his  h®l|>ing
2LnThe   Little  Mfin  b.Ilo  nar®d,"  ±®   LVII
(Ar?ril   23.1951).   24.
22nrio|ii.icg:      A   Greiit   Gtime   and  a   Sight   tt}  13e-
hold.w  ±±±,   49   (July   /i,1960),   Z3-23.
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presence  on  the  family  farm.
Politically,   Truman'B   r)arent®  were   D®mocr*t'.r*_i,
forever  re3entl`ul   ol`  the  R®|iut}lican  I.arty  for  itti  .role
ln  the  Clvll  War  and  ln  the  F.econgtructlon.     |n  later
yec`rg.   Truman  doscrlbed   the  feelings   of  hl8  [tar®nt.3
when  asked  if  he   thought   t!ie  South  was   'ltl   dragn   on  the
I)e"ocratic  r3arty:
I  think  the  South  I.a   coming  around  to  where  it
ought   to  be.     You  8®®,   the  Sout.horn  bloc  va&   brougtit
al]oLlt   by   the  gitutltit.n  after  the  War  Between   tlie
St&teg.     Tliig   gituatio}i  arose   from  the  ltecongtruction
f'.rogram.   and  a   great  many  people   in   the  South  had  a
terribl®  time  getting  over  their  feeling  about  the
Nortl`®     r{y  mother  and  father  never  did  got  over  it.
hut   I  know  th{`t  the  be.¥t  thing  for  the  World.  and
for  the   United  States.   tyti8  what  Lincoln  did   to  make
{i  nfltion  out  of  this   country.     And  we  ore  gradufllly
convincing  the  southerners  tht.]t  lt  tfas  the  best
::l±1T:  i::et:::c::::  :I:<::::8::  ::::in:X.g3th°r.  they
There  are   m{tny  reasons   why  1`ruman  r®meine{l  a
Democrat   even  after  h®  *aB   old  ®nouglt   to  rle®   above
the  political   influence  of  his  parents®     I'®rh@ii®   the
lnost  important   one  ctln  be   best  told  by  'rru"an  hlma®lf :
I  ag8utile   everybody  Jcnow8   that   I   htlve   tllwclys
belonge{l   to   the  Democrtltic   Ilg`rty®      One   of   the  de-
ci{11ng  r®a8on8   I`or   rem*`i{iing  a   Detnocrat.   after
int®n8iv®   study  of  tlie  history  of  the  United
States.   va3   the.t  the  Danocri]tic  I-'arty.1n  the
last   decades   of  the  nille{eelith  century  and   the
first  li&lf  of  the  tveiitieth,   had  alw;`ys   aupF}ort®d
fitrong  ltreBidenta.  while   t,h®  I?epublican  r'arty
hag   been   consttintly   BugT)icioug   or   Strong  ¥'regid®nt8.
even   tthose   of   it.   own   (Teddy  r{{]osevelt),   cand   tiraid
about   .qup}+{}rtlng  rreBldeiiti&l   powers  ancl   t}utie8.
23Tru"`n. Citizen T`.    178.
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The  efforts  1n  the  past  to  hamper  and  restrict
the  office  of  the  I're8idency  fall  largely  into  two
categories--attempts  to  contract  the  inherent
}t':W:::e°:r:}8]:±]:::£adent  €tnd  att®mpt®   to  cause  him
Helng  a   Democrat,   howevt!r,   does  not  ii®ce8stlrily
moan   that  a   person   lH  a   11b®r&l.     Many  Southern  DeHio-
cr<|tg  are  more  conservative   tlmn  t{epuLilicans.     Truman,
uTt.like  jtiB   parents.   became  a   liberal  De"ocl.at.     It  i8
£xppo88ible  to   ®vtlluate  hle  politicf]l   plillo8ophy  trhen
'L:®  flrgt.   entered  T7olltlcB,   bec®u8e   hlB   campnlgnlng  for
the  office  of  8a8t®rn  Judge   ln  Jackson  Couiity  did  not
require  him  to  e]cpr®Ba  hle  viev8   on  national  iBHue8.
I+a  first  ®xpr®.8ed  hifl   liberal  `'i®wpoirit   on  national
lefauee  when  he  ran  for   the   United  Stat®e  Sezlat®   1n
195`1.   vigorously   gu|`portlng  Roo8ev®lt   and   the   N®w   Deal.
W.hen  elected   to  the   senate,   his  Voting  record  from  1934
to  1940  indicates  tlLat  he  lleld   to  a  liberal  phlldsopl]y.
Nevertheless,   I>re8id®nt  l{oosevelt  supported
Tr`uman'8   opponent   in  the   1940  llissourl  primary  on  the
ground8   that  Truman  was   not   protfres8iv®   enough.25     By
1944.   however.   noos®velt  tiad   cl]f]nged  his  nlind,   choosing
`l`rumon  a6   his  running  mtlte   over  many  proclalm®d  lib®rals.
Were   there  any  doubt  aB   to  wtlethor   or  not  Truman  would
follow  a   liberal   program  when  he   b®cuttie  13reB]dent,
they  wore  goon  er-adicated.
I)urlng  the   1948  r]re81dentlal   election  rie
adroBges  his  radio  audj.Once  a5   follov.i
I  &m  h.at]py   to   b®   on   this   T}rogram  tonight   to  pay
trit}ute  to  the   libertll  Spirit  of  the  force®  of  lat7or
24Trumn.  Citizen.   P.   258.
25steinbcr„  [`.   13.
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1n  th.  United  State€®
1n  ?#e.¥::e:a:r:£=::8:p:;n:ft:h:®:::::::t:: :::::.26
Irater  ln  the  program  Truman  ®.c|jlaln®d  what  he
in.ant  by  a   "liberal  philosophy."
F`or  mye®lf  and  for  the  Democratic  Party,   I
com|.1®tely  reject  the  1dea  that  we  Should  ellminete
the  New  Deal.     Inet®ed,  ve  Should  build  upon  a
better  vay  of  llf®.     Let  m®  b®  8p®ciflc!
W®  Should  repeal   th®  Tfll`t-II&rtley  Act.
V®  f[hould  incr®&8®   the  fnlnimun  v®ge  from  forty
c®nte  an  h®ul.  t®  &t   lee.t  &enr®nty-five   oentB  an
h®ur®
Social  Security  ln8urance  &hould  bc  ®xt®nded  to
1&rg®  groups  of  people  not  now  protected.
The  insurance  b®ncfit8  should  be  lncr®A.®d  by
appr®xlmatel}r  fifty  p®rc®nt.
The   f®der.I   govertLment  Should  provide  &1d  to
the  Btato.   1n  neoting  the  ®ducati®nal  ne®dg  of
our  children.
The  CongreeB  Should  pr®vid®  aid  for  Slum  clear-
Anc®  and  low-rent  hou&1ng.
.   .   ®   Thlg   13   the  program  you  can  expect  from
:::  E:::::::i:  £:::¥:27Y°u  Can  ®J[P®Ct  1.£  only  from
Although  much  of  Truman.e  dome8tlc   le/g18l®tlon
voa  blocked  by  Congraee,  Truman  h&8  Blwaye  been  r®-
ep®ct¢d  for  hl8  wlllingri®B8  to  fight  for  hlB  progt`amB.
Truman  bellev®d  that   lt  i8   tlic  duty  of  the  i.I`Q.€1d®nt   to
fight  for  l®glfil&tion.  .a  can  be  eo®n  by  his  attacke
on  the  Republican  Elghtl€th  Congr®s.   (194?-1948).     I]e
has  described  hlB  philoBophy  of  Presidential  l®ad®r-hip
26Exc®rpt8
appearing  in  The
___
from  .(ldr®.a   by  ll®rry  S.  TrunarL
New   York  Tlm®fl
_  -__  __         .   .._    _          ..--,       lT-
27E±.`  p.18.
.   22   0ctiober,   1948.   p®   18.
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tis   follows:
And  so  a   Huccesflful  adthinistration   i8   olie  of
strong  Pr.gid®Iitiai   l®ader8hip.     Weak   1®adershiri--
or  no  l®adershi|)--produceH   failure.   often  chtlo6®
It  produc®8  a   period  of  government  81milfir  to  that
of  other  countries  whlcli  we   think  of  a8  being
different  from  ourselves.    These  are  countri®f.
where  government8  are  continually  fflllliig--where  no
problem   ctln   b®   d®cid®d   becaut]€  tlie   legi8laturo  *'ill
not   Support  any   government  whicli  ]trorio8eg   to  face
!jrot}l®mg   of  real   difficulty.   wh®r®  any  decision
will  b®  unpopular.28
b'l`en  it  came  to  foreign  t`ffairs.  Tr`iman  believed
in  a  Strict  bl-partlean  approach.  aB  ho.  all`eady  been
I)oted   edrlie-r  ln   thl8   chaiit®r.     M{]11y  iteopl€  8tlll   ln€ist
thf\it   the   I)emocrat.     end   tile   LtepubliccanB   have  different
princir)i-8  and  ideas  trlth  reepect8   to  foreign  ]]olicyi
however.   si))ce  World  War   11,   igoLcationign  has   become  a
dead  issue,  and   there  does   not  seem  to  be  partisfln
diffei`.®]ice8   in  the  basic   goals  of  f oreign  policy.     tihen
there  are   ba81c   diff®r®nce8.   tl}®y  are   usual`inj;.   dlfferenc®8
tietween  individuals  and  not  parties.     1`h®  party  in  r}ow®r
will  always   be  attacked  by  the  party  out  of  poveri   in
recent  years,   iieverthel®ss.   the  attfack  has  bet.n  directed
at   the  "®thods  used,   not  at  tli®  basic   goalg.
When  Truman  made   the   d®cif)ion   to  etitcr   the
Korean  conflict   ln  June.   1950,   he   }lad  the  wholehearted
guppor`t  of  the  i{epubllcan  ]'firty. 29 In  his  book  Years
p£  Trial  ±:±±  j±g]±,   £`rulBan   d®gcribeB   tiiE  iti€tliodB   and
his   goerls:
-`'}Trulnfin.
29Trurnan.
Citizen
Y a {, I a
p.   254.
!1 ..-, 5''i.
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.   .   .  As  ]>resident.   I  have  always   triad  to  listen
to  &11   sides   before  a+tproving  what   I   thought  wca®
the  most  balanced  approflch.
I   did  not  lose  sight   o±`  this  appro&ch  when  Xor.€`
broke   on  us.      In  Korea,   the   Communists   chal`Lenged
ufl,   hut  they  were  capable  of  challenging  uB   in  a
similar  way   in  many  places   and,   u-hat  w.'..`   even  more
seriolis,   they  could  if   tiiey  chose.   plunge  us  &iid   the
world  into  another  and  far  more   terrible  war.     Every
decision   I  made   in  connection  wl€h  the`  KorL*an  con-
fl.lot  h.lad   tfii8   one  eiim   in  minii:      to  prevent  a   third
totorld  farar  and  the  terrible  destruction  it  would
bring  to  the  civilized  ttorld.     This  ffleunt  thtit  we
should  not  do  anything  thi`t  would  rjrovid€   the  L`x-
cu8e   to   the  Soviets  &rid  plum
into  full  sctile  all-out  wtli-. 98
t±`e  f}.ee  nations
Thu#,   the   goal   ol`  Truman`s   Korean  riolicy  was   the
limited  objective  of  removing  the  Communists  from  South
Korea,   hut  to  do  so  without   iirovdrking  a   third  World  Wtlr.
SumltY
jiarry  a.   'i``rufB&n  Wag   an   unporiular   }>r®gitlent  wiiile
in  office.     In  addition  to  beln8  g®nerHlly   congid€r®d
by  moSt   political   l®€&der8   as   a   n|itt|e  manw.3&  he
tfag  con8tdntly  underestimated  hy  his  friendfl  and  his
en®ml®s.     Since   he  heLs   left   office,   hovevor,   the  Truman
i"ag€   has   become  widely  regpect®d  and  more  apprtlciated
by   th.I  ~£im®rictln   people.
Politically,   Trumcan  wca8   ca   liberal   Democrtlt,   e}d-
vocati]ig  a   bi-partiBan  |>olicy   in   for®1gn  aff&jr8.     L'i''hen
the   Korean  t*etr   broke  ottt.   his   elitire  policy  w&8   tlirect®d
tow{ird  iemovlng  t}ie  Communlgt8   from  Korea   without  pro-
voking  h.``orld  `¥'ar   Ill.
Y€,{*rs I,,.    5(i5.
5Lw'rhe   I.itt|e   Man  ttyho   1}&r€`t}.'l   :I:iEi   LV]I   (April
23®     1951},    24®
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This   i8   the   lni`11  who   in   1951   di®charg®d  tllB   Far
i;astern  Commander,   General  }lacArthur.   one   in  sti&rp
political  and  I)hilosof,)hlc   contrast   to  }!i'.rtt
CtELFTEIt   11
THE   USHERAL
Cl]A|)1`Elt    11
TttF,    ar+:H&:rtAL
At   8:a{j   I;.   }}i,   on  April   17.   I`J51.   ten   thou8€ind
p®o!jlt]  begari  cti€ering  &8   the
landed  at   the  Sam  I.hrtlnclBco
C®ngtellation  Bfltaan
Airport.1     on  board  wag
General   of  tl`®  Army  Douglas   M&cArthur.   who  hfld  re-
cently  been  strip|t®d  ®f  his  Far  I;astern  posts  by
President   Harry  S.   Trufunn.     Ae   h®  re8clt®d   the   gt-oum.I.
hundredfl  of  people   broke  past  police   lin®8   1n  an
effort   to  catch  a   a,lo fie   glim|>se   of .   or  perh&pS   to
touch. this   ''old soldlerI.who was  returning  to  the
lJnited  States  for  the  first  time  ln  over  thirteen
years.2     ¥tldi|o  a   cannon  ro&r®d  a   seventeen-g`in  Salute.
MacArthur.  with  his  wife  and   Boll.   glruggled  for  over
twenty  miiiutc8   to   get  to  }1iH   car.
In  all  prpbabillty.  mosit  goldi®rg.  if  relieved
of   their   command  by  a   }Jresid®nt,   woilld  return   to
America   in  national   di.grace®     MacArthur.  how®v{3r,
traB   returning  as  a   nation{il   hero.     |±±:g  m€:`.>Lir.in€
tl®8tFrlb®d   his  arrival   in  Sam  Franci8co   .I.   .   ®   as
thougli   ®v®ry  man.   woman.   and   child  had   beet.I   ttlven
a   massive   ghat   €it`  adr®"|in.w3
I"!|er`o'g   Welcome."   £:j£.   .i.VJ}    (t`r.Iri.I   30.19.r=jl).
2'rh®   New   York   Tin]e8
24.
25 -3'! ,
.14`t   *Sp`rckl.    I.9,.~)li    i'u    i.
3wHer.t.s   weiconio."  ee.   LVII   t`riril   3{!.   I?='i).
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The  news   of  i`1{`cArthur'®   dismissal   inflamed   the
Amerlctln  r]ubllc.     j\|mo8t  every  bar  and  street  corner
was   flll®d  with  people  arguing.      In  New  York  two
thousand  longshoremen  quit  work  for  the  day  in  ordel`
to  demonstrate   for  MacArthur.4     Newsveek -gazin®
re[iorted   that  when  a   C&liforni®   liousewlfe   prot®8t,ed
Trum{in'g   d®clsiori   to  her   hueband',   Plr.   Ifenry   I).   New-
combe.   he   b®cafa®   enra&¢®d  and   8maf)hod   a   radio   over   her
head.5     Three   hundred   tlit.uSAnd   tel®gram8   pou]'L.cl   into
Congr(.isgmen,   while  many  R®rjubllc€In  Con8regBm®n   besa]i
their  I,l&ns   to  demand  Truman's   lmpoachm®nt.
On  the  d€iy  following  his  arriv&l   in  Sam  Fran-
clsco.  }ngacArthur  was   invited  to  address  a   lflrge  crowd
in   tlie   .tan  r`ranci3co  Civic  C®nt®r®     lientionlng   ttle
controv®r8y  which  had   hrought  him  honi®.   but   b®1ng
careful  to  save  tti®  defense  of  lii®  position  f or  Ills
ad{lres®   before  Congress.   hiac+`rthur  Btild  in  part:
I   have   just   been  af3ked  lf   I   intended  to  ent,®r
politics®     My  reply  t+'dg   'No`.      I   hf!ve  no  political
aspirtitions  whatever.     I  dc;  not  intend  to  run  for
any  }.iolitlcal   ofrlc®.      I   liop®   that  my  name  will
never  be  used  ln  ti   political  way.     'rhe  only  pot.1tic8
:fh;::.::]o:°E±::&gLefm::1:a:S'nple  Prlrage  L-mown  to  ti].i
MacArthur   next   flew   to  Wa.lLln`¥ton.      {jn  Thursday,
A?)ril   19.   he   €}ddrt?seed  a   joint   meetln`q  {)f   the   House
4}!±iBj!±±.  xxiv||   (April  23.1951),   afh
5ERE-a,I.
6Thiri.'    ,T\.
7r}xcerpt   from   8ttlten]ont   by   I)ouglaB   MacArthur
a|tr`e{'`ring   in   ''Jlero's   h®1cor.ia..'   £±E±,   I,VII    (April   .5¢}.
1951j,   a.i,
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&|id  Sen&te.8     }]®   was   wcarfflly   received   hy  Congresgfflen  of
botri  p,rirtieB,   even  though  many  of  them  r®ali7.®d   that
his   Speech.   tfhicli  llad  I`ot  been  officifilly  cl®cfrred.
alight  result  in   Bevor®   dflfflage   to   the   D®mocrHtic   }J&rty.
Tile   f irest  }2ortion  ol`  his  Bpe¢ch   dealt  with   the   Earogress
m&d®   in  Japan  QS  a   reBtilt  of   tile   United  States     occur}&-
tion.     tr'hen  he   turned  to  the  Korean  question.  he  vac
relatively  mild   in  !iiB  eittackg  on  the  Trtiman  admini8tr&-
t`ioni   but  he  did  litit  fail  t®  defend  strongly  his  I,`oli-
ci®s   whic!t  had   conflicted  with   thoa®  of  tli®  r!regident«
In  all,  h®  Wad  interru¥`ted  aothe   thirty  times   for
ppp1ctu.qe,9
After  he   had   defcrLded   his   policl®S,   the   was
r®&dy   to  make   his   f{.±r®well.      He   8aid:
I  am  closing  my  fifty-two  yecar8  of  military
service.     *'iien   I  joined   tile  Army  even  b®for®   the
turn  o±-the  century.   it  was   tll®  fulfiilm¢nt  of
till  my   boyish   horteg   and   dr€&ffiS.     The  trorLd  hoe
turned   over  iill&tiy   tim®B   g±nce   i   first  took  the   oath
on   the   plain   #£t  W.eat  l`oirit,   and  the   hopes  alid
dr®am8  h&v®  long  slnc®  vanished.     But'I  Still
remember   t}i®  r®frfiln  or  one  of  the  fflost  popular
b&rrack  ball&d8  of  that  day  which  |troclaim®d
most  proudly  that
Old  Boldiera   n®v®r  diei   they `jugt   fade  away.
And  like  the  old  8oldi®r  of  that  bali&d.   I
now  close  n`y  military  cftreer  and  fade  away--an
old  soldier  Who  tried  to  do  his  duty  a8  God  gave
him  t}}e  light   to  see   that  duty.     Good-by.10
8se®   complete.text   ®f  addregg  in  A|]pendix   I.y,
pp.144-151.
9"The   old  Soldier,W  Ei¥.   LVII   {Ar`ril   30.
1951),   21.
lop;xcer|3t   from  a   Speech   t}y   Douglas   riacArthur
appearing  in
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The   effect  of  his  drflmatic  farewell  on  Congro.qs
*ae   degcrib®d  by  £±±±  magazine  &8   follows:
It  vac  a  Spine-tlngllng  and  theatrical  climax®
audaciously  beyond  the  outer  limits  of  ordinal-y
present-day  oratory.     In  the  Wild  crash  of  applause.
many  a   l®gi8l&tive   eye  w{is   wet.     So  were  many  other
®y®e  acro88   the   land  a8   the  nation  turned  from
radlo&  and  tolevieion`  8cr®en€  back  to  office  dutl®e
and  n®gl€ct®d   chores.      Douglas  MACArthur  handed
his  m&nuscrlpt   to  the  cl.®rk,  waved   to  his  wl£`e  in
the  visitors.   gallery,   then  strode  through  the
ch®z!rlng  rove   of  Congre8gm®n.     History  would
refnember   this   day  and  thl8  man.   &iid  mark  him
large,||
Having   complegted   lLiB   addrcB8   to  CongreB8,   Ncac-
Arthur   then  waB   given  a   triumphant  parade   down  Pelin-
Bylvanla  Avenue   to  c®remonie8  at   the  Waahlngton
Monument.      r}®fore  "or®   than   250.000  peolil®  M®cArthur
Spoke   on   the   ha#ic  Am®rictin   r}rincipl®g   which  h&v®  made
America  a   great  n@tlon. 12
On  April   20.   McacArthur  received  an   ®xuber®nt
welcome  from  the   City  t}f  New  York.     Tl`.  parade   began
and   ended  at  the  Wcaldorf-A®torla  llot¢l.   and  cov®r®d  a
route  ol`   over  nineteen  mll®8.     |±±±  magazine  d®f[crlb®d
his   New  York  welcome  8s   follova:
f``rom   the  moment   the   g®neral'g   motorcade  moved
off.   the  clty'.   gretht  tow®re--which  Stood  cl®:in
and  glowing  L!nder  a   bright   blue  Sky--resounded
to  a   flowing  torrent  of  sound.     At  t}`®  tip  ot`
Mar.h€`tten  it   incr.aged.     Shlp8  and   tugs  lent
their  whi8tl®   to  the   din.     T`licn,   lower  Broadway--
the   financifll   di8trict'8   C&nyon  of  13®roes  began
to  resound  to  tlie   clap  of  |iolic€  hor8ee.   the
crash  of   brags   b@n{18,   a8   pt*re]der8   riioved  out   to
letld  "acArthur  a  unil®   to  City  Ht`11.      t}1story'8
grefitest  foil  of  pdp¢r,   ticker  tape,  ati{l  torn
tLWThe   old  Soldier.''  :i:±.   LVII   (+`pril  30.
1951),   25.
[2l±:±i  ±±£;±=±  ±£±£!:±$  3:±£££L.    20   A|Jrlli    1951.    P.    I.
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tel®rjhon®   Ltooks    (2.850   tons)    c6i8c€`ded   down.
filling  the  8tre®t  ankle  doc.p.     |t  fell  so
:#:C:::a:`:ro:  ::¥:v:J&&::n±:st:::I:::i3ly  blurred
j=±£±  fnc`gazlnc   described   t.}1®   +Vow   York  welcome
a6   followsi
.   .   .   Ag   his   [ful{|cArthur.g7   c€`r   moved  Slowly
thro`i,er,h  nineteen  miles   of   the   city   8tr®®ts.   rtl±ines
wrote    'Welcom®   ]Iome'   1n   the   Sky   above   hilti,    .    .    ®
A't   City   ]]all   eighteen   rTe{]pl®  w®r®   bruised  anfl
trampled  as   the   General   Stepped
f ew  word®   to   the   crowd  of  flbout :8:o:3.iay  a
It  would   eeem   to  dBost  |i®ople   that  nnythirig
t`ollowing   the   grtlnd®ur   of   the   New   Y®rk  welc{jme  would
b®  tlntl-climactic;   for  MacArtliur.   riowever,   it  va8
merely  tlle  beginning.     For  the  next  y.ar  €`.nd  a   half .
he  made  numerous  at`pearance8   ill  Various   citi€.
ttiroughout   thor  country.     F.&ch   city  I)rovid®d   its   own
t`imultuou8  welcome.      Iri  July.1952,   MacArthur  gerv®d
&s   the   keynote   spedrker   £`or   the  R®publican  Njitional
Convention  ln  Chicflso.   thug   concluding  his  gltectnculcar
r®ceptlon   by   the   United  `StateB®
THE   MACAHTliuca    IMAGE:
Af   mi,LlionB   of  Americans   gBth®r®d   on   gre(.t
avenuo8   to  welcome   hoitl®  General  Hacj\rthur.   t,hey  were
welcoming  more   than  a  war  hero.     Norman  Vlncent   P®Ql.
®xplaln®d  what  M&cArthur  m®ont   to   the  American  people
when  h®   said:
No  mtlll   (t£`   oul`  time   i8   more   authentict*11y   the
L3nr|ero.a   tre|com®,"   :E:jiE.   LVII    (AL+ril   50®   1951).
2,4.       T
]`±"'rrle   i}e[.rtiest  \+t{!1co"e   i.,verr  ±±£±,   31   (April   30i
1951),    30--51.   `     `.,
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voice  or  real  America   than   Douglq.  Mac.,\rthur®     To
millioti8  who  lined  the   8treetg  of  our  great  citle8
to  cheer  and  weep  fig  he  passed  by,   he   is   the  per-
aonification  of  Am®ric{in  tradition  and  history.   .   a   .
In  this  atolwart.  rolt]antic  figure,   the  great
hopes,   dr®f.ms,   and   ldGal8   of   our   cou}ltry  came   to
life  again.     If®  8tiri`tulates  reliew®d  faitll   that   the
::::s°frLh':z8LZ®]±::::t8J:ff:::°::a:::. ±3ncoln  8 till
ThtJS.   General  M&cArthur   can  be  `'iewed  a8  an
ideoliz®d,   romantic  fit5ur®  repre8®nting  to  many  rieople
the  piolieering  spirit  and  courage  which  Americans  have
altfays  revered  a3  a  part  of  their  great  h®rltage.
:[±±±  magazine  described  the  romantic  effect  of  the
MacArthur   i"ge  ®s   fol].ow8:
A   good  many   in   ttie   crowd  &av  Dougla8  n&cArthur
as  a   symbol  of  a  kind  of  i}atrit>tlsm  that  still
existed   for   them  even  lf  ®opliiEtlcate8   d±smiBs®d
it  as   old-faghiDned.16
Perhep8   one   of  the  major  reason&  Why  General
Mac^rthur  has  r®pregented  the  American  ideal   1.  that
to  most  A"erlcan8  he  was  a   man  of  mystery,   known  to
them  only   through  picturc&  and  through  newBpar]er
accou.Its.     IJrior   to  l`ig  recall,   he  had  not  been  in
the   U]iited  States   in  over   thirt®{!n  y®ar8.     The  American
people  had  never  been  given  the  op[}ortunity   to  cheer
hl"  for  his  heroic  featB  aa  Supr®m®  Allied  Corrrmnder
ln  the  Pacific   during  World  War   11.     They  lrad  never
had  a   chance  to  rtral8®  him  for  Ills  work  as  head  of  the
L5A   statement   by  Norman  Vincent  }'eal®
in  the   .llritroductionn  of  r)ougla8  l{acArthur,ts± Nation
appearing
Hevitaliz-
editied  by  John  M.   Jtratt   (Chicago
lieritfi`!;.e  Foundation.   Inc.,1952).   p.   5.     Hereafter
referred  to  a8  MacArthur. Notion.
]6M|ero'8   Welcome."  EiEE®   LVII   (April   39.
1951),   24.
The
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United  State.  Occupation  Porce8   in  japan.  which  had
turned  a  war-time  en®tny  into  a   close  ally.     Tl`ey  had
never  been  glvcm  a  chanc.  to  gee   this   great  general
who   they  knew  wa.a   destined   to   tiAk®  his  rtlac®   in  hlatory
with   other   groat    h®roeB      &uch  &8  hi+a8hintorL,   Grant.
Leo.   +tcrshilig.   find   F`ar±.`f.igut.      When  I-tacArtliur   returned,
their  oiir}ortunity  canie.  €and   they  ®xpre8ged  their  grati-
tude,  mingled  with  nogtf*lgic  joy  for  tl&cArthur`8   d®ede
and  with  vitriolic  contem|tt  for  Truman'&  tLct  of  die-
t[lisBal.     A8  millions  T>our®d  out   their  heortf®lt   thtinka
to  }!tic^rthur.   tl`®y  prniBed  not  only  his  personal
accomi`liEliments.   hut  also  the  accompli.hment8   of  many
great  men  t®ho  held  built  a   great  Am®r|ca.L7
l\.nile  Mtic^rtliur  wflf   the  per8oiiiflc.`tion  of   the
Am®rici*n  dr®flm.   he   was   also  &`   Strong,   impregslve-
looking  man.     E±E±  magaF+1n®   de8crlbed  his   general   im-
pression  aB  follows:
i)ouglas  HacArtliur  wt!s  the  personification  of  the
big  man.   with   the  many  a{lmlr®rg  Who   look   to  a   great
:::s€°:n:e:::=g:`±:igw:::,:)I:o£;:a::::i::y:?:8`±±B-
MacArthur's   image,   therefore.  tJas  not  only  a
rofndntlc.   1deallzcd  lmag®   of  a   great  Amerlc8n  hero
who  repregerited   the   gr.cat  lierocg   of  the  American
tradlt.ion,  but  he  Wag  also  fi  bulwark  of  gtrentgth--
the  type  of  Clan  that  people  n6iturally  loo!t  toward  for
1®L`dership.     The  problem  was   that  Tr`trmn,  not  }{acArthur.
wag   in  a  position  to  rtrovide   the  lead®rghip.
Nation
L7Norman  Vinc®nt  P®nle   appearing   in  }IacArthur.
p.   5.
[8wLitt|®  Man  Who   Dared."  =±.   I,VII   (April  25®
1951),   24.
:.y;,¢fIr'.  'L I 8 R A R v
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Q®ner®l   Douglas  MacArthur  was  born  on  Bn  army
p®®t  at  Fort  Little  Rock.  Arkansas.  on  January  26.
1880.     FranclB  trev®lyen  miller  quote.  MacArthur  tie
Baying.   »rtyr  ®arli®.t  r®coll®ction  i&   the  Sound  of  erdy
bugi®®.wL9    Hid  father.   General  Arthur  HacArth`l]h
provided  him  not  only  with  a  mllltary  ®nvirorm®nt.  but
also  with  the  ideal  of  courAg®oue  attainment.     The
eenlor  14acArthur  was  a  v®t®ran  of  th.  Civil  War  and
va.  a  p®r8onal  friend  of  many  lndl&n  fightcrB.  includ-
ing  Buffalo  Bill.ae    |n  the  SpanlSh-Amerl¢an  War  of
1898.  h®  beca"®  a  hero.  tlnd  was  mad.  military  Governor
of  the  Phlllppln®e  vh®n  the  v.r  v&B   t®rminet&d.     R®cal-
11ng  his  f.th®r'$  1nfluenc®  on  hl.  polltlc.I  thinking.
Dougl&a  lfacArthur  etat®d  at  the  1952  Hepubllc®n
Conv.ntlon:
I  &pe®k  with  a  a.nee  of  prld®  that  all  of  my
long  life  I  have  b®®n  .  n®bber  of  the  R®publlcan
:::::£t::  ::f:::a::nw::n:gL::£±er.  an ardent
Pollovlng  hle  graduetl®n  et  West  Point  ln  1903.
wh®r.  he  vac  first  in  hle  class  with  one  of  the
high.Bt  gred®  av®rage8   1n  the  lii8tory  of  the  ^c&deny.
Douglas  MacArthur  B®rvod  in  v`arlou.  posts  until  World
War   I.     Connil8sion®d  to  lead  hl8  famous   I.Ralnbo*
[9Fr®ncis  tr®v®lyan  Mlll®r.
19        ,  p.   31.
20Ei±..  p.  32.
2LExcerpt  from  speech  by
fienerol
14ac^rth`;Lr   (Philadolphla3     The  John  C.  Wlnston  Conipany,
&ppearlng  ln  The  Hew
..__
York  Tlme®
DOuglag
Dougleg  14acArthur
8  J`lly,   1952,  p.   18.
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Divigion''   in  fr`rfinc®,   ,ng&cArthur,   hy   tile  end  of   the  w4`r,
had  been  twice  wounded  and  once   gassed ,   had  won  thir-
teen  med€`tls.   seven  citations  fiTid  twenty-four  foreign
decorditions.   and  li&d  been  I)rcrmoted   to  t}ie   rank  of
brigadier  goner.I.22
*`fter  he  &rriv®d  in  the  United  Stfites,   he  was
appointed  Superintendent  of  fu-eat  Point  from  1919   to
19*?2.     Throughout   the  l9aols  he   #erved   in   t.he   United
!3t#t®S  and  in  the  I;hiiiiipine8  until  1930.  when.   at   the
ag+a   ®f   fifty,   he  wtls  a}3point®d   the   youngest   CJiief  ®±`
Stcaff  in  iiistory. 23
Altl`ough  ho  was  a   rtrofess®d  it®L"blic&r„   few
peoijle  r®€il.1y  know  the  full  extent  of  H&cArthur's
political  pliilo8ofihy  ttntil  h®   ogrenly  ®x})re8god  his
oppo81tion   to  f*rfinklln  D.   2toosevelt'8   New  rjeal.
Frazi®r  Hunt   describ®*q   lli3   feel.1ngB   flbout   the   New  i)e&l
a8  follows3
What  alarmed  +lacArthur  wets  the  definite  turning
away  by  tile  flew  &tlministrtltion  frorm  certain  old
concepts  of  Strict  constitutional  g®vern"®nt  with
•       more  €ind  i"ore  power`  beillg  concentrated  in   the
hcands   of  the  Chief  ffjcecutive.     HacArthnr  had  been
brouglit  up  a   Strict  Confatitutionali8t,  and  h®
was   deeply   concerned  over   t!i®  8o"ewhtit  radicenl
turn  of  affinirs  resulting  from  the   growing  T>ower
of  the  leftist  New  n®fller8.     Ilo  made  little   effort
to  hide  ftis  alarffl  froffl  the  President.24
I]re&ident  ltoijsevelt   Boon   lefjrned   thi``t  his  Chief
of  Staff  va3  a   Strong  corLserv&tive.     lie  fr®qut3ntly
called   Mac+Arthur   to   t)i®  tw`riite   }ious®   to  &8k  his   ad-
vice  dib{)ut  varj+ou8   pieces   of  New  neal   legislation.
a2"ac,\rthurls   c&irt£®r.W  gife,   LVII   (Ai*ril   23.
1951,   24.
23Eii±.'   24.
24r`r&zier  !tunt.
HacArthur   (Hew  York:
p.   15   .
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W.hen  HacArthur  asked  Ttoo8evelt  why   he   always   gou&ht   his
advice  on  m&tter8  wriich  did  not  perttiin  to  military
Off.`ir8.   !!oo8®v®1t   replied:      WIJougl&®,   you  are  my  Ameri-
can  conBc|ence.N25
It  Va8  not  m®r®ly  on  political  matters  that   the
Pre8idelit  ana   jii.  Chl®f  of  Staft`  dl8Qgr®ed.   }lacArthur
was  concerned  abi>ut   the  military  unrtrep®r®dneg8  o±`   the
united  States   throughout  the   1930'8.     I!oo.®velt  w&B
also  conc®rne{l  €ibout  Americd's  mllitcary  strength.   but
both  were   confrolited  with   a   Congr®s8  whicli  *-a8  re-
luct..ant  to  arrant  a  large  budget  for  the  Army  and  to
pa8s  le!¥iBlatlon  calling  for   com¥jul8ory  mllitnry  3er-
vice®     Mac^rthur  wag   infuri&t®d  when  ltoo.evelt  failed
to  8upp.ort  his  requ®stg  to  Congress.     On  one   occasion.
Mac^rthur  called  on  Roosevelt  to  pr(}te8t   the  fact  tliat
ti.ie  Army  budget  had  been  slashed  in  order  to  pay  for
the  Civilifln  Coli®orvation  Corps.     ri`razier  Hunt  has
d®8crib®d  the   incident  a8   follow8!
lle[McacArthu4     in®1et®d   that   h®  w.caB   in   no  way
usurpi*ig  civil  &uthorlty.     Coi`8reas  rightly  li®ld
the  purse  strings  of  tall  ®xpenditures.     But  this
was  a  matter  of  life  or  {]eath  for   the  ^rm®d  ForceB
£`nd   the   country.      It  vas   tlie   )'>rcBid®nt'8   duty  to
throw  liiB   great  weight   on  t]`®  Side  of  nt`tional
Becurlty.
Sh€`rp   words   were   ®xcl`€ing®d.      Mac^rthur,   who  had
7}rid®d  himself  all  his   life  on  jLi3  cool  detach-
ment  ill  the  face  of  c®nl`1ict,  now  felt  his  self-
control  begiiining  to  we8k®n.     He  vaB   con8ciou8  of
the  significance  of  th.  fit§ht  he  was  making.     He
could  not  retreat  in  hid  argumont8  or  in  his  de-
mand®.     Ile  felt   that  hl8   country'B   Safety  was  at
Stake.   @Iid  that  if  n®c®ssary.   he  voula  gacrlflce
his   own  prof®a8ional  career.     HIB   gens®   of  duty
25stdt®ment   by   F`ranklin  it{]ogevt}1t   cited  by
Hunt,   p.171.
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Wtls   clear  e`nd  undeniable.26
Thus   it   wag   that   General  MacArthur   b®cam®  cac-
cu8tomcd  to  ®xpreBsing  liis  views  on  political  matters
to  the  I>r®sident.     Inrle®d.   ttooBevelt   encouraged  him  to
do  sol   &I]d.   although   the   two  disagreed  ..iolently  on
certain  mfltt®rs,   it  was  MacArthur'g  will   th&t  occagion-
ally  provt`Ll®d.     Roo8evelt'8   great  respect  for  Mac~
Arthur  can  be  evldenced  ln  hl&  parting  words  to  the
Genertll  as  the  latter  left  for  duty  in  the  Ilhilippineg
in  1935,  after  having  completed  l]is  term  ag  Chief  of
Star.`f .      Roo8®V®lt   gaid:
Douglas,   if  war  should  suddenly  come.   don't
volt  for  ord®rB  to  rett.Lrn  ham..     (arab  the  first
trtln8]}ortation
mend  my   €irmi®s. ¥;u  carl   rind.      I   w{`nt  y{in   to  com-
In  1951.   }{{ICArthur  @gflin  risked  his  militetry
career  ln  order  to  expreB.  his  vlewg  which  he  vei8
convinced  w®r®  right.     Unfortunately,   I>re81dent
Truman.   unlike   Roo8®velt,   would  not  acquieBc®   to   his
demand8.     Tri®  result  was   the   end  of  HacArthur'S
c8rear.
G®neral  }*&cArthur'®   conservative  view.  were  not
only   evld®nt   ln  Ills   opF]ositlon   to   the   New  D`®al.   but
also   1n  his   8peeche8  which  h®  made   after  his  r®c€ill.
1118   chief  aide.   Major   Gener{`l   Courtney  W'hltney.   quotes
}facArtliur  as   Saying,
The  past   twenty  yetlr.a  have  vltncgged  art  in-
ceasant  encrotichit}.eat  upon   the   cai!italiBtic
System   t]`ruu`qjli   the   direction  of   o`]r   own  public
26iiunt.   }j.152.
27st.ite"ent  by  F`rflnkiin  !`{oosev®1t   cited  by
I,lunt,   p.171.
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policy.     This  has  left  our  free  economy  badly
bruised  and  sev®r®ly  tried.   .   ®   .  +\noth.r  and
yet  more  Berloue  agBault  upon  the  capitalL8tic
system  has  been  the  1]icrea8ingly  ortprosp,ive
government  levi®.  urton  both  capital  and  profit.
The  principle  underlying  8uch  l®vie8  has  not  I.eon
to   e£]uallze   tri®   bt]rd®n   of  tn®®ting  the   legitimate
costs   of  gov®rnm®nt  by  t`   just  and  uniform  as8e8s-
ment.   but  has  followed  inst®Ad  a   congpiratorlal
design,   origirifilly  evolved  by  K&ri  Marx.   to  first
w®&k®n  and  then   to   d®strov   the   c{ittltt'.`listic
£8d  then  to  destroy   the  c{iitltt'.`listica y a t ®B, .
At   the   1952  ]{®publican  Convention  MacArthur
furtlier  ®xpreg8®d  his  co]icern  about   the  sr.irlt  of
America  being  crualied  by  oppr®gsive   ta]cation.     I{e
gaid!
Our  p®opl®  are   deep®rate  f or  a   plan  wriich  will
reviv.  hope  and  r®8tor®  faith  aB   they  f eel  the
oppressive  burden  of  tlie  tax  levy  upon  every  sour®e
of  revenue  and  upon  every  property  tran8actioni
as  they  gee  astronomically  rising  put}lic  debt
heavily  mortgaglng  the   1ndugtry.   th.  well-being
and  opportunity  of  our  chi,ldr®n  {ilid  our  children'.
children ....   Th®r®   18  no  plan   to   tran8forfp
®xtravagflncc  into  1`rugality.   Ilo  d®.ire  to  regain
economic  and  fl8cal  stability.  no  prospect  of
return  to  rugged  idcflli8m  and  collective  trtln-
quility  of  our  fatl`®ra.29
In  Revltallizin a  Nation
-       __i__  __    I___  _._  _
}lacArthur  explained
why  he  beli®ved   t!iat   'la  return"   to  the   forces   of  tli®
past   is   desirable.     He  Bald!
Our  gr®tit  strengt}i  reBt8   in  those  high-minded
and  r}atriotic  Am®ric&n8  whose  faith  in  God  and
love  of  country  tr&nscpn{]fl  all  selfish  and  gell`-
8®rving   i(18tinct3.      tw`e   D`]ust   command   their   maximum
effort  toff&].d  a  restoration  to  public  and  privflt®
38Excerpt   from  &T]eech   by   Douglas
cited  by  Major   General  Courtri®y  Whitney.
His .Rendezvous  with  l]i#tory   (Now   York:
EE5pf.195D),   pTi35.
2t\r3xcorpt   from   Speech   by
app®®ring in  The   New   York  Ti"ea
MacArthur
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Gener&l  Mac4rt.hur
.   8  July.   1g52i   a:   18:
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relati®nfihip3  of  our  a#e-Old  stand®rd8  of  mor;llity
i*nd  Sthic8--a  return  to  the  r®ligiou8  f erv®r  which
animdited  our  Leaderghlp  of  former  years   t®  chtlrt
tl   c®ur8¢  of  humility  and  integrity  a8  b®at  to
gerv®   the  t]uf]lic   interest.30
The  unique  a8¥]ect   ®f  MacArthur'E  phlll3ophy
i8   not  his  conEervfltigm,   but  his  tgillingn®a#   to  ex-
pr®sca  publicly  his   vi®wfl,   ev®n  tfhen   they  conflicted
with   those   of  his   superiorg.     Although  en&ny  h&V®
8ev®rely  criticized  FTac*rt}iur  for  his  public  opp®gi-
tion  to  rLis   Suri®riorg,   h€  *&a   adament  ln  his   3®lf-
dGfen3e.      I\le   3tcated:
I   have   l}e®n   wtli-ned   by   mcany   th¢^,it   &ri   outapokeri
course,   ®vGn  if  it  h®  #ol®ly  af  truth.  will  t3ring
down  upon  my  he&d  ruthlGHB   ret&1i+Stion--th{2t   efforts
vlll  he  made   t®  deLqtroy  public  ftlith  in   t}le   ln-
tegrity  of  my  vi®wE--not  tSy   force  of  just  argurmant
foul   by  tli®   aripllc{.ttion   of   trte   ralffi®  m¢thode   ol-
pro|7&gesnda.      I   am   told   ±n   effect   th4Tfit   I   mt*st
blindly  follow  the  leflder--it®®p  Silent--or  take
the  bitter  conBetiu8nc€£.      I  had  t.h®ught   Abrah{]"
Lincoln  had  pirmed  down  for  till  time   this  ugly
code  when  he   declfir®ds       'To  sin   I.y  Silence  wii®n
the}'   should  I.>rot®st  z#[ak®8   covardB   o`jt   of  caen. '51
Thus,   General  HflcArtllur  I)ever   kt.pt   8il®nt  when
convinced  h®  w&8  right.     Although  MflcArthur'S  political
viow8   contrB8ted  with   thoSt?   of  13r®ald®nt  TrtamarL,   it.
tva8   IfacArtl`ur'6   views   on  Vcr   thflt   cthtised  hire   to
publicly   diBagr®®   with   the   i.tre€ide)it.     Trulacan   cl¢.iian-d
tlt€Rt  M&c.4rthur'8   vietfg   on  war   cotild  nt}t   b®   {iivorced
from  }§€ScArtz`*ur'8  views   colic®rning   international  re-
ifltiu*ii   wlien  }!cacj\rthur   ®xFred.,¢d  his  {i31litflry  views,
3°h}cacr\rthurt Nfition
Slug..  I,.15.
p.   15.
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Truman  con81dcr®d  him   trying  to   influence   ^,\merican
forolsn  f`+o|icy.52
It   18   triie   that  Ma,c*/+rthur  vo&   opposed   to
'l`ru.n.1n's   for®i.t5n  policy.     After  tltorld  hrar   11.   Trum{.n
lmd  directed  America'B  foreign  pplicy  towf*rd  rebuilding
and  r®gt®rin&  Europe,  end  defending  lt  against  Com-
munlsD.     }IacArtriur   b®,11ev®d  t))iB  apriroach   to  be  fnig-
dlrectcd.     He  said:
It  8®®m®   strtmg®ly  difficult  for  some   to
r®calla,e   that  here  in  Asia   is  vher®   the  Communlgt
conspirator.  have  el®ct®d  to  znake  their  play  for
global   cot:qu®f]t.   and   thf`t  we  tair®   joined  the   iSsue
thuB  rt`1s®d  on  the   battlefi®ldi   thflt  lier®  we
fight  Eur®pe'8  war  with  arms  while   the  diplotttlt.
otlll  fight  it  with  uorda:   ththt  if  we  lose  the
war   to  Communl8D  in  A3i&   tJt®  fall   ®f  Europe  is
i)1evltabl®.  win  lt  and  ftur`ope  most  probab
would  avoid  war  alid  yet  pre8®rv®  freedom.
Tr,18  author   iB   convinc®t]  that   it  was  precisely
this  denunciation  of  Trumanlg   l'Buro|t®  l'`irgt"  r]olicy
that  re8ult®d  .1n  llacArth`ur'8  recall.     In  addition.
MacArthur 'fi   Staunch  viewpoint   toward  wtlr--total
ab8tinanc®  or  total  pflrtici|.ittloi`--might   conceivably
heave  been  a   contrlbutive  f+actor   in  hl8  recall.     In
accefsing  the  Fractibility  ol`  war  in  this  modern  ctge,
}iacArthur  explain®d!
No  ir.an   in   tLle  World   if  more  aiixio`IS   to  avoid
the   expanBlon  of  war   tllan  I.     I  .am  a   one  hundred
percent  di8believer.  in  war.     The  enormous  sacri-
I`ices   th¢qt  hfive  b®en  brouglit  about  by  sci®ntlfic
methods  of  killing  have  rend®r€d  a  w{tr  a   fanta®tlc
32Trum&n.   Years,   p.   442.
c±tedb;38¥£=Epfe£:OE038±£±tfi:c£¥t]¥ELu8Lt:e:a:::±¥ur
lHenry  llolt   and   Company,   1952   i   rl.   5      .
tind  imrjoBsible  ni®tllod  for  the   Solution  of   irit®r-
ncational  diffic`iltio8.34
Yet.   d®grtite   the  fact   that   Genertll  MacArthur
colisidered  war  a  Ben'8elc8B   solution  to  internationell
r,roblems,   for  him  there  was  no  concept  of  a   ''limit®d
war."     While  Truman  tfflnted   to  prevent   a  widening  ol-
tli®   Korean  conflict   into  World  War   Ill.   MacArtllur
denounced  tile  policy  of  limited  war   in  his  addr®g8
to   Congreg8,   by   Saying:
.   .   .   Efforts  have  been  made   to  distort  my
pc8ition.     It  has  been  Bald  in  effect   that  I
am  a  v.:irmonger.     Nothing  could  be  further  from
the   truth.     I  know  war  as  few  othc.r  men  now  living
know  lt.  and  nothing  to  me  lB  more  revolting ....
r]ut  once  war   i®   forced  upon  us.   th®r€   i8  no  other
alternative  than  to  apply  every  available  means
to  bring  it   to  a  Swift  end.    h'ar.8  very  otjject
18  victory--not  |irolong®d  indecision.     In  war.
indeed.   there  can  be  no  ®ub8tit`ite  for  victory.
SU}thIARY
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}Jresid®nt  I]arry  S.   Truman  and  General  Douglas
MacArthur  are   extremely  di8Bimiler.     Trut8an  has  alvay8
been  liberali   MacArthur  has  always  been  conservative.
Truman  believed  tlmt.   a8  I;r®8idcnt   of  the  United  Sttltes,
his   ord®r`g  and  autliority  should  not  b®  publicly
questioned  by  8ubordinategi   MacArthur  believed  that  it
was  }iis  personal  duty  to  proteBt  the  decision&  of  llig
superiors   if  he  wag   convinced   +,}itlt   they  were  wrong.
34MflcArthur.   Nation.   pp.   15-16.
35F,xcerpt   from  a   gpeech   by   Dou&1ns  }iacArthur
a P P e ,`.I r 1 n 8
p.   4125.
in   Coll ressional  i{ecord April   19,   1951,
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Truman  wag  an  unrjopular.  Pregid®nt  with  tlie  public
image  of  a   'Ilittl®  man"i   lt&cArthur  conveyed  not  only
the  image  of  a   nbig  man",   but  also  stood  as  a  romantic.
ideallzed  figure.in  whom  Am®ric&n8   ear  America'e   great
heritage.     Truimn  believed  ill  a  foreign  policy  directed
totfard  a   "F,urope   !t`irst"  pliil®gophyi   MacArthur  bellev®d
that  j\merict`n  foreign  policy  should  b®  centered  in
Asia  where   the   Communists  were  making  th®1r   bid  for
wol`ld  power.     Truman. beli®v®d  ln  l'indting  tlic  Korean
conflict  to  Korea  in  order   to  avoid  t..'orld  War  Ills
MtlcArthur   believed   in  ®xteridiiig   tl`®  war   to   the  "&in-
lflnd  of  Ch.ina   in  order   to  flvoid  defeat   in  Koret]®
Tl`ieir  Jforean  policieE  refl®cted  Truma]i'£   lio!7e   for
`.containment,"   a&   oppofI®d   to  HacArthur'S   hope   for
'lc{tmplete  victory."
h'hen   two   such   OPT)o8ite   men  attempted   to   eataL}-
li8h  a  policy  in  the  Fcar  F}a8t.   the   cliiBh  that  followed
Be®mg   quite   iti®vltabl®.
CIIAPTER   Ill
PREEL}OH  AND   FRUSTRATION
CilAPTEtt   Ill
Fj.tF.EL}{)M   AND    i;.j{USTRAT10N
I'rior   to  +\uesu8t,1945.   when  the  United  St&te8
occupation  forces  lflnd®d  ln  Hor®a,   there  were  pro-
bably  f ev  Americans  who  kn®v  firLything  about  horefl
other  than  thfit  it  was  a  distitnt  land  in  Asia  which
vag  a  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire.
Rorea  wQ8   originally  an  Asian  kingdom,   depend-
ent  on  China  until  the  Sin®-Japcane8e  t*'ar  of  189/1-
1895.     Japan,   the  victor  in  th&t  conflict,   begfln  to
extend  its  influence  in  Korea  until   the  F.orean
government  became  a   pu|Tpet   government   controlled  by
t}ie   Ja|]tT}nese   }Jfflperor.      In   1910.   Jtlpan   firin®xed   Korea
am{.I   trecated   it  a3  a   conquered  province.
In  the  years  following  the  annex&ti®n.  Japan
pursued  a   policy   of   Wagsimilation",I     {\|n  atteni}`t   to
absorb   the   Itor®an  people   ig&to  i,Ilo  LJtlp&|ne8e  nationality
and  to  make   them  i`orget   that  they  Were  Hor®anE.     Thi.5
policy.  however,   ®xt®nded  for   thirty-fiv€}  y®ara,   did
not  €iccompliBh  its   ol.j®ctlv®:     Korean  nationalism
rein.lined  alive.
In   Hovemb®r.1943.   Pr®gldent   I.r&nklin  l{oogevelt
LRe|`neth   ``,:cott   L&tour®tt®i
T¥?TT|7TH3.
2ng..  p.  515.
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of   the   United   .`3tates,   j`rim®   rSinist®r  WinBton  Cliurc]lill
of   Hnglan{],   and   rien®rnlissimo   Chiang  K€ti-8hek  of  Cl`inB
met   in  Cairo.   H;gy}it.   to  digcu8s   rut,ure  arrangements
ln   the  Far   I.?&gt  Which  woLLld   s.o   into   effect  i ollou'ing
the  defeat  of  Ja|tan.     The   three  agreed  that  riost-
't*`orld  War   11  Asia  must   inclu(le  a   free  a)id   ind®|tendent
liorea.     The  Joint   Communique.   which   they   1&sued  ®t
the  close  of   tt`i®  conf®r®nc8,   said  in  part:
I'resid®nt   [toos®v®lt,   Generalissimo  Chiang  Ktii-
sh®k.   find  I.rime  rllnister  Cliurchill.   tog®th®r  with
their  r®sp®ctive  military  and  dipLotH&tlc  advisers,
have   compl®t®d  a   confer®nc®   in  North   Africa.
The  following  general   8tat®rment  was   issued:
The   gever&1   military  mlBff ions   have  agreed  upon
future  milit€`ry  operation.  agailist  J€`pnn.     Tli®
Three  rireat  AILie&   ex[7reBsed  their  retlolve  to
bring  unrelenting  pressur-a  against  t.heir  bi`utal
enemies   by  g®a.land,   and  air.     This  I)r.sgur®
i8  alref2dy  rising.
The  Three  riret`]t  Allies  are  fighting  thl8  war  to
restraiti  and  punlSh   the  oggrefigion  of  ~Yapan.     They
covet  no  gal.n  for   themselves  arid  hflve  no   thought
of  territorial  ®xpdn8ioli ....   The  afor®gaid'rliree   Great  r>®wers.   mindful   of   the   enslavement   of
tl`e   peopltl  of   Korea,   are   tletiJ.I.mined   t}iat   in   due
cc"rs®   liore€I   r..hall   become   free  and  ind®pend®nt.
uiter.   in   DCcemb{!r,1943.   r{oosev®lt  ai`d  Churcl`ill
met  witli  ]'ren`)ier  Jose|ili  Stalin  of   the  Soviet  Union  at
Teher&n.   Iran.     Stalin  8aid  that  h®  a|]proved  of   the
Cairo  Declaration.   but  h®   felt  tliat   FLorea  would  m`e€d
a   periot,I   of  ap7'irentic®ghlp   before   comT)l®te   independ®nc®
might  be  obtained.4
3wjoint   comuuniq,ue   on tlie  Cairo  Coi`f erence  of
December   1,1945,"   €`ppe€;ring   in
j\ a dr c a a e g
J.    .itoserrl€,I.|ltew  Yorki
of  F`ranklin  D.=
1`hc   [JUL)lic
.             .          _    _                        .                      _                          _                      __I
ltooeevelt
Jmrp¢r   tlntl
pp.   530-531.
4Trum®n,  i±.  p.   316.
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ItooBev®lt,   Cii`irchill,   |nd   i-Stalin  met  again  at
the  Y{ilta   Canferenc®   in  Fob-ruary.   1945.     I`oosevelt
br:'.ught  up   the   Subject   or   Korea   £Irid  claiuted   tliat   the
best  form  of  government  for  horea,  until  they  Were
ready  for  comi.ilet®   independence.  would  b®  a   three-
pov®r   tru8t®esILlp  with  the   Sovietg,   the  Chinese.  and
the  tinited  States  r®pr®8eiited.     n®cause  of  the   United
`Stat®s'   experience   in  the  r`hilippines,   Roosevelt  be-
lit3ved  that   it  would  t&k®  &t   l®agt  thirty  y®tlrg   to
prepare  the  Koreiin8  for   lndepend®nce.     Stalin  agreed,
but  li®   th¢,iught   th-t   the  British  should  be  asked  to
join  the  trusteeship  ar`rangefiient.
itoosevelt  died   on  April   12.   1945.     I-larry  Truman.
Iiis   successor.   Bent   H&rry  llopklns   to  H{}8cow  to   confer
with   .t3talin  in  M{iy.   19/15.     At   that   time,   Stalin  assured
Hoitkin®  that  the  Soviet  Union  wag  still  in  favor  of
a  f our-}}ow®r  trusteeship   in  Korea.
Korea  did  not  become  a   subject  for  di8cu8sion
When  Pr®Bldent  TruEpan  in-t  with  Stalin  and  Churchill
at   tLie  1`otBdam  Conference   ln  July,   l{j45,   but  when  the
military  chiefg  ol.  tli.  three  Allies  conferred  `in  that
8am®  month.   they  agreed  that   th®r®  gliould  b®  a   line  of
demarcatioli   in   Korea   between  AmerlcLln  and  r{usgian
operat|on8.7
`rhe   tj`irty-eighth  parallel  eventually  became
the  line  of  demarcatioii.     'rruman  later   explaiiied  liow
the  thirty-eighth  parallel   be.cil`d®  t[te  line  that  divided
Korea.      ]]e   Said:
Ye€tr
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7ng.'  p.  317.
I,P,.   516-317,.
37
The   thirty-eithth  rwar£4.Il®l  ag  a   dividing  line
in  Korea  wag  never  the   8ubj®ct   of  intern&itional
cliscussi®ns.      It  was  proposed  by  u8  flo  a  prd.tcticablo
solntion  wh€ri   a   Sudden  collap8@   of   the  Japariege
war  mac}iirLe   cre@ted  a   vacuum   in   Korea.      b`®  had  no
troops   there  tlnd  no  #hiti|'in.g  to  l£"ld  forces  at
inor.a   than  a   few  1®c€-itions   in   the   gout}i®rn  half  of
tlle   peningulca.      The  St&te   D®itarttnent  tlrged   tl`tlt
in   e±1l   Korea   tile   gurr®nder   of  `3flpanese   f®rcee
sllould   be   taken  by   tile   I:.L"eric*ang,   but   there  was
no  way  to  got   our  troops   into  the  northern  p€±rt
of  t,1]®  country  with  the   speed  required  without
B&crll`icing  the  Security  of  otir  initl8l   l&ndi]lg&
iri  Jap&n.     In  view  of   the  fact  that  Stalin  had
concurred  in  the  idea   of  a  joint  tru8te®shirl.  we
eaq`ect®d   tliiit   tl`e   division   ®f   the   country  wo.uld  b®
Solely   for   the  pt]rp®se   or  acc®]'¥tlng  the  Japan®Be
:::=®:}i::u:::u:h:ittej;:::n::::T8]  W°uld  tn®n  ex-
The   first   Sign  that   the   r{`is&i&ng   con6it`ler®d  the
thirty-eigllth  parallel  more  than  merely  a  temporary
line  of  deniarcation  came  when  they  completed  the
Burr.ender  of  Japanese  forces   in  North  Korea.     It  was
suddenly  announced  that  no  traffic  would  b®  allowed
to  enter  North  Kor®ca  without   flpecisl  pcrmisBion.
Friction  began  rlBing  between  the  United  St,&te8  and
Russia.   becnu8e  now  that  the  Jflpan®Be  forces  had  gur-
render®d.   it  v&g  time  to  dla8olve  the   thirty-el`ghth
parallel  divisiori  and  begin  arran8'1ng  the  joint  trtlstee-
S!1ip.9
Lieutenant   G®rl©r€&l   John  Ft.   rlodgc.   Commander   of
the  United  States   force81n  Korea,  attefflpted  t®  op©Ii
talks  with  the  i+ugE§i&nsi   howev€i.,   after  s®ver&l  re-
buff.a,   it   became   obvloug   to   hiffl   th€.tt   the   T{ug8i&n8  were
I e fl r a p.   517.
9Ei±'i.„  p.   317.
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not  cooperating  to  bring  about   the  four-power  trust®®-
Bhip.L°     General  }]acArthur.   the   Supreme   Allied  Com€`nder
in  the  Far  F.a8t.  was  also  becoming  increasingly  con-
cerned  vlth  t[ie  fallur.  of  the  HusslanB  to  fulfill
their  t]romises.     Hle  monthly  rep,arts  to  the  Chi€f8  of
St.iiff  on   the  progr®gg   of   the  Unlt®d  Stat®f[   occupation
of  Korea  and  Japan  b®c&me   so  pessimistic   conc®rnirig
Korea.   that  by  (}ctober.1945,   he  pictur.ed  Korea  as  a
''confuged  and  h®|p|tssg   country.w[L
By   late   1945.   rien®ral   l]odA.a  f{.und   that   tile   idea
of  a   four-power   truBt®®8hlp  va8  very  un|topular  With  the
Korean  people   tlietne®1veg.     I]avlng  been   denied   self-
gov®rnliient  for  thirty-five  y®ar8.   the  K®recan®  wore   in
no  mood   to  wflit   thirty  more  years.     Concerning  the
trustoeshlp.   }lodge  wrote  that   ''.   .   .   if  it  is  imposed
now  or  at  any  futur.   time.   the  Korean  P®ople  will
actually  and  phyBlca||y  revolt.W±2
In   D®c®mb©r,   194.5.   Secretary   of  State   James   F.
Byrnee  was   gchedt]led   to   m®®t  With   t,he   Jtu8gitln  ,iroreign
Minister   hiolotov   ln  Mo8Cov.   At th®`me®tlng.  Byrne. pr®po8ed
that  the  United  States  and  Russian  military  zones  be
abolished.   and  that   the  four-ijow®r   truBte®Bhip  begin
at  once.     `rruman   described  what  ha|>p®n8d  &s   follows:
Holotov  a8k®d  for   time  to  study  our   Btat®ment,
and  it  wag  not  until  D®cemb®r   20  thcat  h®  returned
t®  the  subject.     Then  h®  agreed  that   the   Sovic.t
Union  had  &grt3ed   to   the   ido&   of  a   four-rtower
tru8teeshlp.  but.  he  added  this  wag  a  long-term
Yetlr8
Years ''p.   517-318.
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rather  than  @n   immediate   riuestion.     E!e   then  I.Tro-
po8®d  on  behalf  of  the  Soviet   q®vernmer.it   th,fit  a
provlslomil  government  be  get  up  in  Korea  to
undertake  all  liecessary  mcasur®g  I or  tile  develop-
ment  of  industry,  agriculture,  and  transportation
of  Horea  &rid   the  nationtil  culture  of  the  Korean
p®opl®'13
^fulolotov  also  proposed  that  both  the  United
States  a]'id  tiug8ian   coBun&nderB   8houla  @g8lst   in  forming
this  provisional   government.     These  cor¥"and®rs  would
form  a   United  States-Soviet  CommlgBion  to  constr.uct  tlie
provi8ion&l   government  arLd  would   be   jn  charge  of
®Btablishing  a   1`our-power   tru8tee8liip  to  govern  Koreca
until   full   Korean   i!`id®peritl®HCG     could   b®  achieved.
Htivlng  b@€n  ]``romlscd   once   €ig8in   th&t   t)i®   Soviet   Union
favored  a   four-ijower  trust@e8hi}S  for  Korea.   Byrnes
return-d  to  the  tinited  States  optimistic  about  United
St®teg-Soviet  relcatioll8  for  1946. 14
1946:       `ANTICIpj&Tlr}NS   AND   DIS`APP0INTMENTS
t¥'h®n  news   of   the   Moscow   agreement   r®€`ch®d
Se®"l.   cetpit€u  of  Xorefi,   located  in  the  tJ-nited  States
zone.   tile  Kore&na  began  to  protest  the  tl`uste®ship  by
means  of  Rlafa8  strikes  and  attacks   on  Am®I`ican  gol-
di®rg.15
t3n   January   16,1946.   the   ^meriQ&rL  Esnd  E`tuggian
coramt<±ndei-8   met   ln  5®oul   to   discu8fi   the  egtablishm®nt
of  a   i!rovisiontll   `ng€ivereiit.      !}dl'ry  Truoum   tiescrib®d
Yenrs I).    :h3|9.
14EL"  p.  --}19
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the  meeting  a8  follov8:'`
A8   had   bc®n   &grG®d   at   Mo8cotf ,   the  American
and  £'iu8gian  commanders   in  Korea  met  on  January  16.
1946.   but  al"oBt  at  once  it  bec{&me   clear  that  no
results  would  come  of  their  tAlk8.     Tll®  Russians
insisted  that  tile  conference  had  no  author.ity  to
discu85   stnythlng  excer>t  minor  caccommod&tion8   b®-
twe®n  the   two  zones.     Our  repr®sent&tives  to{}k  the
position  that  tli®  diBcu8Biong  Should  point  toward
the  eventu{il  joining  of  the  z®neB.     In  the  end,
::a:£:::a:y.5:]8niy  limited  agreements  had  b®eH
The  hortelessrLe8&   of   the  situation  vaB  obvious
t®  everyone.     In  a  BarcaBtlc  article  in  tlte  JeLnuary
28,1946   issue,  £±Efs  mflgcaszin®  referred   to  the  meeting
&s   a   "circus.!117
In  his  annual     ''State  of   the  L'tlion`'  address  to
Congr.BE   on  January  21.   i946,   Truflmn  doscrih®d  the
policy  of  the  United  St&t®s  toward  Korea   fls  follotrB:
It   iB  the  purpo3®  of  the  fiov®rnment  of  the
United  States  t®  proc®etl  &£  rapidly  as  i$  7'Jractl-
cable  toward  the  regtorati{7n  of  the  aaver®igmty  of
fiorea  and  the  e8tabllghment  of  a   d®m®cratic
government  by  the  free  choice  of  the  p®opl®  of
Korea .18
Despite  the  fallur®  of  the  Januflry  conference.
the  J®1nt  Cormmigsj.on  provided  for   in  the  Hoscow  Agr®®-
"ent   b®gan  its  work  in  Seoul   on  March  20,   1946®     On
the  key  qu®3tion8   concerning  Korc&n  lndependemce,   how-
ever.   the  Cormigaion  was  deadlocked  from  the  Start.     On
Hay  8.   the  Cogivlml8sion  adjourned  without  having  Solved
the  basic  problems  of  Korea.     Botli7<  the  United  States
Years p.   520.
17.lKorea.0  :gse.   XLVII   {Janunry  28.1946},   5`J4.
18Excerpt of  bl®s8age   by  Harry  S.   Tr`}"an.
appearing  in  tile  The  Newp.16.              __ York  Times .   22   `T@nu€iry,   1946,
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and  Soviet  delegations  blamed  each  other  for  the  Coun-
missi®n.S  failure.L9
By  the   summer  of   1%6,   p®oril®  were  becoming
increasingly  guspiciou€  ab®`lt  the  re4il  aims  and  agpira-
ti®ns  of  Soviet  foreign  policy.     In  Harch.  at  Fulton.
His8ouri.   Win&ton  Churchill  warned  the  American  rj®oril®
that  tli®y  must  be  aware  of  the  n.w  throat  to  democracy
pre8®nted  hy  imperialistic  Cofrmunigm.     Ijointing  to  the
fact   that  Burop®  was   divided  b®tk-®tm   the   f orce8  ®f  Com-
munlam  and  the  forces  of  {lemocr&cy,  Churchill  proclaimed:
''From  St®ttin  in  the  Baltic  to  Trie8te  in  the  Adricatic
an  iron  CurtaifL  has  degcendQd  acro38   the  continent.«2°
In  a  B®rieg  of  articles  for  j=±£s  rna.gaaine.  John  Foster
Dulle8  warned  of  the  grotJing  threat  of  Soviet  foreign
policy.     He  gaid  in  pal.t:
.   .   .   the  forelgm  policy  of  tile  Soviet  Union
1g  world-wide  in  8cope'.     ItB   goal   18   to  have
g®vernbent8  everyelrhor®  which  guppre88  political
and  religious  thiriking  which  runs  counter  to   t}1eir
doctrines.     Tllereby  th,a  Soviet  Union  would  achieve
world-wide  harmony--a  Fax  S®vietica.2l
If  President  Tru"ELn  hod  any  doubts  about  Soviet
motlveg,   they  were  certainly  removed  when.1n  June.
he  received  a   report  from  Bdwin  `ff-.   Paul®y,   hla  p®r-
gon&l  rerireBelit&tiv®.  who  had  visited  North  K®re&
from  REcay  29  to  June  3.22     The  report  d®scrit*ed  the
Years p.   320.
£°Bxc®rpt   of  gp®ech  by  Winston  Churchill
appearing  in   .'The  Natj.on."  g±Eg.   XLVII   {March  18.
1946).17.
2Luohn  Foster  nu||e8.   WThoughtf  on  Soviet
F`oreign  rtolicy  and  Whflt  to  no  J}botit   It',l     part  ?
E±£±i®   26    {June   10.1946),11€j.
22Truman,  gse#|  P.  320.
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Soviet  occuptltion  of  North  Korea  a®  follows:
They  are  pro|']agandizlng  and  promoting  a  Com-
muniat  Party  and  a  5®vlet  type  ot`  program  which
would  ®stabliBh  loyalty  t®  moscow  &8  the  hi8h®8t
form  of  loyalty  to  Korea.     To  this  end  they  fire
riding  rough-Shod  over  dill  politlcfll  factions
which  might  oppose  or   even  question  such  a
philosophy.     For  ex&mpltS,   the  Btre®tg  of  Northern
ltorea  are  decorated  with  Soviet  propaganda  posters.
Most  or   these  posters  ptlblicig,a  the   §ovi®t  Gov®.rrl-
ment  and  lnclud®  large  pictures  of  Leliln  and
Stalin,,.,
CommuniBm  ±n  Korea   could  get  off  to  a   better
start  th&n  |}r®cticcally  finywhere  else  in  the  world.
The  `Japa.ieg®  owned  the  railroads.  all  of  tlie  puhlic
utllltles  including  power  and  light.  a3  well  as
all  the  iltdugtri.?  and  n&tural  re3ourc®&.     There-
fore.   if  lt  1g  Suddenly  found  to  be  owned  by  ''The
Pe®ple'8   CoEtifnitt{3ew      (The   Cormunigt  I'arty),   they
will  have  acquired  them  without  any  Struggle  of
any  kind  or  any  workJ `in  developing  them.     Thie!   i8
one  of  the  re&Bon8  why   the  uriit®d  Sttlteg   Should
not  valve  ltg  title  or  claim  to  Japanese  external
assets  located  in  Kor®&  until  ca   democratic   {capital-
istic)   form  of  gov®rn"ent  is  assured.25
'rrutoan  Boon  learned   tliat  the  problem  in  Kor®®
was  more  than  Soviet  infiltration  into  North  Korea.
South  Kor®€i   also  pr®Bented  serious   protllems   bec&ug®   the
people   in  that  area  w®r®  becoming  lncr®aBingly  im-
patient  with  foreign  occupation.     Etichcard  J.   H.  Johnson.
a  foreign  tiews  c®rre8ponderit.   r®riorted  t®  'rh€  New  York
_          _           -_i              _                                                    .    .
Times  that  the Korean  peo|Ile  were  b{Rcoming  disilluBi®ned.
Fie  Said  in  ptlrt!
One  year  &g®  next  weelt  Kode&,   the  first  large
st®ppins  stone  in  Japfln's  march  of  co]ifiu®st  ln  A8ia.
avalt®d  freedom  within  her   grtl3p®
Today  the  jubilation  hag  been  replaced  by
23se|®ctioig  from  a   report   by  li}dwin  k.   r'&ul®y.
cited   by  'rrurrian. Yeclrs pp.   521-322.
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disillusion.   tlnd  most  Koreans  feel   that  they  have
exch&nged  one  master   for  two.   the  United  States  and
the  Sovl®t  Union.     G®ogrflriliically  divided  at  the
38th  parall.i  €`nd  politict*lly  bisected  by  two  di8-
Similar  8y8tem8  of  government.   this  n€?tion  of
3§:::::8:31::  :::a:::::¥¥4te8t±ng  ground  of  united
j}urllig  the  fall.   the  Russians  conducted  election®
in  North   K®r®a   for   local  lteo|>l®'8  Commltte®s.   but   there
was  only  one   8lflt®   of  candidates. 25
In   the   United  Stat®8     zone   tile   81tuation  w{is
becormlng  incret*8ingly   ten8e.     'i`he  Korefin8  v®re   given
freedom  of  speec}i.  and  ttiey  ®xerciSed  that  freedom
to  th®  utmost.     Disorders  and  raopular  demon8trationa
against   th.  United  States  were  widespread.     I'n  a  few
in8tanc®e  the  8ituatlon  b®cam®  8o  dangerous   that  United
States   tro®its  had  to  fire  into  the  mobs.26     General
MacArtllur  was  pr€occupled  With  events   in  Japan,  but   the
increased  tenBlong  in  Korea  throughout  the  fall  of
1946  caused  him  to  direct  Ills  att®ntlolis  tliere.     Mac-
Arthur  w&.  intensely  &ggravtlted  by  the  refuetll  on  the
part  of  the  Sovlete  to  cooperate.     On  October  26.  h®
18sued  a  €tatement  ln  which  h®  attacked  the  Soviet
Union  and  cl&im®d  that  no   agreement   could  be  r®{]ched
in  Korea  &s   long  a3   the   l{us31anE   p®rgist®d  in  their
att®mpt3   to   8uppr.sB   frcet[om  ®f   Speech.27
Perlia|ig   the  most  out8tandlng  8pokeman  for  the
Koreans  after  W`orld  War   11   wtis   Dr.   Syngman  rthe®.      This
Z4Ric|iard   J.   H.   John8on®
5  August.1946,   p.   5.
25Truman. Y®ars 1}.    322.
26ERE..  p.   322.
27Th®   New   York  Times
The   New  York  'i`imes
.   28  October,   1946.   p.   7.
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Bee[ned  justified  in  view  of  the  fnot  that  }thee  had  re-
sisted  Japanese  lmp®rlali8m  ln  Korea  prior  to  annexation.
AB   leader  of  the  movement   for  Korefin  lnd®pend€nce.   Rh®e
b®cam®  well-kno*n  in  tlie  United  States.     Exiled  from
Korea  most   of  hlf]   1if.,  Rhee  r®tur.ned  in  1945   follotvlng
the  defeat  of  Japan.     I]e  wag   etiger  to  obtain  control
of  the  independent  Korean  government.  but  the  etraln  in
United  Stat®g-Soviet  relations  appea.-®d  to  be  frustrat-
ing  his  apbltlon.
On  December   5,1946.   fthee   g`igge:ted  to  C`eneral
Hedge  that  the  best   8olution  to  the   Kor®&n  |jrobl®D
Would  tie  to  divide  h'orca  and  to  establl8h  ee]jarote
gov®rlun®nta   in   the   United  States  eAnd  ltus8iQn  zones.
t]odge  vac  liostile   to   this   8ug8®3tiorii   lth®c,   Liowever.
eager  for  ijow®r,   began  to  favor  Such  a  move  publicly.28
1947!       INc£{H;ASP.D   r`RusTlt.^.TloNs
AND   ^N   Ai]r.HAL   TO   THF,   UNITED  NATIONs
On  January  4.   1947.   General  IIodge  publicly
denounced  J{h®®'6   BuggeBtlon  tlitat   Korea   be   dlv|ded.29
Hie  reports   to  'ITuman  w®r®   becoming  lncretlBingly        "
posglmi8tic.     I)esirlng  to  confer  p®r8onally  with
Hods.  about  the  political  and  ®cononic   cri81g  in
Korea.   Truman  invited  him  to  Washington.
Arriving  at  the  White  »ouee  on  February  24.
I.)edge  reported  to  Truman  tlii]t  he  had  recently  r®celv®d
information  concerning  a  vast  Sovi®t  military  build-up
Not.  York  Times
__  ____  _         ___I___   _        _  _   _       _       -     _-_
New   York  Tim®g
I.T  _I_I        i_i     _       _                              _     __   __   _
.    6   December.    191±6,   ri.    2£`.
.   4  Jt`nuary.   19'17®   P.   i.
45
1n  North  Korea.     According   to  r®r!ort8.   thee  Soviet8
w®r®   building  a   North   Koregm  army   or   5oo.Coo  m®n.3°
Nevertl`eles.i,   llodge  convlnc®d  Truman  that  dividing
Xor®a   wou,la  not   8olv.  any   pr®bielRT8.      Once  agaili,   }`e
urged  that  lncr®ased  efl`ortg   bc  made   to  obtain  coln~
Plate   Coop®rntion  from  the  soviet  union.31
In  hlB  r®rtort8  fro fa  Tokyo.   General  ltacArthur
encouraged  Tt.uman  to  breflk  the  UrLlted  States-Sovl®t
deadlock  by  dlplofmtlc  m€anB.     Accordingly.   on  the
b&el8   of   th®B®  I.®port&   from  G€n®ral   I!®dge  and   General
M&c^rthur,   Sccr®tfiry  of  State   George  C.   Mareihall   c¢)n-
vlnced  Truman  to  make  one  nore  fittempt   to  n®gotlate
with  the  Soviet   Union.     Margl}all   quickly  proc®ed®d
to  Bake  arrangements  with  Soviet  For®1gn  M|nleter
Plolotov  for  a  new  m®etlng  of  the  United  Stat®B-f.ovi®t
Joint  Commission  ln  Seoul   on  fifty  2|,   |g47.32
AB   the   Comml381on  began  its   diecueglon3.   the
fiueBtion  of  a   trii3tee8hlp  became  a  major  i.sue.
P`ibllc  opinion  in  Korea  vaB  agaln®t  it.   but  the
I{u88ian.  Would  not  consider  free   el®cti{)n8.      In  A
typically  angry     mood.   Syngman  lthee  d®clar€d:
More   good   cfln  cone  to  K®rea   if   the  |tr®8ent
conference  brecak8   than  if   it  coint$8   to  &n  agree-
mcnt.     If   I  ver®   Generfil  IIod.ge.   .   .   I  would  not
waste  time  talking  with  the  Russians.
The  Commi8$1on  got  off   to  a   good  Start,  but
by  July.   the  delegete4  were  once  again  d®adlockod.
The  liu.qsians  were  `inwillill8  to  begin  organir.ing  the
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provisional   g®verliment  £`nd   to  allow  free   ®l®ction8
in  North  Korea  to  choose  repr®®entativea  of  the  trust®c-
ship.     The  12ug#icarig   arg`ied  that  the   tcrm8   of   the
}lo8ctrw  cagreement   clearly   inc]ud®c!  a   t-jromlfl®   thtlt  a
trusteeShir.  would  b®  tli®   flrgt   Step   toward  Koro.an
indep®ndenc®,   and  tl`at  n®  provision  had  bt?en  made   to
include  freely-®lect®d  repr®B®ntativ®s   from  Kor®&  to
form  A  provisional  government.     8y  the  end  of  Au8uflt
negotiation.   8e®med  ho|`i®leBS. 34
Fru3trated  over  the  rep®at®d  intransigence  of
the  Itu3gians.   Truman  decided  to  tLLrn  the  Korean  i;ro-
bl®m  over   to  the  United  Nations.     On  Sept®mb®r  17.
S®cre¢@ry  of  State  Marghall  a{]{ires3tid  the  General
Assembly   in   Lake   Succ®#s.   Now   York.      He   pre8ent®d
the  United  Stat®8'   vl®w  of   the  Koretln  conflict  and
ask®`d  the   G®n®ral  A8getnbly   to   take   nctlon®      Hig   Speech
clearly  indlc&t®S  that  Truman.a  policy  toward  Korea
w®&   Still   b&81ciilly   the  same  aa   it  hthd  been  at   the
close  of  the  wtlr.    Marshall  said  in  part:
I  turn  now  to  the  q`ie8tion  of  the   independence
of  Kor.a ....
h`or  about  two  y®arg   the  United  Stat®8  G®Vernment
hoe  been  trying  to  ref.ich  fag}.Cement  vlth  the  Soviet
Goverenm®nt   through   the  Joint  Commlg&ion.   and  other-
vise,   on  mt*thods   of   lmplementlng  +,he  M®8cow  Agree-
ment  and  tliu3  bringing  about  the  lndep®nd®nc®  or
Hor®a®     The  United  Stat®E   repreeelitativ®B   have   1n-
giBt®d  that  any  Settlement  of  the  Korean  problem
must  in  no  v®y  infrlng®  th.  fun{]amenttal  democrfltlc
right  of  freedom  and  opini{}n.     That  iB  Still  th©
poBltlon  of  my  gov®rnment®
Today  the   indep®nd®nc®   of  lforea   is  Ilo  further
advanced  than
mflin8   {tivid®d ±t  ¥f]:  3E€hy;g=:Ltg£:  w¥¥Ee%o3§;t
forc®8   in  the   industrial  North  and  United  `C!jtat©.
34Truman.   ¥=E=E.   pr>.   523-524.
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r®rc®®   in   tt`®  agrlculturcal   *8!.outh.     Tt`®r®   i.   little
®r   n® .ea[cfi&nge   of  g®®dfl   ®r   Bervice8   betwce!t   tii8
two  aon®b.      Xor®u'£   ec®nouiy   la   uliu8   crlp]-*l®d ....
It  1.   St`¢rel`ore   the   ±Iite77tlon  of   the  LJnited
f`5tqt®R   government   to  p].os®nt  the   I.robl®m   of   fior®ari
lndtBiA®nd€nce   to   t}11.   e¢#3io*L   of   the   ficft®reLl   rq®S®mbLy.
Alt]lough  ve   Shful.I   b®  grre}>&rSd   to   a!ubmit   3ugge4tlons
qs   to  how   the   early  €ittcalnm®nt   a,f  ltorecan  i]idep®nd-
Once   mlgket   b®   &]ffected.   ue   t!call®v®   t€`At   this   1&   ti
matter  which  now  retiulree   the  i"pi.rtiDl  jud£®H®nt
of   the   other  m®mb®ra.      `.q.a   {±o  not   wii!h   to  ti&v®   the
inat}1lity  of   the   two  pov®rs   to  rettch   an   fiffireeut€nt
:: L:X®`q E:r:::t#::FS::®f::8:::®:::a::g!e):§¥L  C}a±mB
The   `S®vi®t   Union  ®}bpos®d  brliiglrig  t!.a   Xorezin
qu®gtl®n   bt±f®r®   the   Gen¢rtll   fist34mb.Ly.      -ti'hen   t}]®   mo+.len
wt+A8   mstd®   to   place   Korea   ®n   t±`®`m.%end€t   for   diBcuS®ion,
trtG   .f3oviet   d®l€gation   e&flpe®ing®d  Gi.&&1nst   it.      tin
Sertt®mber   23.   tilt   v®t®  wfiS   t€iken.      T}}e   Soviet   l$1oc
voted   golld,Ly   ageeln8t   lt,   but   tEiey  w®r®   d®f®at®d  &3
the  fflotioh  carried. 36
In  Se®uL,   ®n  Scpte"ber  26,   the  flovl®t  reFrt}-
a®nt&tlv®z!   in   tl`®   J®1Iit   Coiritm±6#1on      counter®ct   the   LJnlt®d
Sttlt®®     propoai&l  of   turning  tn®  pi-oblem  over  to  tb®
t).   t¥.   by  tJ®mdindi»8  ,thtit  all   occu!iallon  for¢e81n  H®ree
be  withr]rav»  fit   ttre   B€J"e   tirm®.   a€rm®tlute   in  early 1g48.5?
Since   the   Lj'imericcan  delegtltl®it  had   no   fauthur`1ty   to
tigr®®  to  the  rtropoeel,   t.he   ±deft  v?a   ¢o"munlctlt®d  to   the
St8t®   {}eptirtm€nt,   find  Blnce   the   princli*al   i&ffu®  Was
pending  before   the   Uii±t®d   H#ti®n8.   tli®  `qtat®   n®part"®mt
35H=¢®rpt froca   ca   &pt±ecli   by   rieor&e   C.   Fjflr€±iflll
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I)e|7&rtment  refused   to  con8id®r   enterlrig  iiuch  tin  agr®c-
ment,38
]>r®8ident   Truman.   horw®v®r.   had   congidcred   the
[josEibility  of   troop  witl`drawals  from  Hor®a.     Congress
va3  pr®asuriiig  him  to   cut  military  eponding  atid  many
were  gllgs®sting-that  he  review  United  States'   coinmit-
mentg.     The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  revleved  the
mllltary  8ituatlon  in  the  Far  F,act  and  reported  to
Truman  in  September.     The  report  said   in  part:
The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  con8idor   that.  from
the  standpoint  of  millt&ry  gecurlty.   the   United
States  hag  little  .trategic  lnt®rest   ln  m&i[t-
talning  preserit   troops   and  bag.e®   in  Korea.   .   .   ® 39
TI.uman  also  received  a  reriort  from  Gen.ral  Al-
bert   C.   }`.edemoyer.   who  had  undertaken  a   t{.ur   of  South    `
Korea   tit   the  ]`'resident'3  request.     tv'edemey®r  agret>d
tllat  there  wd.  no  strategic  advantiige  to  the  United
Stcates   ln  ke®rting  troops   ill  Korea.   but  h®  Warned   that
lf   the   United  States  wore   to  withdraw  from  South  Koi.®a.
tlint  Eon.  would  b®  vulnerable  to  attack  from  the  North
Hor®an  army.     Ttierefore.  W.demeyer  suggested  that   the
United  .Stcat®8  should  concentrate  on  buildilig  a   Strong
Soutli  Korean  army.     Once  t)le  army  1g  self-.ufficlent,
th®   United  Stat®fi  sliould  withdraw.     'rruman   decided   to
follow  his  advice. 40
On  Oct.ober   17.   the   Unltod  Stat®e   introduced
a  resolution  into  the  General  A8sembly  calliilg  for
free   ®lection8   under   the   8r..oneor®Jilp   of   the   Uliited
Y a ca r a .   p|].   324-325.
39se|ection  fran  a  report  of  the  Joi}1t  Chl.fs
of  Staff .   cited  by  Truman.
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Nations.41     The  ItuBsianB   debated  the  rc8olution  and
then  char.god  tht`t   the   Unlt®d  States  cind  the  Soviet
Union  ehould  vlthdrav  all  occupation  forc®B  from
Korea  be for.  out.lining  a  progr&m  1.or  uniflcdtion.
On  October  30.   a  resolution  calling  for  a   Unlt®d
Nations  Tempor`&ry  Codanl8slon   to  Study   the  qu®etion  of
free   el®ctlone   was   introduced.     i-{u®elan  U.   N.   Ambas-
sador   Gromyko  wtls  absent  wli®n   tlio  resolution  came   t®  a
Vote.     The  l{u88ian  r®presentatlveB  ab8tainet],   along  With
the  rest  of  tlie  Soviet  bloc,  and  the  resolution  carried
41-0.     Shortly  thereafter.   Gromyko  tjnnounced  thcat   the
R'.s8ian&  Would  not   cool)erote  with   the   Comml#Glon.   since
it  vac  illegal  for  tlie  Unlte{l  Ndtlone  to  tabp®r  vith
tile  i.iternal  affairs  of  Korea.43     Ilo  also  claimed  th&t
the  United  Stat®g  had  vloleited  the  Ho®cow  A8r.@"ent
by  taking  Korea   to  tile  United  Nations.
1948:`      Tt/O   GOVI.:HNMENTS
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The  United   Natio"]   1`emporary  Commi&Bloii  ®rrlved
in  .Scoul   on  Jtinuary   8.   1948.   and  began  ltB   work  on
January   12.     The  Cormls®ion  was   faced  With   imf.iedlat®
problems   81nce   the   nu&8ian   comnend®r   ln  North   fcorea
would  not  allow  the  Comlsslon  to  cross  the  tl`irty-
eighth  parallel. 45
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In  February.   the  Commlgglon  received  word  that
the  Soviet  authoritlGg  and  Cotanuni8t  ]'arty  chleftain£
were  rushing  to  complete  a  North  Kor®tln  government
Which  #ould  be  pronounced   €h.   ''fiov®rnment  of  all
j{®rea..146     This  wag  reported  to  t!`®   Interim  Committee
of   the   f]®ner&1  f\sfl®mbly.  which   then   in8trmct®d   the
Coimmi.egiori  ti-.   Bupervls®   free  electioses   in  whatever  part
a.f  Korea  it  could  reach. 47
On  Hay   1.   the  n`orth   Koretln  r>`ipp®t   government
d¢ficd   the  United  N&ttiong  arid  adopted  a   c®nBtitution
claiming  jurisdiction  over  all  Horea.48     |t  arj|je&red
thcat  Syng"&n  lthee'g   demand   for  a   divided  H®r®a  would
b®co"®  a   reality.
On  #ay  10.   1948.   fro..  election  u®re  held
throughout  South  Korea   for  "®ff]ber8   of   tli®  Natior`£±l
Agsembly  which  would  b®  the   N&ti®nal  ABgembly  of
both  N®rth  and  South   Korea   alike.49     The   NQtlon&|
^8Sembly  rtyet  for  the  f irst   time  on  nfiy  51.     After
Syngrman   Rh®®  wag   choB®n   €halrmall.   the  AstBecaL.1y   pro-
ceeded  to  draw  uT}  a   constitution,  which  vft8   completed
on  July  la,   and  slgn®d   by  Syngm&n   Rhee   on  `Tuly  |7.5{)
On  July   20.   tli®   Nation&&1   ^Sgembly   elected   lth®e   Premqi-
dcnt   of   the   K®re&n   DeRIocratic   R®pub|ic.5L
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The   next   8t®p  was   to   turn   the   {5overnm®nt   over
to   the   Kore£`n3.      Trumfm  ord®r®d  the  State   L}epartment
to   cl-eate   an   "indep®nd®)it.   Korea,"   but   he   r®aliz®d
that.   in  r®&lity.   clrctmgtanceB   liad  1`orced  him   t®
modify  1'113   Korean  policy.      No   longer  w€ig   lt   possiL}l®
for  llim  to  oppose  a  divided  Korea.     The  only  alternative
to  a   divided  Korea  would  be  to  1`orce   tile  Soviet8   from
North  Kor.ct   by  me{ins  of  a  militjiry  confrontation.     This.
o£`   course.   would   m®na   war.
Trulnan's  decision  to  support  a   divided  Korea
did  not   m®t&n  th€it   h®   had   lost   I)op®   that   Korea  would
ev®ntu{tlly   b®   united.      On  A`igu8t   15.   19`18.   the   It®-
rt`Iblic   of  Korea  Wca8   formally  proclaim®r].     Speaking  at
special   cer®moni®s.   General   }lacArthur  expre#gt9d   the
horie8   of  all   government   offici@18   th{it   Korea  would
eventually  b®   I]nifi®d.     1]®   8aid   in  |tart:
In  this   hour  a8   t.he   forces  of  right®oucnesg
advances.   th®   triumrih   ls   dull®d   by  one  of  the
great®8t  tragedlee  of  coritemporary  history--
an  artificial  barrier  has  clivid®d  your  land.
T]`18   b&rri®r  must  aiid  will   be   torn.down.
Nothing  8h£`ll  pi`event  the  ultim€`te  unity  ol`  your
people   as   fr®®  nien   ol.  a   free  nation.52
0n  S®F}tember   9.   the  Soviet   &uthorltie3   in
North  Korea   formally  proclaimed  the  est&Uliahm®nt  of
the   "Democratic   Peoi`1e's  j{opublic   of  Korea.n53     Ten
days   later  the  ;tLisglan8   Bent  word  to   the  State  De-
partment   tn®t  {111  Russian   troops   would  be  withdrawn
from  North  Korea.
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Th®   tJig  question  facing  Truman  w+is  not  whether
or   not   to  withdr@v  United  StflteB  forces  from  South
Korea,` but  when  to  do  g®.     Truman  explained  the  pro-
bl®m&   which  confronted  him  a&   folLotf8!
We.   of  course.  w®r®   ill  favor  of  troop  with-
dr4*w€ils.      I   h&v®   &ltffiyg   b®11eved   thfit   there   ie
nothing   that  tnor€   etlgily   cr®&te8  antagonigm8
thfin  the  pres..rice  of  unw&nted  soldi®rg.   foreign
or  do"estic .....
fe'®  knew,   ht"evel`,   i.h+It   the  I.tussianB   hf±d  built
up  a   "People`'s   Army"   .in  No,rth   Kore€`.     We  knew  that
CoJrmunl8t  infiltration  into  South  Korea  wag  con-
91dercable.      W8  lfnew   tlifit   th-   rit!w   a-overnm®rit   or
Syngman  llhee  would  find  it  difficult  to  reaigt
effectively  lf  it  were  attacked.     II®wever.  a
car€£.ul   ®Btimate   hftd  I,te€m  made   by   our   ®xpert3   of
the  chances   of   gurviv&l   of  the  now  itepublic  ®f
Korea,   and  the   conclusion  had  been  reac!`Ied  that'ita  proai`ects  for  survivtil  may  be  considered
favorable  r`s  long  aft   it  can  co}itinu®  large  scale
aid  from  the  lJnited  Stat®B. '55
tlflving  decided   to  help   haliLd  uz.j  a   Strong  Soutli
Kbrefan  army,   'hruman  planned  ®n  vithdrawlng  I;'nited
States   tro{i|]9   froft  l{orea   Bometime   ln   19£19.
19q9!       NEGOTIAT,IONS   CF,ASP.   AS   TR0t}PS   h;IT!tDRAW
Soviet  troo[ts  having  been  withdrawn  from  North
Korea.   Truman  ord®r®{l  the  Seventh   Infantry  1)ivision
fr.om   Korefl   to  Japim   in  Jchnuary.   |949.56     Trumdn
began   to   Speed  up   the  withdrawdlB  wti®n.   in  Februcary,
he   learned  from  Secr®tary  of  the  Army  3~toyall   th€±t
Gener{4l  MacArthur   needed  more   troo|>s   irL  J€ipan  beccauge
of   the   8pre®|d  of   Communiflm   thr.oughout   the   Chinese
Years I}.    5P.8.
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mainland.     Finn|ly,   on  Jtlne  29.   1949.   except  for  a
Small  group  of  officers  trho  stayed  on  in  an  advls®ry
capacity.   the  la.gt  Unlt®d  i3tate8  troops   left  Korea. 57
Truman  realized  that  tll®  only  hor}®  for   Korean
unity  was  that  one  of   the   two  8ystefBg  of   gov®rnnlent
would  prove  more   desirable   to   the  Xor®an  tjeople   than
the  other.     All  ho}te  of  nc`qotiatii`g  with   the  rtu88ianS
tras   lost.    .Th®reFore,   the  Republic  of  Sout)`  f{orea
v{}ula  need   lar`¥e  amounts   of   economic  Bid  from  the
United  Sttltes.
In  Juno.   `rruman  asked  Congress   for  one  hundred
and  fifty  million  dollars   in  aid  to  k®et]  Korea  stab.Ie®
He  had  trouble  getting  Congre8t5  to  approve  hl8  program
aa  he   describes   in  liig  memoirs:
Shortly  be for.  the  ®xplr;.ition  of  the  military
appropFlatlone   for  Korea.   {for  fiJBcal   1949).   I
sent  a  h.c£3age   to  tli®   Congre8t3  asking  for   economic
aid  to   Hor®a   in   the  ainount   of   SL50,000.COO.     Un-
fortunately.   the  Congress  took  over  four  mot`thB
to  authorize  this   sum.   and  w}ien  I  ¢i8ked  fd'r  another
giixty  million  dollfir8   for  the  sfime  purriose  in  the
budget  1`or   1950-1951.   the  re`iu®st  va®  actually
defeated   ln   the   H{>uee   t)f  I?Le|>i-es®Iitative.   with
most   of   the  ntSgatlv®  votes   coming  from  the  He-
publictin  memb®rg.     While   it  was   later  ptl$3ed
a8  a  part  of  a  cofBbined  K.Jrea-China  aid  bill,   it
can  be   said  that.   g®ti®rally.   Congress  *@81n  no
:::r¥o::ap:;V#:  :::a:::t]¥¥§8h  had  been  requested
surmhity
j'tis   1950   began,   Trumari's   Koredr`   .riolicy  had
Teal.S I,.    529.
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evolved  from  a  |tolicy  directed  at  ®gtabll8hlng  a  free
and  independent  Korea.   to  a `policy  dir®ct®d  at
sustaining  a  regime  in  the  southel.n  portion  of  a
divided  Kor®&.     The  division  of  Korea  was  the   direct
r®Bult  of  8everalfactors:     the  Soviet  Union'S  failure
to  keep  its  promiBeB  and  its  failure  to  cooper€&te  with
the   United  States.  and  Syngm&n  Rhee'8   desire  f`or   power.
Tltoge  who  choose  to  criticize  1`ruman'8   Korean
policy  from  1945-1950,  might  claim  that  the  division
of   Korea  must  b®  regarded  &g  a  mark  o£:  Truman'a
fflilurei   that  he  and  Franklin  Roosevelt  should  mover
have  allowed  the  Ru88ian8  to  enter  Korea  in  the  first
plac®i   that  a  Strong  Btand  and  the  threat  of  fl  military
confrontation  would  have  f®rc®d  the  Soviet  Un3,on  to
withdraw  from  North  fioretl.   since  they  did  not  have  the
at®mlc   bomb  until  1949.
Those  ttho  choose  to  apologize  for  Truman'B  Korean
policy.   from  1945-1950.  might  argue  that  the  division
of  Korea  was  Trum&n's  only  tllt®rnative  to  t.ar  with
the  Soviet  Unions   that  Truman  was  fflced  with  this
comr]1ex  81tuatlon  following  the  S®cond  be'®rld  War,
vh®n  the  Unlt®d  States.  and.   indeed.   the  whole  world
wfls  not  psychologicf`lly  prepared  to   fight  another  wtlri
thf-it  the  only  way  a  War  tyith  the   Soviet  Union  could
htlve  been  won  in  a   short  period  of  tlm®  Would  have
been  to  use   the  atomic  bomb.   attd.   the`reft>re,  Truman
vaB  faced  with  a   gr€cat  moral  decision  as  well  ag  a
political  one.
There  is  no  8impl®  answer  to  thlg  question.
What   the  argument  really  boil5  down  to  iB  thisi   t.ould
the  Soviet  Union  helve  been  willing  to  f isht  a  war  to
keep  Kor®@,   or  any  other  territory  acquired  aB  a  re-
sult  of  World  'rdar   11.     M&Iiy  people   cfin  Bpeculat®.   but
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Stalin.   the  only  person  who  really  would  know  the
answer  to  that   question.   died  in  }Iarch.   1953.     With
him.   the  ansvere  died  also.
When  f`it`ire  histori&ii8  begin  to  evaluate  l!arry
Truman's  Korean  |3olicy.   they  will   be  less  concerned
abfjut  hiB   K{}re+in  [}olicy  from  1945-1950   than  with  his
policies   ®mploy®d  during  the   Korean  War.     The  American
ijeoplt  have  all  but  forgotten  Trumanls  post-World  tir'ar
11  Korean  policy  because  of  the  h®at®d  public  contro-
versy  which  surround®t]  his  policy  of  'lcontainment''
Which,   h®  malntain®d.   wag   the   only  Way   to  prevent   the
Korean  War  from  eru|`ti.ig  into  World  War   Ill.     This
policy  will  be   consld®red  in   the   following  c}`tipter.
CIIAP"H   IV
WAR   IN   ASIJ`
CI±AIJTk+R    IV
WAR   IH   A3IA
ny  1950.   Truman  tJas   concerned  about  Syngfrmn
Rh®®'s   failure   to  d€mocratizB®  South  Korea.     Since
millions  of  dollars  in  United  States  aid  wfls  |touring
into  .South  Korea,  Truman  felt  that  h®  could  at  least
®xpeet   !`h®e   to  €tll®if   fr®edoffl   of   ®xpr®egicin.      Ilo   d®g-
crib€d  Rhee  as   1`olloefg:
Syn®m&n  r{h®e   i8  a   mtcan  of   strong  conurictions
and  hag   little  pcati®nce  with   thojB®  wl±®  differ
with  him.     From  the  fflom®nt  of  his   return  to
K®r®fi   in  1945,   he  €*ttr&atcd   to  himsL`1f  men  of
®xtre!m®  right-wing  attitudes  and  disagreed  slmrply
with  the  political  letid®r8  of  more  modflrate  views.
and  the  removal  ®f  military  government  removed
r®8tr&int8  thnt  liad  itrevcnted  arbitrary  action
against  his  oppanentg.     I  did  nQt  care  for  the
meth®d8  ug®d  by  fthee.a  police   to  break  LLp  political
meetlngg   and  control  p®1iticfll   en®mlea.  e*nd  I  i*a8
d®®ply   conc€rn®d   over   t±`®  ltEL®¢   gov®rrm®nt's   lack
of  concern  about  tile  serious  inflation  that  Swept
the  c{}untry.     Yet,  w®  had  no  choice  but  to  Support
rth®e.     Kor®&   had  been  overrun  and  downtrodden  by
the  Jflpanese   €inc®  1905  and  had  had  no  ch&nc®   to
develop  other   lefader8  and  1€ader8hlp.I
I)egplt€  his   dlB8fltlsfaction  with  Hhee.  Trufrmn
r€alir+ed  that  witho?„:t  ffiid  from  the  United  States  the
Republic   of  South   Hor®*|  c®uid  not   siurviv®.     £{ow®v®r,
United  States  aid  t®  South  K®r€fi   incltided  more   than
economic  aid.     A   South  Kore&It  car"}-  of  Bi3gty-five
thougamd  trien  was  trained  and  equipped.  along  with  a
four~th®ugand-man  co®St  guard  and  a  forty-five-thousand-
[Trurmn, Y®firg p.   3R9.
57
man  police  force.
Although  the  United  States  veg  commltt®d  to
aiding  South  Korea,   the  big  qu®gtion  vac  whether  or
not   the  Unlt®d  States  would  defend  South  f€or®&  should
it  bG  attticked.     The  po8Blbility  ®f  a   North  Korecan
&tt&ck  ®n  South  Korea  had  tLot  been  diffcoutited  in  view
of  the  fact   that  North  Hore&  hfid  8n  army  known  to  b®
superior  to  the  Soutti  Horeijn  forces,  and  a   gov®rnm€nt
tfhicll.like  8yn8m®n  Rhe®'s.   claimtpd  jurifi{-lictlon  over
all  Jtor®fl®     The  problem  was  that  United  States   govern-
ment  officicalB  were  not  8pGciflc  on  thl®  question.
In  J&nmary.   1950.   Secretary  of  State  i)®an
Acheson,  who  had  Bucc®®d®d  REarghall  after  the   latter
t*ag   forced  to  r®81gn  b®cauBe  of  poor  health.  addre3ged
the  National  Pr®sg  Club.     While   describing  the  govern-
ment'8   Kor®&n  policy.   Achegon  mentioned   that  i&merlca'g
first   lime   ®£`   d®fena®   did  not   include   K®re&.     H®   said:
''No  p®rff ®n  can  guarantee  these  are fag  agalri8t  military
attack."     However.   h®  "dded:
Should  an  attack  occur.   .   a  the  initial  re-
llance  must  h®  on  the  people  attacked,  and  Ellen
upon  the  com"itment8  of  the  entire  civilized
world  under  the  Chcart®r  of  tlie  United  H&tions.3
Later  when  the  ltorth  Kor®mns  did  &ttBck  South
Korea,  #mny  influential  lteput}licanB.   including  Senator
#obert  A.   T8ft   of  Ohio,   blamed  the  attack  on  hch®8on
for  indicating  to  the  t3uH8iail8  t±lat  the  Uiiited  Stat®g
might  not  defend  South  Korea.     !£Eg  m&ga¥,in®  rep®rt®d!
The  Joint  Chiefs  of  Stfiff--and  i)Can  Ach®8on  in
his   9peech®®--had  heen  wary  of  pr®mlBln&  apecifl¢fllly
2.steinberg.  p.   575.
3F,xcerpts   from  gpeecri   by  l}®¢`n  Ach®Eon  cited   by
Steinberg.  p.   576.
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to  defend  Korea,  With  U.   5.   troops.   f.rome   its
enemy  north  of   the  58th  p&rfillel.     That  vag'uenesg
gave  Russia   its  opening:     it   could  attack  ein{l  fall
back  if  resist&nc®  !>roved  too  stroiigi   lt  might
:::ns¥:I:  ::k£::P:;t:t:tn8)i::T8uest  While  the  "  s.
In  the  spring  of  1950.  T)^~uman  received  report8
from  the  Centr.all   IntelligGncc  Agency  that   the  North
Korean  forces  ware   being  Strengthened.     N®v®rth®le8sii
Trutrmn  saw  no  particul€ar  c&ug®  for   alarm  8inc®  the
reports  Blgo  indicated  the  CommuniBte  wore  8trength®n-
lng  forces  in  a  dozen  other  areas.
THE   OUTBRBAK   or`   liosTILITlit}s
On   S&turdiiy.   Juno   2'±,1950,   Trufflan  w£`8   in
lndep®mdcnc®.   Higsouri   speILdlng  a  v®ek®nd  ttith  hl8
family.     Approximately  at   10!5013.   M.   the   telerj}ioii®
r<Alig.      It  vft&   Secret€`ry  of   State  AcheBon.      ''"r.   I.Sresi-
dent,n  h®   8j3id.111   have  very   Seri®u@   news.     -rhe   North
Koreans  have   invaded  South  Korea.n6    Ache8on  then  in-
formtsd  Truman  that  there  wcas  no  need  for  him  t®  rush
back  to  Washington  until  further  details  were  &vail&bl®.
Ilo   suggested  that  an  emergency  f.egslon  of  the  United
NtltionB   Security  Council   b®   c&.lied   inimediat®ly  and
that  a  declaration  b®  intrdduc®d  charging  North  Korea
with  an  act  of  aggr®s8ion.     T`r`ifnan  agreed.7
`±nA   Dangerous   Situ&tion®"   £±E±:L®   LVI    (July   3®
1950).   7.
5§teiiiberg.   p.   3?6.
6Stat®memt   tty   Dean   ..t.che8on   cited   1}y  Tr.ulrmn,
Yeqr±_,   p.   332..
7Trurmn.  ± p.  35Z.
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Acheson  p}`oned  again  at   11:30  A.   }1.   on  Sund€*y.
H®   infarm®d  1+uman  that  r®portg   from  Koreti   ggiv®   clear
®vldenc®  that  an  all-out  lnvaalion  wq8  under  `.ay.     1`h.
Security  Council.   he  told  Trurmn.  had  been  cQll®d  into
can  emergency  8eg3ion  and  Would  m®®t  at   throe   o'clock
that  afternoon.     Truman  lrrimediately  eummon®d  hle  aid.a
and  left  from  Kan8QB  City  }!uriicipi*l  ^1rport   at  two
o'clock.
While   Truman  va8   ®n   r{)`it®   t®
_____I     _              __        ___I     _                         _
tJ&8hington.   the
United  NfitionB   Security  Council  met   ln   Lake   Succebeq8.
iv®w  York.     Ironically,   the   relir®8cir.tative   of  the  Soviet
Union  vac  absent  from  the  m®oting,   due  to  a  Ltu8slan
boycott  of   the  United  Nations   in  £>rot®st  to  its  failure
to  s®fit   the  delegates  from  Com"unigt  China.     The  d®clara-
tlon  agairLEt  North  hor®a  vas  introduced  to  the  ten
memb€r8  who  were  present.   and  wa.   quickly  &riopt®d  by
Jiine  .affirmative  votes.  with  Yugo8lovia  &batainlng.
Although   the  decl&ratiori  &sain8t  North  Koretl
wag  anecess&ry  8t®p   towtlrd  the  soluti(in  of  the  r}ro-
bl®m,   Truman  I.ealized  that   both  Russia   an{l  North  Korea
had  Shown  comi>lcte  .di8regartl  for  the  United  Nation.   1n
the  past  and  that.  in  fill  |trobablllty.   they  would  not
comply  tllth  tlie  d®cleratlon  vhlch  de"&]Ldcd  that  ho8tili-
tie8  c®a8®  at  once.     The  question  for  Truman   t®  decide
wag  *h®ther  or  not   the  Unlt®d  States  Shoula  Bend  forc®e
to  stop   the  North  Korean  aggre8Blon.     He  explained  how
Years p.   352.
9Th®   New   York  Times
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h®  reBch®d   tl\at   decl®1on  as  follov4:
In  my  generation.  this  wag  not  the  first  occasion
when   the   strorig  had  attacked   tl`®  w®&k.      I  r®c&11ed
Some  earlier  ingtotic®s:     Mancliuria,  Ethiopia.
Austria.      I  remembered  how   eoc]i   tlm®   that   t}`ie   defBo-
craci®e  foll®d  to  act  lt  had  encouraged  the  aggrcg-
8or.   to  k®op   gol[ig  &l`®fld.     Communism  *08   acting  ln
Korea  just  a8  Ifltl®r,   Mussollni.  and  the  Ja!'.ane8c
had  flcted  ten.  fifteen,  and  twenty  yearB  ®arller®
I  felt  certain  thflt  if  South  Korea  wac  allowed  to
fall  Communist  leaderl  would  be  ®tbboldened  to  over-
ride  natlonfi  clofl®r  to  otir  own  Shores.     If  the
Communists  wore  permitted   to  force   their  w€`y   into
the  Republic  of  Korea  without  o|.po8itlon  from  the
free  world.  no  Small  nation  would  have   the  courage
to  reai8t   tlir®at8  tind  aggrea3ion  by  Stronger  Com-
muniBt  neighbors.     If `thlB  va8  allov®d   to  go  un-
challenged  it  would  Dt.an  a   third  world  war,   just
aB   Similar   incldentJB   liad  brought  on  the   g®¢ond
world  vcr.     It  also  waft  cle€ir  to  me   thfit  the  foundQ-
tiona  and  t}ie  principl.a  of  the  United  NfltionB  were
at   stake  unlegg   this  unpr`ovok®d  attack  ori  Xorea
could   b®   gto|t|]®d.10
Truman'8  mintl  waB  made  up  wlitn  l`t]  arrived  cat
tl`®  airport.     Acheaon  and  S®cr®tary  of  D®f®nBe   Loui8
Jo)ineon  v®re  valting  for  him.     They  hurried  to  the
Blalr  House  which  wac  b®1ng  used  by  Truman  slnc®   th.
Whlt®  House  uae  being  ,r®novat®d.      Truman  then  lnvlted
the  `Joint  Chi®f@   ®f  Staff  and  other  nt}viser8   to  a
dinner  conference  in  order  to  di8cu8g  what  action  Should
b®   t8k®n   imni®diateiy.LL
Truman  told  hlB  adviB®rB  that  he  vfla  die.atle-
fled  with  the  resolution  adopted  by  the  S®curlty  Council
Binc®  it  did  not  threaten  the  North  Kor®ane  With  any
Years .   pp.   332-333.
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intervention  by  tile  United  ff®tioriB.     His  advisers
agreed  that  8   .Stronger  resolution  uas  n.ed®d.     In  the
m®tinti"®.   `rruman  ordered  fien®rtil   MacArthur   to   ®vacuat.
by  air  the   two   th{.us&nd  A"®rictin8   living  in  Seoul.     t}e-
lieving  that   the  South  Korean  eirmy  had  a   strorig  fight-
ing  capacity  and  was  qBolaentarily  &ufferlng  from  the
initi&l  shock  of  th.  invasion.   Truman  €]lso  ordered
HacArtliur   to  rush   8u[3plie8   to   them  by  alrdrop.     ^g  a
third  order   to  &iac,.``rthur.   Truman  asked  tli&t   the  United
Stat®8  Seventh  Fi`leet.   then  off   the  TJhllippines.   be
ru8h®d  to  the  r`ormosen  StraitS   ill  order  to  prevent   tile
Communist.  from  attacking  FordoB&.     This  woilld  also
prevent  Chiang  Hal-ghek  from  att®cklng  the  Chinee®
mainland  from  which  h®  had  been  driven  seven  months
®ari®r.[£     A8   a   result.   F`ormo®a   wag  n®utrt.ilig,ed.
There  was  no  {]ue8tion  ln  t,he  mlndg   of  most
American.  aB   to  who  were   the  real  aggre#BorB   in  K®rea.
Although  no  proof  could  be   obtained  to  d®t®rmin€   the
extent  of  Soviet  ptirtlci|}fition  in  the  war.   it  was
commonly  acc®}.ted  by  tlie  public,   a8  veil  ®8   th.
American  gov®rnmcnt.   that  lt  wac  the  Russitins.  rather
than  the  North  Zcorean.i,  Who  really  ran  the   Show.
In  1960,   Pawel  "oiiat,   tin  ex-13oll8h  officl&1  who
fled  Poland  with  his  wif.  and  family  in  1959.  qrote
an  article   for  ±±£±  magazi]ie  entitled  .''Russlans  in
Xor®a:      the   i}idd©n  Bogs®®.''     In   thl8   article.   Ijonat
tells  of  hie  official  activitic&  in  Korea  a8  a  Com-
munist  military  advlBer,  and  of  his  actual  encounters
with  Rug$1ans  who  were   1n  Korea  to  aid  the  Chinese
Conrmunlst   forces  who  by   thfit   tizbc  had  entered  the  War.
12Trunl"n-. Yetlr`, p.    53Jl.
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He  eald  in  part:
.   .   .   I   ttoarded  &  a,hinat$8   train  at  *lukden,   in
lt¢rincl'iuritR,   for   tlie   ride   t®   the   Y@lu  Etiv®I-tiorder.
I  trmvelied  tgith  a   group  of  &bout  two  hundred  "®n,
call   dressed  in  the   green  8umrmer  unlformE   of   the
Chinese  Peo}`,la'g  Volunteers.     But  they  were  not
Chineg®   &t  &lli   they  tiere   l{usgiang--and  not  just
the  Ru88ian  fflilit&ry  advisers   I  head  expected  t®
see.     These  fflen  Were   combat   troopg:     Mlfi  pil®tE
from  the  Soviet  air  force,   combat  ®ngine®r8.  and
antl-aircrraft  guliner8.     They  were  going  to  Korea
to  fight.
Tlie  secret  of  these  S®viet  fighters  in  Korea
w&8   8o   carefully  k®r]t   from  the  fa`®Bt  th&t,   to  my
knowledge  at  least,   the  United  Nntion8  forc€g
were  never  @bl®  to  pr€®®nt  ariy  real  proof  of
Soviet  particiT3ation ....
ft`igfii&n  pilots   d.itl   most   ®f   the   CommuzListB'
fighting  1n  the  air  battles  betw®®n  HIGS  and
U.   S.   Sdibre   jets.     Soviet  dnti-aircrtift  I)catteries.
pi&nted   till   over   N®rth   ELor®a.   shot   down   U.   wS®
planes.     .£ovi¢t  combat   engineers  constructed
bridges,   ro@r]g.   and   tunnels   to  fae®p  amnluniti®n
and  Other  8upplieg  rmoving  to  the  front.     And  what-
ever   succ€$8   the  rvorth   fi®r®flng  had  a&r&1n8t   the
U.   H.   f®rc®s   tgr®g   due   t®   the   liundref+Sg   of  Soviet
advlB€rg  Who   tr&in®d   theln.     When   I  wag   tha®r®,   dt
1®aat   5,GOO  Soviet  officer ff  and  Soldiers  were  on
active  duty  either  in  Korea  or  just  over  the  Y&lu
ltlv®r  on  the  tllfi  b&@®g   in  Manchuria.13
0n  "ond®y.   Juno   26.   the   news   from  XorSca  wcaf
axtrGniely  pessimistic.     Truman  received  a  m®ssa8e
from  G®n®ral  HacArthur  w]`ich  read  in  }iart:
South  Koreaii  units  unable  to  resist  det®r"ined
Northern  offensive.     Contributory  factors  exclusive
enemy  po88eGBion  of   ttilikg   and  fighter  |pl@ne8.
South  Korean  c&sualtieS  @8  &n  index  to  fighting
have  not   Shown  BdequQte  reBigt&nc®   c®pat]1litieB
::in:J::t:i::|±:]\,::8::  ::Hid:::t:££imate  is  that  8
L3£.`awe|   rsonflt.   IlflusBifinB   in   Korea:      the   Hidden
Bosses,M  i±£±.   4{j   (Jurie   a7,1960}.   76.
L4F*xcerrit  of  "essase  of  I)ouglas  "acArthur  cited
by  Truman.   Ye&rs,   p.   337.
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Truq)tin  now  re&liz®d  that   it  t.ould  be   lmpo891bl®
for   the  S®utli   Kor®tln  for.cos   to  hold  their  own.     Rhee'8
govornm®nt  lifld  been  forced  to  flee  from  Seoul.   And  it
looked  ®s  if  South  Kor®®  would  be  lost  if  action  wa.
not   taken  imm®dltltely.     At  nine  o'clock  thcit   evening
'rruman  hold  canoth®r   confor®nce  with  his  advi8®rs  at
the   Blair   IIouB®.      It  wa®   d®clded   that   Gt*n€ral  Mac-
Artl.iur  Would  begin  using  air  and  naval  l`orcee   to  flupport
South  Korea.   but   8p®cific   lnBtructionB   d®1`1nlt¢1y  were -
to  b®   included   ln  Maci\rtliur'B   ord®rB  forbidding  him  to
operate  north  of  the  thirty-eighth  p&rall®l.     AlthouglL
no  mention  v®8  made   of   coBimltting  United  StateB   ground
forces.  Truman  instructed  Ache®on  to  call  another  meeting
of   tll®  Security  Council. 16
On  Tu®Sdeiy.   June   27.   the  Security  Council  met
once  again   in   L€`ke  Succ®8B.   New  York.     United  States
del®gat®  Worr®n  Auatln  intr`oduced  a  reeolutlon  re-
cotnm®nding   that  mcmbcr   Btate8
.   .   .   furni.h  Such  assiettince  to  the  Republic
of   Korea  a&  may   be  n®ce&8ary   to  repel   the  arioed
attack  and  to  restore   inter]iational  I.etlc®  1n
that  areca.16
Agfiin.   Itus)81a   wets   riot   pl-®8®nt   due   to  the   boycott.
tgith   1`'`oland  and  Cz®chosl®vakla   also  aL)Bent.   the  r®Bolu-
tion  paBBed  by  fi  vote  of  goven  in  fciv®r  to  on.  agaln8t
(Tugo8|avia}.17     Although  ltuBsia   l®t®r  cl`tllleng®d  the
legcality  of  the  resolution,   the  Security  Council
Ttledged   to   Our.port  what®v®r  action  Truman  thought  Would
be  needed  to  r®lj®l   tli®  aggre88ors.
L5Truntan.
16The   New
__  .I_ I     ____
Years p.   )37.
York  Times
17EE±..  ,).i.
.   2`9  June,   1950.   P.   i.
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At  four  A.   }S..   on  Thursday.   June   29,   General  ltac.-\rth`ir
held  a   teletype  radio  confo]`enc®  with  the  Joint  Chiefs
of  Stafl`.     H®   informed  them  th{.t  South  Korea  wag  about
to  collap8e  and  that  the  only  way  to  prevent  Such  a
cata8troph®  would  be  to  sen{l  United  Stat®8   ground
combat  forces  into  the  Korean  area.     Secretary  of  the
Army  Fra*ik  Page   tLwak®n®d  Truman  at   flvG  A.   M.   and   told
him  of  MacArthur.8  recommendation.      ''Inform  MacArtliur
ilnunediutely.W   he   gaid.   I'tliat   the  use  of  on.  r®gimelital
combat   teflm   ln  approvedrL8     The  war   in  Korea  wag   now
011,
Since  Truman  had  co""itted  tJnited  Stat®®   ground
forces  to  Support   th.  South  Korean  troops.  the  next
move  wag   to  e8tabli8ll  a   ¢l®ar  I.olicy   tovarrl.  tlli8   con-
f lict   go   that   no  one  Would  i`,.]ve  arly  doubts  about   the
United  Str'`tes  po8itlon.     Trumcan   exitl&in®d   this   }iolicy
a8   follows:
The  National  Security  Council  met  again  Thursday,
when  Secretary  of  i)®fen6e  John.on  introduced  a
proposed   directive  to  G®neral  FtacArthur.     The  final
paragraph  of  tliig  !irortoged  dir®ctiv®.   however.  per-
mltted  an  implication  that  ve  were  I+lanning  to  go
to  war  with   the   Soviet   Unioti.     I   ®tcated  categorical-
ly   tli&t   I  did  not  wish   to  see   even  the   8li{nghtest
implictltion  of  Such  a  plthn.     I  vant®d  to  take
::::yb::::dn:i:8;SEX  ::r::::I:h®B::r:hv::::3n:o
be   8ur®   that  wo  would  not   b®colne   so  deeply   commit-
ted  in  Kor.a  thflt  w®  could  not   take  care   of  other
Such   sitLiation8  es  might   develop.19
Thus.  Truman  lot  it  be  known  that  it  va8  not
the  policy  of  the  United  States   to  fight  a  tJ&r.     The
vcr  ln  K®+'oa  vas  a   limited  war--1n  the  Bense   that  ob-
jcctlv®s  w®r®   limited.     The   obj®ctlve6   of   the  United
L8st&toment   I)y  ]|arry  S.   Truman  cited  by  St®in-
berg.   TJ.   378.
[9Truman. Y®ar8 p.   34.
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States   included  driving   the  Nortin  Korefln8  back  acro8B
€h®  thirty-eighth  i]arall®l,   and  no  ntore.
Truman  WQB   alffo   concerned  €.ibout  an  offer  from
Chiang  Kai-sh€k   t,o  gend  thirty-three  thou®&nd  Formo8€[n
troops   to  f[orea.     f'Z®  vaB   ln  favor  of  accepting  the
offer  Since  he  conglder®d  lt  essential  that  tJnlted
Nations  m®nib®r8   be   ei`courag®d   to  rtarticipate.     Acl`®son.
inowever.,   con8id®red   it  inconsistent   to  |jrotect  Formo8&
with  the  United  `qtates  S®v®nth  Fleet  while  its  native
defenders  fought  some  place  else. 20
By   the   end   of   the  week.   F:.nglfind,   New  2:ealand.
.Australia,   Canada.   and   the   Netlierlancls   {tledg®d   t®
8`itiport  militarily  the  United  States   1n  Korea. 21
In  addition   to  h®{-irlng   tt`Le   title   of   Supreone   Allied
Commander  in  the   Far  F.ast,   General  hi&cArthur  wa81ater
flppoint®d  Coselmander   of   United   Nations   !I`orce8   in
Korea  in  order  to  ]ielp  organize  the  troops  from  the
various  Uiiited  H8tlonB  mGmberB   into  a   coristructive
fighting  force.    HacArthur'a  title  often  confused
`m&ny  people  a8  to  where  hlg  ultimate  re8pori8ibility
lay.     Af`ter  rii8  recftll.  "acArthur  t®stifled  before
joint  heiiring8   c®nduct®d  by  tli®   Senate  Armed  Services
Comaroltt®e   and  the   Seliat®   i;`oreign  !t®lationa   Committee
thmt  hiti  ultimate  responsibility  was  to  the  tJnited
St&t®8   State   Dertartment  and  to  the  F''resident   ol`  the
United  States.     In  respong®   to  a  que#tion  concerning
this  matter,  MacArthur  te8tifl.d:
Senator,   my  connection  with  the  United  NatioriB
wtls   larffely  nominal.     There  tJere  provisions  made
2°Trum€in.  ±.  p.  542.
2Lwcounci|   |teviewB   .Membe!rE   Jt.espoll84t,
Nations  ijulletin IX   {.Tuly   15.1950}.   49.
I,     United
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thtlt   th®   ®ntirfl   c¢ntrol   ¢±-  ffly   cDEN#tnd  tina   ®v®ry-
thirl&   I   dtti   c€tm®   from   oilr   Own   t}l}1®fs   of   +qtf±ff   diritt
my   chtlnnel   or   conErmL&nica?,i{in   haJ&g   d®t!igne€]   aS   the
<`-trmy   Chicaf.   til'   ,Stsf{*.
F„V®»   ttie  r€{¥ort#  t*hic{i   tf®re   mar+catllly   raade   by
me   t®   the   Unlt®d  ffiationB   ut!r.®   8ubject   to  cen8®r-
8I`ip   fey   our   .tt+t&t®   and   BSf®riBe   I}®prart"®ntff .      I   h&d
no   ct."j}ectJ t.in  tflth  the   tjnited  FT&Llom4!  *t`iltso®ver.
'flSE   fill.ITAliY   .5ITt}ATlfiN
2£
Tltca  firBt   AmcaricAin   ground   tro®p®   1rito   Xor®a
utrr®  "€cebBr8  of   the  Twenty-fourth  lnfueri€ry  ljivi$1on,
ttlio   confrout®d   the   ke+ort!.i   &or®finti  ffit   tli®   city   af   tiescan,
directly   Houth   ot-Seoul.      A   c®Hrmunl{xp®   fr®tsi  T®tryo,
put`Lili@h®tl   im  E:±±!±±  rm£§;affilne   bo4!t   dtiscrib®g   the   out-
a On'® 3
Tzi®   1ssolctt®d  unit   af   le#&   tlra!i   a,ne   bt*tt&Llon
Bugrr;ort®d   hy   ¢n®   tj®ttt9ry   t!f   fi®lti  al.tl].®ry,   t*hlGh
w@#   at   osfln   y®fit"rde`y,   tm®  di€tf.`cit®tl   try   tS`G   t}®St
r&®`d   dlvlfiion,   *ufsp®rt®{]   l>y   forty   tBnk#.   which
wt§re   extr®tB®ly   ckillfully  ffi&an®uvered.     The  rditi®
of   tro®tiS   ting€ag®d  trees  "or®   €h&n  eight   to   one
®#alnst   the   t\mtiricdt(`   *ftorc®#.      F&or  "or®   than   61se
h®lirff   tile   j*`rR®ric#*n   fflrc¢#   heltl   of f   the   invcatS®ra
until   thnlr   o!±rmuiliti®n  vca8   €xli#q3t®d.   tend  tft®n
wlthdreer ....   The  jAm®rlcdin   forcee  tp®r®   being
®nve}`®p@d   on  hotl`   fiflnkB.      T}i®y   u®r®   c®nfront®d
:::¥£:ttr;:::=::f#:er:::r:a:¥::d::v:=:p:::t:#&Ly
rfift®r   O8€*n  fell   to   the   !8®rtha   Kor®d*m.£,    the   Ljtilt®d
22T®gtiRI{tny   ®f   Ht}t]S|"@   .petlcArti¥ur   ca!`}pe&ring   in
tJr)it®¢l   Stfit®E   8®Ti&te.   pr,|5hty-±jccortd   C®*igr®ss,   Flrutt
Sej!8iaii,   Cou±fubilt.tee   on   F\rthod   S®rvlce#   and   Committ®G   ®n
#   tuution  lit-I-_   -_-___i   -_          ---__   _i=          .       ___- se gjf ae.For¢1gn   r3®latjcanB ,   REllitcary
pflrt  I   (#a#lling toft§      {iov®i.I`ro®Itt   r*rlntin&   t}fflcc,1951}.
p.    10.       f!erefiftt±r   refGj`r®(I.I   t®   &fi   ±ig__g±±=±[±±;i;±.
a5
Commulliq`1e   from   Tokyo   aT}{7e;`ring   in   ''Battle   of
Korea."  [±,     LVI   (July  2'1,1950),   2().
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States   cofnlnand®rB   u8e{]  ro(`d  min®g   ttnd   brldg®   demolitions
in  a   futl.I.  att®m}jt   to   Stop   them  from  advaricir.g  ally
farther.     Re{`lizing  that  lt  would  tf`ke  troop  reinforce-
me]`t8   to   Stop   the   North   Kor®tln8,   F!acArtl`ur  and  his
field  commantler,   }]ajor  tiener€`1  tr.illiflm   F.   Dean.   agrt!ed
to  retreat  to  the  South. 24
'l`ruman  ord®r®d   trie  Second  Infantry  Division  and
the  First  lilarine   Divi8ioii  to  T`I.®pare   to  lnove   into
Korea,   but  MacArthur   complaln®d   to  the   Joint  Chief€
of  Staff  that  n®  voula  need  glx  allied  {livlsiong  be-
1`or®  the   North  Korcalis   could  be   effectively   checked.25
Later.   wh®n  asked  b®for®   the  joint  }iearings   of  the
S®nat®  Armed  Services  and   Foreign  'rtel.|tions   Committe®£:
whether  or  not  he  had  been  supplied  with  sufficient
troops.  I.lac^rthur   testified:
I  h€`v®   constantly   iigk®d   1`or   mc`r®   troops   than
I  was  able  to  obt&1n.   Senator,   from  the  very
beginning  of  h{}stlliti®g.     The  nurmber9   th.it  were
avi^ilable   to  n]e  were   limited,   and  I  was   informed
::a:h:tc:::::i6  and  With  Wht`t  I  had  I   di{]  the
Wliil-MacArtl`ur  waitet`l  for  more   troops,   the
sltuatlon   for  the   Unltod  Nation.  f ®rc®B  waf)   b®coJiiing
de8perat®.     1`h®   North  Korecans   wore   pushllig  rapidly
toward  }'u8ctri.   the  heel   of   the  Korean  peninsula.   and
MacArthur  was   determined  not  to  let  it   fall.     Th®
United  N.ation8   forced  were  with{]rawn   to   uliat  }{ac-
Arthur   cflJ.led   the   ''Pu®an  ]'®rimet®r."  a   line   of  de-
fense  around  the  Pusan  area.     In  ad{}ition,   he  appointed
24wBatt|e   of   Korea,W  I±.   LVI   (July   17i   1950).
17.
25E±.'  18.
26Testinoriy   o£`   noug|ens   }lacALgivthur   appearing   in
J7ettrings.   peirt   i,   pp.   9-1{}.
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I,ieutenc`nt  General Waltoli H. Walker  aB  ground commander  in
Koretl  with  the   title  of  Commending   G®ner#l  of   the
F`ar   i;ast   Cofflm&ndla   F.Ightli  f`rmy.27     b'1||i&m  f .   I)ean
wag  t,laced  in   comm;`nd  of   the  'rwet`ity-fourt.h   lnfcintry
Division.
MacArthur   believed   tha`t  h®  could  trick   the
North  it-oreans   into  believing  tliat  Ilo  had  a   l€ii-ge
force.     If  this   could  be  &ccompli8hed,   he  might
prevent   the  North  Hor®ans   frorl  launching  a  D&jor
attack  agaln8t  ltuBan  until  his  reinforcements  arrived.
He  d®clded  to   trana[port  hla   troops   to  Korea   by  air  in
or{]er  to  m€`ke   t}ie   enemy   think   that   these   troops  were
merely  relnforcin.q  the   tri}{}`pg   being  t].ansported  by
Beca.     McacArthur   later   d®8cribed   his  strdt®gy!
I   threw   in  trooi3a   by   air   in   the  lio|je  of
est€iblishlng  a   locus   o£`  resi.et+]nc®   around  which
I  could  rally   the  fast-retreating  South  Korefln
1`orcoB.      I   also   horjed   by   thdrt   arrog{2nt   disr}lay
to  fool   the  enemy  into  a  belief   that  I  had  gr®&ter
reflources   Qt   my   dis}>o8€il   thtm   I   ha{].    .    .   The
enemy.   .   .   could  llot  und®r8tand   that  we   ct)uld
make   suc}i  an  effort  wltn   such  a   fti"all   force.
Instead  of  rushing  ra}iidly   forwarf}   to  r>ugfin.
which  he  could  have  reached  within  a   week  without
tlie   81ightest   dif£1cLilty,   he  stor]ped   to   deploy
his   cartillery  across   t.he  }Jan.     ``je   galn®d   ten
day®   by   that  ]trocess.28
0n  July  31.   while  United  h'ationB   forces  were
defending   tl`c   r'u8tln  rJ®rimeter.   }fact\rthur  flo.v   to  Por-
mo8a   to  confer  wit]`  Chiang  Kni-sl`ek.     Since   he  had  been
ordered  by  T`rumari   to  See   that   Formosa 'was  adequately
defended.   M€`cArtl`ur  called  his   trip   ''a   Short
27Mstrat®gy,n   :I:iEiE.   LVI    (July   2'h   1950)®   20.
285tthtement   by   }`ou&`l&g   llacAr.thur   cited   by
.Stoinberg,   pr).   379-3f,?io.
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recormais8ance  of  the  poteri.tial  ®f  its  d®fenge  ag&ingt
posgib|.  attmck.W29     The   United  St&tes  wfls   now   comfflitted
to   the   defen8®   oi`  rrormoga,   £`nd  MacArthtir  had  promised
t®  refuge  politely  f`,hi&ng.Ig  offer  of  troops  for  fior®a
on   the   bti^ngis   th<`t   a   Commun±gt   atttlck  agflinst   I+-®rmo8a
might   t}e   imminent.     MacArthur  held  a   cordictl  meeting
tiith  Chiang  &nci   left   him   8fiying!      "XBep  your-chin  u}},
we're   going   to  trim.w3°
Shortly  after  }]acArthur  hod  left,  a,hiang
announced   to   the   pr®s8   that   lie   and  REacArt}tur   op`!]oBeck
Pr®8ident  Truman'8   i>®1icy   ®f  neutr&li*,ing  rfr`orHlos&.
It®   also   boaSte{l   thcat   ?i+*cArtht]r   had   gug&eLst®d  that
the   taptltiori€ilist  Chinese   forces   8ht>uld  b®  allowed   to
wage   an  «|isgregsiv®   Campfil.¥n  agr*eninfft   the   Chineg®
malnltlnd. 31
Truman  wag   furious.     While   the  I.`ormosan  question
marked  the  initial  policy  di8put®   betw®£n  Truffian  &nd
M&cArthur,   t.he  Jlr®©id®nt  felt  that  the  problem  wag
primarily  caused  by  t}ie  fact  that  direct  corsimunication
hoetw®rm   himself  and  REacArthur  had   been   too   infrequent.
In  8n  attempt   to  e8tabli8h   b®ttcr  communication  b®-
tw®®n   tz.ie  Lt'hit®   i!cuse   and  &tacArthur.   'rruman,   on  August
3,   dispatched  /`verell  llarriman   to  Tokyo   to  ediscusg   the
Fear   [`}&stern  politic€Sl   situation  with   him.      Harrim&n's
reriort   to   Trumtan   (1®scrlbed  i,i&c.A\rtziur'8   attitude   tonrartl
i?orrmofla   as   follows:
In  may  fir.qt   ttilk  with  M®cArthur.   I   told  him
the   L>re3ident  we*nted  me   to   tell   him  he  fituat  li®t
29st&teffl©nt   by  |}ouglas  FlacArthur  a!}pearlng  in
•liieconnais#anc€>   1n  Formosa,"  E±::i,   4tL,I   (August   14,
1950)'   22.
50Eue-  £#.
3LTruman,  r±,  „  554.
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permit  Chiang   to  be   tli.   ccause   of  Starting  a  war
with   the  Chinese  Cormunigt&   on   the  utainland.   the
effect  ol   which  might   drag  ug   into  a  world  war.
Ilo  answered   thrit  he  would.  as  a   soldier.   obey
any  orders  th&t   he  r®c®ived  1`rom   the  I`resideiit.
}ie   Said   tl`at   ,i®  had   discu`qsed   on].y  mj.1itary  matt,erg
with   the  fieneralissimo  on  hl8   trlF`  to  Formosa.     He
had  r®fu8®d  to  discuss   any  |iolitictil   subjects
vllcnever   the  Genertili8flimo  attem}]ted   to   do  8o.
The   faener®11i3slmo   liad   offered   him  con'imt*nd   of   the
Chlnose  Nation.ll  troops.     Hacjt`rthur  replle(I  that
that  `Ja8  not  tlppropriat®,   but   that  h®  would  be
willing  to  give  military  I.dvice  if  requogted  by
th.  Generaliesimo  to  do  so ....
F`or  r®a8ons  which  €ii.e   difficult   to  explain.   I
did  not  feel   that  we  came   to  a  full  agre®m®nt
on   the  w,qy  we   heLieved   things   .chould  be  handled
on  Formo.qa   and  with  the   r`eneralissltlio.     H®   accepted
th.  Pr®8ident'a  position  and  vlll  act  accordingly.
but  without   1`ull  conviction.52
0n  ^uguBt   14.   the  J®int  Chiefs   of  Staff   i8su®d
to  l*iacArthur  a   8tate"ent   of  United  States  policy  toward
Formosa.     Truman   thought   tlij.tt   8inc®  MacArthur  was   now
familiar  wit.h  Washington'#   official  }`ormofan  policy.
no  more  would  b®   said.
On   August   26.    t.lie   F¢'hlt®   llouse   r`re8g   I{oom
t}rought  Trumein   n   copy   of  a   Statement  wl`ic}l  Ganer&l
M€ic+lirthur   had  Bent   to   tl`c   Comniander   ln  Chief  of   the
Veterans   of   Foreign  Wtir3.      It   &e®med   thf`t  hlcaci`,rthur
had   been  asked  by   the   Veterf`nB   {}f   Foreign  W.&rg   to   Bend
th.in  a   6tatem€nt  which  would  be  read  at   th®1r  annual
convention  ln  Chicago.     The  complete  text   of   the   et/.`te-
ment  vae   printed   in  a  weekly  maga7-ine  vhlch  wag  al-
r®f*dy   in   the  mallg.
MacArthur'a  statem®}it   criticir.®d  the  neutrali-
zation  of  Pormo8a   fr{}m  a   military   titandpoint.     This,
32r;xcerpts
citeci   by  Truman,
from  reiiort   of  Aver®ll   r]arriin@n
Y a f\ r g pp.   551-352.
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lie  felt,  tras  a   legitifmte   I.r®rogativ®   t)f  his.   slnc®
the  Supreme  Allied  Coen"nder  in   the  Far  F.ast   is  moSt
ftlmiliar  with  the  flilittlry   gitutltlon  in   th{Att  area.
rle  said   in  pelrt:
Nothing  could  b®  more  fallacious   than  the  thread-
bare   8r&umerLt   of   those   who  &dvocat€   apt)®e]8ement
and  def®atlam  in   the  Pacific   that   if  tf®   d®f®nd
£::us:;:a:etf,:: e3:t:a:0:::re':::::dA:i:.or:::::33  jK
A|tl`ous.h  FTac{\rthur   considered  it  his  right,  as
well   as   his   duty.   to  ext>r®B8   r]ubllcLy   on  milital`y
affairs,   Truman  con8id®red  }lacArthur'a  statement  &8
an  att&ck  agai]`8t  h].fi  hagic   foreign  policy  rather
than  1]18  military  riollcy.     Said  t`ruman!
It  was  my  opinion  thnt   this  Statement   could
only   nerve   to   confu8®   the  World  @8   to  what   our
Formosa  policy  was.   for   it  wag  at   odds  with  my
announcement  of  June  27,   and  lt  also  contr€`dicted
what   I  had   told  the  Congreg8.   .   .   ®
Of  course.   I  Would  never   deny  G®ner®l  }iacArthur
or  anyone  else  tile  right  to  differ  with  ln®  in
opinions.     The   of±`1clal  po&1tion  of  the  United
St`.3,tog,   however.   ie   defln®d   by   dec±8iotl'fl   and
declarations   of   the  Pr®gldent.     Th®r®   cftn  b®
::::t:;®ix°:i:  ±i`®::a::ngo:::g:°::::::a::.§H±g   iF
Truman  met  with  th®  Joint  Chiefs  ol.  Staff  that
morning.     ^ch®son.   I)efenB®   Secretary  Johnson.   Jolin
Snyder.,   and  Averell  Harriman  were   €ila.a  invited.     Truman
read  NacArthur'8   &tatetn®nt   to   them  and   announced   that
}i®   had   ®®rio'u8ly   con8idel-®d  I`®1ieving  }1tlcArthur  of  his
Par  lfast®rn  Com"`nd.   but  ®tlll   leaving  him  in  charge   ol`
35Excerpt   froffl  me8#age   of   Douglas  M@c^rthur
app®orlng   in   ''ftyo  VoiceS."  £±E±,   LVI   (S®ptemb®r   4.
1950).   9.     See   compl®t®   text   of   M.RCArtliur's   et!ite-
ment   in  Appencllx   I,   pp.   .I~l].-I:.]/i.
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the  Japtin®se  occu}tqtion.      On  second  tliought.   he  had
d®cid®d   that  a   d©motion   for  MtlcJ\rthur  would  dapez.,Lee  !lis
concern.     He  told  the  group  that  it  must  be  knoun  to
everyone  that  ltacArttiur's  gt&t®ment  {!id  not  represent
the  officica|  policy  of  the  United  States.     n®f8nBe
Secretary  Johnson  vaB  Ordered  to  8elid  Mac;\rthur  the
following  m®ssag®I
The   I.r®sid®rlt   of   tile   tj.nit®d  St{..t®s   directS  you
to  withdraw  your  ftyegBaee®   for   National  t3ncfatapment.
of  Vet®rfin®   of  Por®ign  W`'&r8.   because  v-rioug
features  with  re8T>®ct  to  Forcoosd  are  ln  conflict
With  the  policy  of   tl.le  United  St&t®s  and  ltB
position  in  the  `Jnited  N&tion8.35
Although  MacArthur   still   felt   thE*t  lie  had  the
right   to  ftfite  his  military  Vi®``'8  publicly,   h®  com-
pll®d  at   once  with   Trumal)'8   r®qu®8t.     T}ie   damag;a  was
rton®,   however,   as   far   a8  Truman  was   c®ric®rn®d.      Mac-
Artliur's   8tntottie»t  vac   not  read  at   the  VeterEinfi   of
Foreign  h'ars  Convention,   but   it  wats  pub],ighed  in
U,    .5,    Itotys==          _i          '_  __ ___i cand   World _It_?=P_9=r_t.       j`&   g±±g±   maffcazine    sum-
marir,®d  the  dig*)ute,
Ilarry  Truman   di{J  whi&t   not   evc]i  FI`anklin
ltoosevalt  !iad   the  temerity  to  do.     |^|e  ordoroi|  X
L}ougl&s   REacArtJiur   to   shut   up.      The   Pr`®8id®Iit'H
suranary  order  arrived  in  Tokyo  ghortiy  a£.'ter  mid-
ni`ght   }!onday  mornlt`g.     There   im  his   h®€idqueirt®rs
in  tile   not   lchi  t}uilding,   fienerfll  A£[±c,4rtriur  made
the  only  declaion  h®  could  make.     He  8ilently
Saluted  1]18   commnnd®r   in  chief  across  b,769
miles  of  ltind  {`nd  Ocean.   and  shut  up.
But  for  whi`t  Harry  Truman   intended   to  accoRIplifili.
the  order  had  b®®n  given  too  lat..     A   atfltenient
by  MacArtJiur.   drawn  with   the  obvious   lnt®ntion
of  making  cailitary  8ense  out  of  the  ^dmifti.qtra-
:::n::r::=;rtg::nv::::i::1::a:{s'L±:yt::  tpr.?rg?;8 .
Y a a I. s I"   556.
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INCHON   AND   WARE    ISLAND
Throughout  August.   the   North  Koreans  con-
tinued   th®1r  aB8ault  agFIln,qt   trie  ru.an  1>eripeter.
fteneral   \*;&lk8r.g   Eighth  Army   co`ild   do  Ilo  lnore   tlian
defend   the   Fuean  Perimeter,   but  he  managed  t®  hold
the  area  intact  while  reinforcements  Were  obtained.
By   S®pt®mber,   }tacArtllur   w4i8   r®@dy   t®   begin
taking  the  initi€itiv®  in  hor®a.     He  had  decided  tliat
the  best  Btr&tegy  would  be   to  attack   t,h®  enemy  where
he  least  expected   lt.     MflcArthur  k)lew   that  G®neral
James  Wolf.  had  captured  nu®bec   from   the   Fr®ncli  in
1759,   becaug®  he  tltt`|cked   tlle  city  from  the  South
after  his  troops  had  &caled  the  almo-qt  p®r[.ondiculc-`r
river   banks.37    The  move  ca`ight   the  F`rench   com-
i:`let®ly  by  sur|.rigei   and  MacArthur  believed  tliat   the
best   i.l{ice   to   st.cig®   his   Quebec   would   be   at   Inchoi`.
Ioczat®d   on   the  v®Bt   coo.t   of   Korea,   Just   South  of   the
thirty-eighth  p&r&llel.     Trumfin  approved  the   lnchon
ilivaslon  rl{in.   calling  lt   ''®  detring  ,strfltegic  con-
Ce{.ttion.w38
0n   Se}-ite"ber   15,   the   X   Cor|is.   comrloB®d   of
troops   from  the  First  Mf&rine  i)ivlaion  and  the  Armu'8
Seventh  Infantry  Division,   under  tl`e  lo8dersliiij  of
ffajor   G®n®ral   I±dward   N.   Almond,   went   ashore   &t
lnchon  and  eatabli8hed  a   I)each®ad.     The  landing  had
to   be   completed  wl:ilo   t,h®   ti<]®   w&s   lii&h   in   order
to  avoid  tll®  ahlp8   being  strcanded  on  the  rocks.
tnt   the  move  ccaught  the  North  Ror.ans   by  surprise,  as
37steinberg.   rh   383.
58Trumfln. Y®ar8 i,.   358.
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#&cArthur  had  eiliticipttted.      'rhe  r}lan  vtls   a   comf,`;l®t®
stJCeeg&.3€j
The   .t  Cor{is  uafl   then  under  orderei   t®   liber&t®
rj®oul.      ,,iilth®u#h   t!&®  regist{jiic®   w€is   8tr®ng.   S}eoul  tr.as
Libet-a{,®rl   by   Septeifiber   2{}.       On   Septel¥`ber   Z9,   jel`i®®
tgt®ved   iris   i,€®verun}ent   back   to   ?i®olll.40
93y   c€'`pturing   .L;®8ul,   the   'Ljnited   Nations   force.ii
were   &t}1e   to   cut   off   tite   .ftyortli   i:Lorean   snftF,1y   line.i!.
T`he   tyorth   Kor®&n  eiri%y  was   in  a   liel|tless   Situation
#i3ice   its   tr®or"q  were  gurrt.undGd  by   the  X  {:or¥`s   in
t`he   north  and  by  }#-&lkerlg   Eigr`th  .f\r"y   in  tli®   south.
As   titey  attefflpted  ta  retro€.±t   to  tile  iiorth,   tile  F,ight:h
+\rmy  broke   out   of   the  r!us&n   +J®rlfflet¢r  &nr}   1'allowed.
ray   the   tifste   5®t,Lth   Hore&   had   been  liber£'ted   to   the
thirty-ei+;nth   ptir®ii®1,LSD,Otjo   tw.orth   Fiore&n   tro{}[.a
h€`d   been   c&ptur®d.
'11
Tru"exn   gent  a  megs&age   of   congrestulati{]ng   t®
?.1acArtltur   which   r¢zcAd   as   £`{.11®wg=
I  know   th.tit   I  g}ieg`k  for  the  entire  American
p®opl®   when   I   send  y{iu   ."y   W€*I-f7!est   coS{grat.uliatio]}s
on  the  victory  wliict}  h€}H   beeri  acltieved  under   your
ltgL`}dership   in   KoreE`.      j``ew   o+}erations   in  military
hi.Story  ctln  mat,ch  either   the  delaying  &ctlon
where  you   tril{]6d   sp€`c®   for   time   in  which   to
build  uri  your  f®rctis,   or  the  hrilli±int  malienver
tr7hicb   hag   i`iow   resulted   ln   tli®   lib®rdttion  ol-   fieoul.
I   a.L4!fl   }3{.`,trticul£4rly   lm7`jressed   by   the   8i!lendld   co-
operfition  of  our   i''\rny,   Navy,   and  j\ir  Force,   dind
I   wish  you  wot±l{}   extenul  ray   thanks   And   c®ngrattl-
leitions   ta   the   c{}!!]#i€inder8   0±`   those   services--
i,ieuteliant   GenGr€iil   [riJ€Slttm   H.   t¢€`lkecr,   Vice
triiasir&1   Cl`iarles   T.   Joy   find   Lieutenant   Gener£^±l
-¥9Tf,®
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rn®®rge   F,.   .ngtrsr*temeyer.      The  unlfic&ation  of  our
®r"s   ogt&blished   hy   you   ®rid   by   t}``®m  h€ag   set   a
eshiming  exaffliL`l®.      F'iy   thanft8   &iid   the   tilt.*tks   of
the   Tteortle   of   tt`[l   fr€¢   nati®n&   g®   ot]t   to   yc*iigr
gall&mt   fnrcGs-~soldi®r8,   sfiilors,   marines  {`}nd
cairmen--from   tile   united   ;®.{tHteg   Cnd   ti2e   other
countries  flgh€ing  for  fr®®dom  under  tile  United
H&tioris   hoann®r.      I   B{tlutc  you  #11   gand   say   to  all   i(
::n::'dffr°"  fill   ®r  us   &t  !1tJtl]¢\   well  and  noh|y
Trum4anl$   1niti&l   instrnctionB   to  }{&cL`rt}iur  had
ordered  him  t®  |]ush  the  N®rth  Kor®tln#  back  acroS#   the
thirty-eiffhth  par'allel.     .Since   lnchon  hfld  prov®tl  atich
an   overwhel"in#   .Succ®¥5s,   i"-jtfevter,   Truinan   cri&IiF*Gd   i'ii8
mind.       tjn   t3®£..-jtG[rsb®r    27,    }i®    i8Su®d   n®tw-orders    lri   whiGii
he   i)1structed  }i€±c`t\rthur   th&t   his   ohj®ctiv®  wtl&   "the
de`titructien   of   the   ftT®rtl]   Ktlr®an  tr\rffi®{±   ff orc®s. „45
ingacftrteiur   Slots-w&8   &uthorizt¥ul   to   o{;ei`-ate   north   ¢f   the
t}iirty~eighth   p€`€rfill®1,    haul   't`rt2ffliin   c4-T.ution®d   him   t®
ufie   only   }€orefti']   troo:,,8   i[}   the  vicinit3,'   of   the  pe,t*n-
ciiuri€an  #`nd  Rusfii&n   b®rdorg   or   Rorea,   €"ic±  unc]er  no
circtimstance8  w®r®   any   H®r®an   troops   t®   cr®®s   the
t'Or a er ® 4£±
On  Oct®her  i,  Chou  r,It-l€ii.   the  foreign  minister
of  }t®d  Chllia,   &nn®unc®d   that   his   gov®rn"®nt  would   not
Stdind  by  and  8e®  lJortn  H®re&   invaded.     Th®ref®re.
ffiac.+\rthur,   reali#,ing  the  ®dvant&g€  ®f  havltig  tjnit®d
Wtltionfi'   Surtport   in  this  new  criglg.  t¥tiited  for   the
United  Natlona   fien®ral   AseseRIhly   to  p&sg  a   re8olutlon
ffiuthorlff.ing  him   to  proc®®d   into  Nort}i   Korea.     The
r€soluti®n  wvafi   &dopet®d   on   Oat,oh®]`   7.      friac.,\rthur   then
order-®tl   (.i®nel-£tl   t!e2lker   to   &{]v&nce   the   Eighth  Array  £`crosg
Yedrr§ p.   36Q.
45Eng„  ,„  360.
44EE¥.,  p.   560.
76
the  thirty-eight|i  parallel.45
rrun{.iti   became   concerned  {£bout   tti®   incretas31ng
llunber  of  re{>orts   thcat  lt®d  Chitica  might   intervene.
He  decided  tl`at  a   per8on&l  mB®ting  with  }]acArthur  wag
®sBentiail.      Gen®rQI   M&cArthur   agreed   to  rme®t   him   ®n
Sunday,   October   15,  at  twrake   I8,1€tnd  in   the  I'acific.
Although  Mac,&rtliur   later  €tdmltted  thtlt  he  had  be€!n
suspiciou#   about  Truman.a  m{jtiv®s  for  walitlng  the
meeting.   Truman  explt*1n®tl  his  re&sonirig  ag  followe:
The   first  and  ®impl®#t  r®dBon  wily   I  wanted   to
meet  uith  rieneral  Mac,\rth`ir  was  that  ue  liaT]  never
had  any  pergone!l   contacts  at  all,   find  I   thought  h®
oLight   to  know   his   C®men{*ntl®r   ill  Chief  and   that   I
ought   to  know   the   senior  f ield  c®rrmicandcr   in   the
!i`fir   t3a8t ,,,.
The  r®1ping  r®portg  of  threat,elied  intervention
in  Korea  by   the  Chinese  l`Qm"unistB  were  another
r®fag®n  for  cly   deBlre   t.a  confer  with  (ienerdl  Mac-
.i\rtriur.     I  wanted  to  get  the  lieliefit  or  riia  first-
hand  informfition  and  ju{`]ger,Sent.46
Truman'g   pl(`ne,   t}ie Ind® jondenc® &rrlved  ct
'i`'afa®   Island  ett   6:00  A.   M.     i\lac..\rthur  was  waiting  for
him  a8  he   gt®pp®d  down   the  ramp.      ''ili8   Shirt  w&B  un-
buttoned,  and  he  u8e  w®ijritig  a  cap  which  I.ad  evidently
seen  a   good   de{*l   of  ug®,"   Tr`I¢ti{m   later  r€cEalle{I.47
After  call®wlng  photograith®rg   to   t®k®  pictures,   M&c-
j\rthur  escorted  Truman  to  the  car  he  had  v€i'{iting  for
him.     It  was  a   battered  1948  Chevrol®t  sedan,   alld   the
two  men  hfld   to   climb  over   the   front   .q®at   fiinc®   the
rear   doors  W®r®   stuck.
45The   New
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They  drove   to  the  offlcc  ol`  the  airllrte  mHn..4g®r
on  the  island  and  talked  alone  for.  over  un  hour,  dis-
cussing  tli®  Ja),eanege  and  Korean  sltutitions.     }l,ttc.,'+rthur
assured  Truman  that   ttie  victory  ln  Korea  was  w.on.   ®x-
i.ilaitiing  that  there  was  little  ch*qric®  of  either  Chin®s®
®r  Soviet  intervention  in  Korea,  not  denying,  however.
the  remote  poe8ibllity.     He  also  ®xt®nd®d  an  eL]30logy
to  Trtitnan  for  his  statement  to   the  V.ter&ns  of  F®r®itngn
h'ar8,   and  Trumati  aasur®d  i`im  that  tlie  cage  vac  closed.49
At   7:45.   the  two  men  climbed  hack  into   the  sodan
and  made  a  quick  trip  to  faJ8ke   lsland'B  adminlgtration
buildiiig.     There  they  met  witli  advis®r8   to  discuss  the
Korean  81tt]&tion.     givacArthur  predicted  that   the  war
would   end   by  TI]anksgiving.      He  wtSultl   then  withdraw
other  forces  in  Korea  until  elec€1ons  would  be  held
Sometime   in  Jtlnuary.     once  again,   #acArthur  as8ur®d
the  group   tl.let  Chin®s®  or  Soviet   lnt®rventlon  was  most
unlikely.     Other  genertll   topics  v®r®  dl&cu33€d.   Such
as  tti®  aid  Korea  would  ncod  for  r®h&billt&tion  when
the  war  was  orrer.     The  meeting  ended  at  approximately
9:3o.50
Truman  invited  Mac&rthur  to  fufave  lunch  witli
him,   but  the   generctl  Wanted  to  #®t  back  to   the  wtlr
front.     At   the  &1rr]ort,   Trur`inn  awarded  t`!oc,\rthur  a
fourth   Oak  Leaf   to  hi®   Di8tlnguigh®d  S®rvlc®  re®d&l.
The   two  then  €xpregaed  their  flppreciatic}n  for  the
c®nfer®nc®  as  Truman  climb®tl   on  htrard   the   Indepentlence.
It  w&8   #hortly  after  ®1®v®n  o.clock  when  Truman     left,
Years 1}.    365.
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and  flv€  mlnutefi   later  MaoArthur  vee  ®n  hl3  way  t®
T®ky®.51
The  joint  comnmnlqu®  1&Bued  by  trumn  and  H&c-
Arthur  Btat®d  that  both  ver®  pleased  with  the  re8ultS
of  the  conference.     ¥®t.   th®r®  Wag  much  public  a.kcptl-
oiaB.   becauB®   1950  was  a  mid-term  el®ctl®n  year,  &nd\
many  felt  that  Truman  merely  Wanted  to  uS®  HecArthur
to  help  obt&1n  vote3  for  the  Dem®crt±t8.    E±±± mga2ine
rep®rt®d3
What  h&ti  been  ace®mpLifihed?     "e  conf®ren®¢  had
been  g®  Bh®rt.   the  ®xpl&nati®n*  of  it  So  unr€-
wording.   that.  a&  Wake  I&1ond  faded  a.tern,  many
a  c®rr®op®nd,ent  felt  ha  had  wltn€Beed  n®€Iiing  but
a  p®lit±aal  grand-8t®nd  play®    There  wag  no  doubt
£:::f±¥®f:::#:£:n£:;:n:3 i::d8::::=::: §2Party Would
A   avEw   wiAR
The  Off enelv€  in  H®rth  K®r®a  moved  throughout
Oct®b®r  .t  a  rapid  pae€.     On  October  19.  Pyongyang.
the  ev®rth  H®r®an  capital.   fell.53     The  tJn|t®d  H&tl®nB
force*  were  now  co"po8ed  ®f  unltB  from  many  notionB
of  the  v®rld  including  a  gw®edlfrh  h®3plt81  team.
A.  HACAr±hurl8   f®ree3  da®verd  north,   h®  *eB
faced  with  an  important  decl81®n.     }`Jr®Bldent  Truman
had  ord®r®d  him  t®  uB€  Only  K®r€an  tro®p3  1n  the
viclnit¥  ®r  the  Manchurl&n  and  Soviet  b®rderB  of
Korea.     Yet.   the  Korean  unltB  w®r®  1n®xp€rlcnc®d.
H®   th®refor®  ordered  American  unlt®   t®  &p®arh®&d  the
51"®
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drive   to  the  Y&|u  Rlv®r  which  @eparat®&   Korea  from
Menchurla.     The  Joint  Chl®f.  of  Staff  dl®&ppr®v®d.   but
HacArthur  ®e&ur®d  them  that  it  wa.  pr-ctical     from  a
military  Standpoint. 54
On  Octob®r  51.   Truman  r®c®iv®d  a  report  from  th®
X  Corp&   1n  the  WonBBn  sector  of  North  Korea.     I.ri&onere
captured  on  october  a6  had  been  ld®ntlfi®d  &e  Chinese.
Under  lnt®rrogation,  it  was  di&conrer€d  that  Chlne£®
ComBuni8t  units  had  b®en  active  ln  the  Korean  War  Since
October  16.     They  clal"®d  to  b€  m€mb®rs  of  volunteer
unlt8.    Although  thiB  did; not  nec€S€arily  deem  full-
Bcale  lnterventlon  by  Hod  Chlne.  truflan  va&  deeply
conc®rn®d.     Ile'  b®cane  even  more  concerned  when  G®n®ral
Yu  Jal  l]ung  of  the  Sotlth  Korean  army  &nn®unc®d  that
€catt®r®d  r€portB   lndicat®d  that  ®pproxlnat®ly  40,COO
Chin..e  CodmunlBt  troop8  v®r®  in  Kor®..     But.  h.  added:
'IIt  may  b®   that   the  Chln®B®  have  c®d®   1n  to  Bav®   the
big  generator  et  Suprung.   .   .  which  4erveB  both  North
Korea  and  Menchur|a. w55
Truman  asked  tlLe  Joint  Chief.  ®f  St&rf  to  ®btaln
an  up-t®-date  eetinate  on  the  €1tuation  from  MacArthur.
The  report  recoiv®d  from  M®cArthur  on  N®v€bb®r   4  read
ln  parti
It  iS  impos®ible  at  this  time  to  aprtrove  author-
1ttltiv®ly  the  actuallti®8  or  Chinaz]®  Cormuniat
lnt®rv®ntlon  ln  Horth  Kor®..    Varioue  pogslbllitleB
®xl4t  baaed  upon  battle  int®lllg®nc®`  coming  ln
from  the  front ....
54st®inb®rg.   pE+.   388-389.
55stat®n®nt  by  G®n®rftl   ¥u Ja® `flung  ®ppearlng
ln   "Y®r   in  Acl.."  ±±=±£±,   LVI   {N®v®mb®r  6.1950).   26.
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While   lt   i3  a   dl8ti[Lct  }'ioBsibility,   €ind  many
f oreign  experts  |ir®dict  Such  a.ction.   there  €ir®
in+.tny  fundato¢nt€&l   arguerentg   &g®inflt   it  and  8uffic-
±::ti:::::::  :i::]e;:::n:::58°ffl®  t°  }ltlnd  to  warrant
Two   days   later,   on   IVov®mh®r  6.   Trumdin  was   back
in   Inde!]®ndenc®,   .`!i.qsouri.     It  tta8  the  d4iy   before
®lectlon8.     Su.ddeltly,   a   telephone  call  came   through
from  Dean  Ach®&on.      IZ®   had  .just  received  word   t}iat
MacArthur  r`ad  ol`d®red  nln®ty  8-29  bombers   to   begin
destroying  brldgea  ticroBs   the  Yfllu  £{ivor.     Truman
wag   finrioue   lt`nd  der..iand®d  an  exT]lanatlon  from  Mac-
Arthur  ot   Once.     I]e  also  ordered   t]i®  bombing  to  b®
promptly  c&ncell®d.     This  W&,g  N.icArthur's  reply
Which  co)ifirm®d  1`ruman'8  fears   {if  Chlne8c   lntcrv€n-
tion :
6  Nove-bar,   50
Men  and  m€it®rifil   ln  large   force  are  pouring
across  all   bridges   ovtar  the  Yalu  from  .hfanchuria.
This  movement  not  only  jeoSjardize8  but  thre&ten8
tile  ultiEi€ite  de8tructlon  of  trle  ,f'orc®8  un{ler  my
comE!ia)id.      T})e   actual   movemtint   €acro8g   t)`i®   river
ctln   be  ciccom}.]liH}1ed   u]Lder   the   cover   of   darkl)ess
and  o`ir  lln®s   143   8o  8ltort   that  tlie   forces   cfin  b®
d®ploy®d  ag€`in8t  our  troops  without  being  geriously
aubj®cted  to  air  lnterdiction.    The  only  `'ay  to
Stop  this  rclnforco"ent   r.}f   tlie   enemy  ig  the  de3-
tructlon  of  th®8e  bridge.  find  the  Subjection  of  all
installations   in  the  north  8urir+ortlng  the  ®n®my
Qdv{,}nce   to   the   maxlmun  of  o`ir  air  {l®`qtruction.
P,very  !ic>ur   thitt  this   ig   postponed  will   be  p&id
for  dearly   ln  Amu®ricnn  {`rid  other  Uiilted  Nations
blood®     Th.  main  crossirig  at   tr5inuiju  was   to  b®
hit  I.ithin  tli®  next  few  liours  tlttd  the  mission  ie
actutllly   being  mounted.     Under   the  Srav®Bt  pro-
test   tht`t   I   c.|n  make,   18ra  Euspendlng  thlE   *itrlke
and  carrying  out  your  instructions.     twhat  I  had
t)rder®d  is  entirely  within  the  cacope  of  the  rut.a
of  wflr  and  t}te  rt}.qolutions  and  directions  which  I
56F,xc¢i.pt8
cite(I   by  Truman.
1`rom  report   by   D[tu8la8   i\tac`'\rthur
Yctirs p.   373.
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have  received  from  t}i®  United  .Stateg  aiid  con-
Stitute8  no   .ili{*htefit   &€t  t}f  belligerency  ag€iin.gt
Cllln®s®   territory,   in   ff(]ite   ®f   t±Le   outrage()u5
interncrjtitj"i|   l{twlgg.Bneses   Qffltanfiting   trierelrom.
I   cannot   overempj-i€'*tlig,a   the   difl&gtr®`is   ®f£'ect,
}\joth  physlc&1   and  p8ycl]ol(,igic*il,   t*lat  ttill
result  from  the  restrictions  you  are  ifflI}o8.indsr.
I  trust  that  tlLe  meatter  he  immediate.Iy` broualt
t®  the  &tt8nti*>n  of  the   }2reesident   aft   I   beli©v®
your  instructl®ns  n!fly  Well  result   ir!`  .i   cfil.±mity
of  major  i:.rpportion  for  which  I  c{Jinnot  accept  the
responBit®ility  wlth{}`it  his  p®rson&1  find  direct
understandirLg  of  the   git`l&tion.     Time  is   8o
®Ssenti&l   that   I  requ®gt   ifflHiediat®  r®con8ider€*tion
of  your  d®cisi®n  pencting  which  c®mS]let®   co"-
r.1ietnc€  tyllJ.   of   coul.3®   be   {`;1vGn   to  your   I,rder.57
Gcner8l   Pxpar   8radl®y  phoned  tt&e  megga&e   to
Trtim&n.     Jt®alizin&  the   situation  ff€icArthur  was   i`aced
with,   Trum&Ii   {!rd®red  Rradley   to  give  ENftcArthur   the
g0-aha?.td. 5S
Reports   from  the   Central   lnt®11i.Sence  &g®ncy
indicttted   thtit   thor-©  fE[ight   he  as  ffiany  a&   two-hundred
thousand  ChinesLh   forces   in  iu€&nchuria,   and  thflt   their
entry  would  prob{-Ably   force   t!`i®   United  Hc.:itions   to  ro-
treftt ,
&1tliough   it   was  not   leitrrLed   irmrfl®diately  how
large  the  Ciii]iege   intervention  would  }]®,   the   two
!irifl}ary  qua.5tions  were   the  Chinese  fflotive#   for            fa
intervention  anul  the  reason  for  }iacArthur's  l®to-
ness  in  discovering  it.
In   1960,    P@t€®l   F.¢ona+„    tfie   €x-Comzenuni.t3t.    g&.v®
his  re"8or-g  why   the  Chinc`q®  C®tununist.i  d®cidcd  to   in-
tervene.     fu'riting  for  L|i.+?  magazine,Ilo  Said:
Y ® il r a
5?i{®}>ort   by   nougl€ig   HacArthur   cited   by  Truitftlnt
p.   375.
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q`he  Chint.flo  were  terrified  ®f  {.ien®ral  i.iacArthttr.
T!Ley  regarded  him  aH  a   t}rl`lliant  and  un|`jredictai]le~*
enigma.     #`or  all   they  knew,1f  they  didn+t  atop
£::.8*:r,=±££:X:::::€[;a;:::  :F]:  ;3t#.p£::±[::.I,e
They  were  also  tlfraid  tllat  MacAi`t}iur  might
bring  Chi&ng  Hal-ghek's  troops_  into  Korea  from
Pormoga   and  let   tliem  att€Lck  across   the  Y&ltt.
Nao  v&g  determined  to   defend  tlnd  hold  North
Horea   &g  a   rtuffer  gtLtte   to gru&rd  his  .Manchtiriari
Even  i±`  the  border  trcre  not  ln  d&nger~-the
Chinese  did  nat   tru.St  rlr®gld€nt  Truman's  fisBur®nceg
on  thlz3  Score~-they  rea8oried  that  a   Small  war
would   do   them  no  harm.      i;`ijShting  in  Korea  would
help   distr&ct   tile  T]o¥ulcatiorl  from  Chim®'s   do-
raesti¢   troubles.     It  would  sticoulate  army   tr.&inlng.
L&st,   btit  not   least,   it  would   give  }i&o  a   good
excuse   to  wlL®edl®   a  I.Lew   tirgenel   of   guns   arid
tanks  Out  of  the  |tug.qia|ig.59
At   tile   joint  hearlngff   ®f  tile   i;enELte  +\rmed  #er-
¥<-|c®s   C®fi}"ittee   land   the   Stsnfflte   Foreign   !telj&tiQn,a
Committee   in  Fjay.1951,   giv!&cArtllur  was   &gk`€d  why   h®   had
not  t}een  awfire  of  tjte  Chi]ies®  intentions  t®  intervene.
t±®  testified  a8  follows;
We   liad  knowl®d&e   thtlt   the   Chin®ge   Conittlunists
}iad  collected  large  forcg8  along  the  Yalu  }tiver.
rSy   own  r®co]!naisg&nce.   you   underst€Ind  wag   lin]ited
entirely  to  K®reai   but   the  general  inform£*tlon
tfhich  was  available.   ±`ram  China  arid  other  r>lace8.
indicated  large  Qccu"ulationg  of  troo}^3g.
The   !i®d  Chinese,   at   th+fit  tllne,   were  putting
out,   almost   dffily.   8tcatem®ntB   ththt   they  tr®re  not
intervening,   th€it  these  were  volunt®®rs  only.
About   the  mld{`Ile   of   Septeexib®r  our   .Secretary   of`itate  announced  thent  ilo  thought  there  wfis  little
chiinc®,  BIid  no  loiilc   in  Chinese  intervention.
In  November,   our  C,entr{il   llitalligenc®  Agency,
here,  had  said  that  tiiey  f®1t  there  was  little
ch€*nc®  of  tiny  major  intervention  on  the  pfirt  of
tile   Chirie%®   forces.
59]iawe|   .}2on®t,   'lftu$3glaTtgln   Kor¢„      the   !Ildften
B®gses|"  Effii   `£9   (June   27,1960},   9`J.
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Now,  `*`®  ourselves,   on   the  front  rL.alized   ttiat
the  North  Koreari  forc®g  wore  being  atlffeii®d,   rand
our   int®lligeiLce,   f§iade   just   before   G®neral  ®]`'alker
l&unctt®d  his  &ttack5,   indict.`tted  tiiey   thought   from
/10,COO   to   60,Otlo  m®ti  might   be   down   there.
Now,  you  must  understand  thcat  t'.lie   intelligence
that  a  nthtion  ls   going  to   l€iunch  war.   iB  n{}t  an
intelligence  thcat   iB  flvail&bl®   to   €i   commander,
limited   to   a   Small  car®&   ®f   combat.
T'hat  intelligence   Should  h-ve  been  givef]   t®  moo
The  ag®ncl®#  that  the  controlling  powers  had,
which  received  r®})ort8   from  all  over  tlic  uorld--
from  all  the  nations  of  the  wor`ld.  which  had  it--
the  nritish  Secret  `±®rvice  had  every  stScret  service
of   the  flllieB  at  hifi  diB}7oBal,   w.hich  wore  not  at
mine.   gave  a  much  wld®r  and  a  much,kroader  b&Els65upon  which   to  bake   th®s®   conc®ritg.
Oi]ce  REac+\rthur   }iacl   the   Yalu   bridges   bofflt}ed.   the
I}}ovoment   of   Chin®.se   Communis5t   into   North   Korea   seemed
to   c®a3ts.      The   Criine&e   f,ommui`igt8   be:gan  air  att{ick8
from  &cr®8fl   the  }taiichuri&n  hord®r,   but   it  appeftred  ag
thou€qh  t}`er®  was  no  longer  tiny  r©tAl   thref`t   of  a   full-
gc&l®  Chinese   interv®iition.
}}acArthur  conaidGr®d  the  initial  move"ant8
®cros8   the  Yalu  aB  a   setback.   but  lie   began  a  renewed
drive   t®  renclt   the   Yetltl.     By   Nov®mb®r   £1   sccattered  unltg
of  the  United  Natio.is  f®rce8  arrived  at  the  border.
On  Nov®mb®r  24.   Mac^rthur   ordered  General  Walker'8
Eight   Arm}'   t®  basin  a  final   off®nsiv®  ag&inLqt  re-
rm&ining  North   Hol`enn   cand  Chinese  r®sistanc®. 61
Suddenly.   on  November   26.   ne&cArthur'g   ht.p®®
for  a   quick  victory  were   smasli®d  by  ca   gudd®n  att&ck
from  acroe8   th.  Ftanchurlan  border.     'I|.a  hundred
thou.Band  we`Ll-armed  ancl  e..®ll-tr?lined  Chi»®s®   Communist
q°Testimony  of   Douglas  N&cArthur.    I®ctringgi
pcart   li   F}1.18-19.
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tro`o}]8  |]oured  across  what  wag   left  ®f  tile  Yalu  River
bridges.
'rhe  as8e`ult   continued  for   Sever.ql  days.     ()n
November   28,   l]acArthur  r®port©d   th€tt  h®  va8   c[itlnging
his  plans  from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive.     Ttier®
wag  no  longer  any  doubt  about  the  intentions   (`}f  the
Chin®8e  Comliiunlngt8--full   gcttle  interv®ntlon  was  under-
way  a+nd  }iacj\rthur  *a3   f&ce{]  w.ith  a   new  w€ir.      In  his
report  Mcac,1r-thur   gaid:
The  resulting  Situation  presents  an  t!ritir®  now
picture  whicli  broadens  trie  potentifllitieg  to  world
enibrtlcing  co]isideratio}i8  beyond   the  s!!here  of
decision  I)y   the   th®atrc   comm€}nd®r.      'rhis   cofr§13cLnd
hag  done  ev®rythlng  humflnly  possible  witliin  its
::;:::]±€:a:o::£o±:f,±B  now  f&C®d  Witll  circun8tanco8
Macj.t!rtriur  requested   tt7.ctt  he  be   glv®n  t]ie   right
to  purguti   enemy  planes  ®V€n  if  it  me4Lnt  crossing  the
Manchurian  border.     }`Ie  warned   ihat  unl®3s  h®  was
given  the  right  of  hot  pursuit,   the  Unlt®d  Nations
forco8  would  suffer  from  heavy  attack  without  tiny
retcali&tion  81nce   the  MaTLcliurlan  border  w{7uld  provide
a   sancturary  t}r  enemy  plQn®g.     In  addition  to  hot
pursuit.   MncArthur   also  r®queBted  I)erRE1&slon   to  bomb
enemy  b€`Ases   in  M€:nchuri&   in  order   to  cripple   the   Rod
Chin®8e  Air  Porc®  and  prov®nt   ¢n®my  air  attacks  be-
fore  they  occurred.
In  reply  `rru"an  rejected  hath  r©quefltg  on
several  occasions.     As  he  saw  it.   sucn  action  would
only  ®xt®nd   the  wflr  to  China.   i.ringing  tli®  *€.ovi®t
Unl(}n  to  its   d®feris®,   nd  u8hcrlng  in  World  fro-fLr Ill.63
62Excer|'t  fror,.  re|]ort   by   I)ouglas  }lacAr`thul-cited
by  Truman,   Years T).     -i:,8/i.
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0n  November  29.   General  "acArthur  told  Truman
that  h®  might  have  to  plan  a  major  retl.eat.     lie  r®-
que8t®d  thftt  Truman  t€ikc  up  the   offer  of  Chl&ng  Hal-
ghek  f ive  months  earlier  when  he  offered  thirty-tl.ir®e
tl'1ousai}d  Formo8an  troo};a   for  use   in  Korea.     Truftlan
informed  MacArthur  throug}i  tlie  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff
that  his  i}ropogal  would  b®  corisidered.64
Truman.a  policy  was  8tlll   tl`®  8cam®  as   it  had
b®€>n  since  he  dccid®d  to  move  nor.th  of  ttie   thirty-
®i`9.:hth  parall®l®     I+a  t.anted  to  unite  North  and  South
Korea.  but  `.ithout  a  m&jor  milltnry  confrontation  with
Red  C]ilna   or  Hu88ia.
raced  with  attack  from  €up®rior  forces.  }]ac-
j\rthur  began  attackilig  Truman'g  policy.     He  complained
blttcrly  to  r®port€r8,   who  promptly  printed  his  view8®
Truman'B   tem|jer  flared  fls  h®  r®€`d  the  reports   of
Mac,'\rtt]`ir'8  att{*cks,   hut   !ie  tJa®   d®termin®d  to  avoid  an
open  conflict  with  his  commander  in  liglit  of  the  nc"
Criels  presented  by  the  Chinese  Coununl8t  interv®nt|on.65
Truman  ordered  }SacArthur  to  kec.ij  fighting.   but
goon  tn®  General  had  ntt  clioic®   but  to  retreat.     TZ`®
drive   for  tl`®  Yalu  ltiver  tr€}8   completely  forgtott®n.
As   the  Eighth  ,t``rmy  and  the  X  Corps  r®tr©ated   south.
MacArthur  b®gali  ]irot®gting  bltt.erly  that  t}]e  gale
reag®n  for  the  retreat  was   tli®  1imitfltiong  placed
upoli  him  by  }Iis   auperior8   in  Wa8hirigton.     T!te  two
men  differed  gharplyi   wl]erea®  Truman  w.qnted  to  do
everything  possible  to  limit  the  aonfllct  to  Koreli,
lt&cArthur  claimed  that   to  d®  So  would  make  it
militarily  imriossibl®  to.win  the  war.
64Truman .
65ERE. .
Yethrs I   Ixp.   58¢-383;
p.   584.
86
In  D®c®utber.   General  J.   LAvton  Collide  vi&1t®d
HacArthur  ln  T®tryo.     I]o  r®port®d  to  Truman  that  Mac-
Arthur  now  f-vored  an  naval  blackad®  ®f  the  Chln®ee
lminland.     In  addition.  h®  favored  ullng  Chinese
Hatl®naliet  troop.  1n  an  all-Out  att.ck  ag&1nBt  the
Chln®.e  mainland.     ".Be  tva  propoeale  Would  only  b®
eff.ctlv®.  h®wev€r,  1f  addltion&l  r®BtrlctionB  v®re
lifted.  namely.   the  rlcht  t®  hot  pur.ult  ®r  enemy
plan..  and  the  bombing  ®r  en®ny  baa®e  ln  Menchurl..
F4ac^rthur  ale®  &tat®d  tliQt  lf  his  vl®v.  v®r®  not
eccept&bl®,   he  would  then  eugg®8t  making  a   truce  with
the  Comntlnlst.  ®t  the  thirty-®1gbth  pArell®l  re.ultlng
1n  a  ®tatue se &nt®  be||uD.66     truman  r®allB®d-  tbat
a  truce  at  the  thirty-eighth  par&ll®1  would  mean  the
virtual  eurrend€r  of  H®rth  Korea  to  the  Cormunlet8.
but  h®  vJae  not  vllling  to  ®v®n  con.ider  approving
Mac^rthur '&  propoB&1e.
In  the  joint  h®oringa  b®f®re  the  Senate  Arm.d
S®rvlcee  end  Po.reign  ttelatlon&  Cormitt®®&,   14eicArthur
Was  a&k®d  why  the  llmitatlone  placed  upon  hip  by
Wa8hlngton  obstructed  hlfl  military  effort.    f`Ie  tegtl-
fi®d  ee  foll®*e:
The  air  and  mval  forc®8  that  ver®  ot  my  dl8po&al
out  th®r®  ver®  only  ®p®r&tlng  at  a  fractlan  ®f  their
•fflcl®nQy.     They  are  ln  effect--by  b®1ng  c®nfln®d
t®  the  h&rrov  bettl®gr®und  ®f  Korea--merely  per-
rormlpg  that  functl®n  vhlch  Would  b®  r®g®rded  a.
t&ctic&l  support  of  the  lnfentry  11n®.
The  gr®&t  .trateglc  concept  of  etopping  the
•uppll®.  t®  tr®op4.  ®f  prev®ntlng  th.  build-up
®f  troop.  to  b®  thrown  agAinet  then.  of  the  dlB-
®rganl2atl®n  of  transp®rtatlon  11n®4--all  of  the
uBeB  Which  over  the  years  and  centurl®s   the  Navy
66Trunan. Yeara p.   &15.
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€ind  ,`bir  are   guppoHed  to  do  are  not  psrmitted  over
there,
If  you  trould   tfike  of f  Lind  permit   them  t]i¢1r
full  c&pflcity,   I  do  mat  b®lieve'it  wottld  take  a
vBry  gr®fit  adt}ition£-2l   coan|aonent   ®f   ,ground   forces
to  fu.End   t}ii8   thing  u].i.
Now,   actucally  if  you  do  riot  pertHit   the  use   of
£:r:::e±=ot[Bt:i:i;°:¥:a:rcfj:::±t£¥:r:::6¥°ull£not
fu'hile  Mac+\rthunr   could  rit*t  underst&`md  why  Truman
VIould  lgnor.e  the  military  nece.qSity  of  allowing  him
to  carry  the  *ar  out  ®f  Kor®fl,   Trumffln  could  not  und®r-
8tand  why  macArthur  coula  ignore  tile  p¢}itic`ql  necessity
of  limiting  the  w£`r  to  Xor®a.     Truman  said:
I  hafsve   I&ever  'bcdn  able   t®  make  ftiygelf   b®li®ve
th/at  MacjLrthur,   g€aa®n®d  Soldier  thfit  he  wffig   did
not  r®&liae  trid*t  tliS  introduction  of  Chinese
Ncationall8t  forces   into  .f§outh  C!tin&  v®`ild  he  an
act  ®f  wfir!   or  that  he.  tfho  h&d  a  front-row  gent
at  world  ev®ntB  for  thirty-five  years,  did  riot
ref`liz®   that   the   Chinese   r}®®pl®  woulct  r®cact   t®   t}ie
boINbing  of   th®1r  cltle8   in  ex&otlF  the   same  m&nn®r
&s   the  people   of  the   lJnited  .€}tat®g  r®€*ct®d   to   the
bombing  of   l'/>®arl  rlart3or3   or   thstt,   it'ith  his  know-
ledge  ®r  the  East,  he  corild  }iave  overlooked  the
fact   that  €Jft€r  h®  head  bomhed   tt.]e   citle&   of  Chills
there  would  still  be  vca8t  fl®Hs  of  r[ieiteri&1s  from
Etussiu  so  that.   if  hG  w±tntetl  to  b€  c®naist®rit,   his
next  move  would  hetv®  to  bo   the   homb&rdm®nt  of
Vladiv®Stok  rand  the  Trams-.¥iberi€-i}t  £!giilroad!     nut
beca"ge   I  was   ©ur®   thff t  }3&cffrrthur  could  not
p®sslbly  have  overL®oh®d  th®ff®/  cansidcra.tionff I
I  wag  left  with  just  one  Simple  c®nclusion!
£:=:ra±  #]::A::I:¥€8tt&8  ready  to  risk  a  general
Througliont   D®cember   the  news   froffl  Hore6i  wag
diBtres8ing.     After  Pyongyang  fell  to   the  Cl.iinese
Cofflmunl8ts,   M&c,f\rthur  was   forced  t®  retreat  south  of
67Tegtimony  of  Douglas  "ncArthur,   Hetlringst
r,i}rt   i,  p.I(].
68TruLtiani Ye{qrs *   pp.   415-416.
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tr*®   thirty-®1ghth  }jaritllel.     On  J&miesry  &.1951,   ti®oul
wftG   in   canSmy  luind"$9     ifefflc.5*`rtlu}r   ti®gcan   to  r®-S}.otip  tiiS
rarcc8  tlbout  8ev®nty  fBlltlff   below  t!\e  t!ilrty-€iffil}t?.
pargtllel  Bntl  pr®Fiira  for  #  ntiw  off®nalt£.     Alt}`¢I.lgh
his  retrej,et  htid  he®tt  4`stpeewh4it   !`umllicatin&'.  }i&o,`rthtlr
Inter  t®£tlfletl  at  the  €;enat€  he&rln&e  ae  f®llow8s
tr'it®n  ve  caov®d  fort.fird  *e   gtru€k  ]`1f3  1n  tr®-
mttndtlu#   force--or  h®  *trut=k  uE  elrld  w®  trlthdrev.
T}t®   con¢®pt   th*Lit  "r  forc>®*  wltl`dr`ew   ill   €11#ord®r
®r  e#er®  bstdly  defeated   isi   one  ®f   Lfa.  Ho#t  vl®l®nt
pr®Vdrlc#tion#  of  truth  tl*at  GVQr  wta#  ncad®.     Theee
i-orc®di  withdrBt.   in  rmat&nlfic®plt   order  and   #hflr!®.
It  vnB  a  pl&rt.led  wlthdrawdrl  fruffl  the  beginzLizig.
T]?a   forc®H   in   the   nortl*®®at.   the  T®ritli  Corpfl,   w®r®
v±thdra`{n   ln<*th®   acam®  ti®y.
The   losts®3   thfit  w8  hstt3   1n  that  wlthtlrn#sol  v®r®
l®f.8   thti*i   the   L®HSGtB  ve   hall   ln   ottr  vlctorloLt3
fit.t{Jck  g.t      ficht*ii.70
AS  asne;`rthur  pr®pevr®d   for   his   n®*  ®ff®n@lv®.
1`®  tfaa  ald®d  b7   the  fact  th&&t   tile  Chin®8®  h4tl  ®#tonded
beyoesd   th€1r   Bup¥$1y   lirsGBi     ¥h®  result  `7tt8   th4tt
tli®y  w®r®  alonit*d  dowt`.      Ill   the  m®flntlfl®,   tyENc,hrtrtur
H®nt   a   r®¢®S'£`#*®ndflti®n   tn   the  J®1nt   C}tl®1.#   or   gt©ff
c"lling  r®r  the  ramovtiL  of  r®fitricti®rie  upon  hlfl.
1£®  etBk¢d  rieermlssion   to   pLLr6u€   eneesy  pl&IIe3   1nta  F!Alii-
churla,   t]l®cteftd®   tli®   c®aHt   ®f   CI`1na.   €*r+d  th8a   Chine8®
h®tit±`onftlipt   t.I.oo£*B   ror  an  drtti*ck   ®n   the  Chin®f*®  fl$1n-
ltlntl.     Th.  J®1nt  Chl®f#  of  #terrf  Bent  hlS  }`tr®po®al*
to  rxeorge  Har8htlll  wltf}  hod  8u€c¢Sdetl  i,®ulS  Jolin®on
a®   €Jecr.t&ry  ®f  I?efe»se.     Tfaey  aBk€d  that  }EBc,lrthtirla
vi®*8   b€  €®nffld¢red.   tout   tile  propotet.L#  wSr®  r®jccted
91Hc®   tte®y  w®rca   not   ln  ficl3®rd  witit   the   I``r®Bitl®ent.g
r'®1±cy.
69,ir]&®   New   ¥orit   TlmeS
_i                          -`   .   ._:i,        'I_J_L__       I      `         -_        _       _.....  i
/I   `}aenu€Sry,   195lt   P.   I.
7°T®#tiffi®ny   of   I){Dn8i4*8   !}cartr`ur.   i!®@rim##t
ptlrt  I,  I?.   £1.
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"iroushout   the   lot,tar   !TL{rt   f„tl`   Jof%nu&iry  &*md  F®bru-
taryt   1931,   }fac,+'.rt}iur'#   ft+rce&  naey€d  9t®tldily  forwfard.
try  ettrly  r!arch   the  Chinefi®  CoREunl*t#  *cr*  ffiuff€.I-1nS
tie«vy  c«fluc`Ltl®n.      S®tJul  ftytiB   r®-cesg>tt]red   by   the   L}nlted
evatiorifi,   tina  tiy   the  mld{}l¢   or  as®rch,   .?iotith  ft®r¢tl  h€it±
b„®rl`   ele®red  Once  ctgcain.
W'hll®   t*&€   Corsrmunl8tf  t*er®   1n  retreat,   Trumtln
ck®€1d®d  t.a  n®#®tl&te   rfir  A   c¢q*®-rlr®.     rhl3   tlid   iiot
at®€'m  An   lrm®dltht®   €hthn#B   iH   hLe   t`Or¢1gn  policy,   b®-
ctiu"B  "nc,trtl`ur  wo`!ld  Htlil  t}e  unedGr  orti®rg   to  u].it®
#ortli  &rld  Soutn  K®rett.     tiov®v®r,   ±f   the  CtrmasLtnlBtB
would   L>®  willl.tg  to  qccept   a   €®«s*¢-#ir®  et   tlt®   trl±rty-
®1ght)I  partlllel,   h8  woulri   then  ch®&t€®  hie  pol±€y  &nd
®ti¢e  dLes€iit8   I.}r®c,lftlm   thnt   the   11ffllt®d  obj®€tlve8   or
the   tj.nltad  .fat+it®.n   1{`cludq{l  only   the   litS¢r&tlon   ®f
w*t}uttt   si®r®€,.?I
T!`®   Jof nt  ChleF#  ®r   Staefr   then  fnfures®d  Ai.tt€-
```rt}Lui-   t!cat   the   Iir®f31d®}tt   *&ff   iirer"#imes   th`   g}rop®8nl
t®  dlficuge  coudltlor*S   trf  ®¢caee~rlr®  with   the   ®i`¢esy.
B®£'®re   ftytLzrmn  had  4`   cfinnc€   t®   1j.t#ue   £\ties   B£@t¢caQnt,
h®vev®&..   n¢aicArthur   ig¥8u®ct   one   of   r`1fr   Own   ori  a}arGli   #j&.
Fgflcj.{t.thur  {`ail  flown   to   tl`®   front   lintifl   Sand   il#u®d  hlfi
&tca€ee*®nt   to   ttro   ®n®myt      tzG   gflld   in  parts
T!i®   ®neffiy.   th®r8for®,  mu&t   tiy  lt®#  b®  ptllnfully
aware   th&t   ei   d©c\i8ian   af   t}ie   Unltetl  RIfttlonas   t®
d®p&rt  from  1€s  toLBrnnt  efft]rt  tu  co7it8ir`  t.he
tf;ir   t®   the   fir`®S   or  Koran,   through  &m  axp}fln8i®n  ®f
Our  rtyillttlry   oper.itlonH   t®  1t8   ¢®tl.tttl   £&refaS  cand
±nt®ri..r   biL#®B,   vtauLd   ri®oB   §&tid  Chizies   to   the   risk
or  lmestln€nt  mlllt,'.try  collo3.ee ..,.
Tlt®   Korean   m&tl®n   givt`il   i-IGaplq   tfhlch   li&v®   b®cn
8o   ®rti®1ly  r8vctgetl,   itjujHt   ti{.t   h®   #€}.®rlflo®ri.      TI]i6
13   fa   i  ttr`{+iffi®ismt   conc¢rn*      +`pfirt   froB   tlt®   mliitd#ry
7LTrurlmmi \,L`£11.a p*    A3(?.
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ar.€i   of   the  r}robl¢m  ltii®r®   i&®ti®B  q`r®  r®8olv®€l   in
the  cttur8®   t}f   codp.bat,   tlte   ftindafflQntael   t[u®8tlon&
®{Jntlutu®  t®  ta®  pollti.ctil   in  8ct€ur®,   *tntl  "uet  1`ind
th®1r  &n*wcr  lm  th®  dlpltxpatlc   eEpha¢r®.     ha'1thln
the  er®ft.  ®f  car  tluth®rlty  R*   tl*e  ngllitary  €ouacaandfrr,
however.   1t  *otLld  tie  n®cfllfaSst   €®  #tly   thtlt   I   4itpfia
r®nd¥  tat  tiny   ti"®  tt'}  conr®r   in  the   fi®l{1  wltl`   tli®
Counand®r-1n-CtiL®f  of  the   enemy  forc®5  Ln  the
®arne®t   ®f£`®rt   ta  find  eiHy  eailitnry  es®«n8  wh®r€try
r®Sl1£&€ion  ®f  the  pollticcal  ohj®ctlvca  of  the
tynl*®tl   arcatl®n8   Ln  !tor®&,   to  #hlch  n®  n&Rtiozt  mtly
##::tt:::t}:::C¥:::::h®::9Et  he  etcco"|}lifhcd
hhlLe  Truisen  Wad   iTlanI`1n#   to  pr®p®e€  a   c®bS®-
flr®,  Hacf\rthur  t}ire&t¢n®d  jt®d  China  ttltn  attfficn.
S.'Lhll¢   TrLrmtln  wflB   Tilanlting   t®   liegotl&t®  *`1tlt   the   ezlefsoyi
Jtocfl\rthur  T&rop®@ftd   ttiat  esorth   Korea   curr®tttl®r   t®  hin
p ®r aonca L ly .
rrum®n  cangld®r€d  thlB   #t&t€peent   "extr&ortlllrat.yt' t
ror  es   fflllitffiry  c®1%rmarid¢r   to  "cak®  tf ltlL4ut   the   Off lcl&1
clQar7`nce   ®r   the   fitmte  ij®pes`rtes¢nt.?5     ?¢qcArth`ur  had
::::a:3::::a;,1 :: `;},el:i::;a: :tit:::0:a::®:::::";il :,:::::®
T"ma.n  con31der®d  thle  #ta`tement  &n  act  €]f  in8ut]®r-
dlTaeti®n.  &facftrthur  conGld®rcd  lt  w,1thllt  !tiB   lln®  of
duty  to  1#Bu€   the  Btatest®nt   Bln€®  1t  concertt®d  thiLltar¥
consider`tltion*.     To  the  t*itter   end  +H4icArt!`ur  n®v®r
c®n@1tftsr®d  hl*   i,1iBput®  with   the   Tlrc31d®nt  &8  a   cB#®
of   lngub®rtllnffition.     He   ln#1fsted:
It  vac  iiot  the  8aldlt*r  who  had  ©n..roach®d  upon
tri®  r®tllm  of   th.  polltlc¢iln.   btit  rat}i¢r  lt  wAe  the
pdlltici&n8  w§}o  were  ®ncrcec}&1n#  on   Chat  ®r   the
7&Exc®rptB   from   #ttttetr]t!nt   by   i}®u&ildt8   ?]ftc.+rthtlr
cited  in  Trum®!n,   Y®cars.   p.   4Jll.      S®®   c®mFi€t®   text   Of
HthcArt!.ur.9   8tatom®nt   in  ^i](i¢md`1x   11,   t`..    i.¥`4-.15f.
?3T-Ran,
?4Ihld.
Yetlr3 p.   `i4l.
+   !}.    (t4£.
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floLd|er.?5
truimm  qttlckly  ordered  €he  Joint  €lii®fB  of  ^tytf*rf
t®   1nfom  Ha®Arthur  €h&t  li®  hind  bc®n  under  ord®r4  eltt€®
Bgivcemb®r  6   to   clerir  sell  public   at.'ttem®*itB  with   his
gu}a®ri®rH.     h'®v®rtit®l®*fi.   mticli  **ubllc   #yt",!"tny  w&|
vlth  #a€j&rtt`ur.3   Bt&t®ra®mt.     E±±£±  tBa8n£1n®  a-e]7orted
the   1."Cid®nt   a&   fcalJ®Vfi3
iror   one   day   lafft  #e®te,   tli®   U.   f3.   dtir®d   t®  !l®|t®
tthgivt   there  !Hi&I±t   b®   a   t+.ay   to  end   tli®  deftdl®c*[   i-
Hgrco,   put  an   end   to   the   flg!-Lt&ngg   thA*t  v8#   coHtinff
+¥®  cau¢h,   Stllnlns   ao   lit.tla.      nt*t*glSie   *&thc#*rtlLLL[r,
flying   t®   the   Horeutn   fi-out   3&ain,   hfid  eest*¥®  ca
FroE.l®g±tl®rl   t®   the   ®iiesiy ....
mit  h®¥;.   ror  a   g¢1utit]m   lti  F&®r¢t&  wnai   Bli®rt-
11v®di   tliough   }lftcArthur'zS   ffit&tcam®nt   racad®  ES®rr®ct
•¥t}tl  obvlou3  colllt&ry   &ttnset   ft   httd  not  bt±®so  cl®ctrcd
with   *+'fl#hin&ton.      St&t®   P€}.&rtr®r&t   }8,LS*mn#r'®.   HtlLI
puL*11€iy  utncom.itt®d  `to  bring  stny  p€ric®  t®   ffiar®n.,
coltferr®d  t+1€h   P®#itJi!F®n  Tilcann®i-8   t`nd   fiesnlly  eB-
8embL€d  them8®lv®B  lntr*  nn  offloiel  I.osltion.
Such  neattere.1t  wcoe  StRte{I,   w.r®  even  nonr  the  4*ub-
J®ct  ®f  d®11cut®  "®gotlatl#n#  ffith   th.   U.   .S.   all±®8
{negotlatlon®  tire  always   Bctid  t®  h®  tieLlcutt.i ....
Froca  l¥®telng   cfamo   (it.t}.1{iq;   btLt   cold  annd   u,tt®r   $1l€nce®
Til®   w£`!r  want   ®n.76
Truftafi  l®`t®r  mdrittcrd   €htlt  l1&cj`rthur.N  8t#tStlent
c®nvin€®d  I`1tl  th#t  the   g¢nfu*r#1  utu#t   b.  r®cAll¢d.??
ln3tcdi{3   of   flrLr*g  him  lREerilftt®1y,   Triannf±n  wBltiili€d   tl3e
16Sa!u®B   ctlli®rulLy.      tl®   r®#11z€d   that   }18aArtltur  w&fl
tlGtermln®d   to  fr®®   all   of   Hortlt   itor®a   wh®r®&ti   !a®  "flB
glllln#  to  ac€cpt  8  €®oae-f.1r®  St   t!ze   tllirty-¢1ght^h
}F8rall®&.      i!®   ten®tt   tri®t   &¥4tl€+`h i*tht&r   w*$   1n.   favor   of
&#tG!id±mg   t.he   war   t®   tile   fficLlnlt-ind  {]f   Cl.ilnst   wfut!r®A8   he
75},tflt®"®nt   By  |}Gti#|fl#  }toeArthur  clS®d  by
ft®1nb®rgt   r}.   597.
76nMa®c.`rtm|r   t®  F{®tl  C!tiJ]a.t.  E±®   LVII
{April   a,195l}i   13.
7?Tru-tt , Y®&rfl p.   j!i`3.
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Wa®   not  wiilitig  to  risk  a   gent;.r€Al  w€ir.      iie   aiflo  W&B
awar.`c   thflt  RE4icArt±"r  tfa8   determined   to   expr®Bff   his
vieus  publici}'.     Although  liacArthnr  considered  lt  hi®
ffrerogativ®   to   S{'Se&k  out   on  militfiry  affairs,1`rum&n
felt   that  h®  w&8   expresBii\ig  Views   on  i8ffiu®B   wiLich
fitt®{L  into  the  retllm  of  f®r®ign  F7olicy.     Th®ff®  views
confused  otir  alli®€  a8  well  nff   the  American  people.
Tli®   finfll   incit*tiiit  which   infuri&totl  T2-.lil;ir:',i
occurred  on  April  5,1951.     On  that  dfly  HomB®  Itinorlty
Le4ad®r   J®a®ph  tty-.   A.1&rtin,   a   R©public&n,   re**ad   a   letter
to   Congre$8   ttliich  h®  liad  r®ceiv®d  from  Gen®r&l  FT&c~
Arthur.      F!€artin  had   sent   S']&c4}rt&+iur   a   c(}py   of   a   as!S€ech
he   had  mati®   on   Fehrufi±-y   i£|      In   ttiis   err.t!®ch  he   had
denounced  Truman'g  K®refan  ijolicy  and  called  for   t!1e
u8®   of   Chin®s®   Ntltionaliet   trot]!3.t3   1n   {m   3``tt&ck   ag&inst
th®   Chinese   rmdiinl&imi.      T&ie   rei}1y   fj.+om  Mdic;.`rt}tur   read
fla   followgs
March   20,   1951
Dear  Cons-r¢ssman  Martins  .
I  &m  most   g.r€qteful   i.or  your  i}ote  ®f  the   eightli
£ortb.cqrding   me   th   Copy   ®f   y®u~p   addresi8   of   fJ`®bru*rary
L£.     'riie  latter   I  llave  recad  with  ffiuah  int€r®.qt.   find
find  witli   the  }iaa#tige   of  y®&rs  you  h&v®  cert£Ainly
lo6§t  none   ®f  your  Old-ti"®  T*imch.
j`fy  vievg   f\nt!  r®co[,I€aeer¢dationg  trith  reaT}®ct   to   the
gitu&tion  cre€,`tGd  t}y  Fted  Chines's  entry   into   the
war  &g{iinst  uS   in  Korea  have   been  submitteul   to
WasnirLgton  ln  m®gt   comFl€te   detail.     Gan®rthlly
t}i®ge  views  care  wall  known  &md  generally  under-
Stood.  as   they.  i`®1low  the  conventional  I.+attern
of  meeting  force  te.ith  maximum  ¢®unt®r-force  &a
u®  h€`v®  never  failed  to  d®  in  the  past.     Your
view  witri  re8!tect   to   th®  utiliz}.ration  ot   the  Chlnes€t
f®rc®3  ®n  Fo.-m®3a   ls   in  cattflict  `tlrit}1  neither   l®glc
nor  this  tr&t]ition.
1t   8e®ms   Strangely  dif`1`icult  for  gcote   t®  recali&e
thfi+,  here   in  Asia   is   w}iere   the  CorREunist   can-
apiratorg  have  electet.I  to  make  their  play  for
91®b&l  conqu®st.  ®Iid  that  we   hsve  joined  the   issue
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thus  raised  on  the  b&ttlefieldi   that  hel`e  we  fight
Hurop®'s  wcar  with  firms  w}iile  the   diplomats   fight
it  with  words;   tli€`t   if  We  los®   t!iis  war   to  Comnlun-
18m  .tn  Asia   the   fall  of  Europe  i8  inevitable,  Win
it  cand  F,urope  most  |}robably  ffould  avoid  h.ar  find
:::.Pr:]B):::eL:I::a::tis t±:u¥:uf::i:±c:::;.¥?,  must
Truman  con&1der®d  thle   letter  an  attetaept  to  go
over  th.  head  of  the  President  in  order  to  prc8®r`it
P!acArthur'8  vl®vs  to  th.  American  peol]le.     It  t.a8  a
dl8agreem®nt  not  only  with  Truman'8  millt{`ry  policl.a
in  Korea.  but  with  Truman's  basic  foreign  policy  which
had-been  desi8n®d  to  conc®ntrato  America'8  efforts
towi±rd   saving   ~i¥egtcrn  Euror`>e   from   th®  Comitiunists.79
At  tli®  Senate  lie8rings  MacArthur   testified  that
h®  had  a  perfect  right  to  express  his  views  concerning
f.orelgri  F}olicy  a8  a  privttite  citizen.     !le  clflimed  hiB
letter  wad  a  private  letter  to  an  old  frl®nd.`  and  was
not  written  with  any  ld®a  that  it  Would  be  read  in
public.     When  h®  l®&rn®d  that  his   letter  had  been
read  to  Congrestt],  and  had  infuriated  the  State  Depart-
"®nt.  he  had  to  .Look  througli  his  files  for  the  letter,
Since  he  had  not   con8ider®d  lt8  contents  worth  remein-
boring. 80
Af tor  many  long  8®s8ionB  with  his  millt&ry  ad-
visers,   Truman  [Iad  his  Press  .`;ecretary.  Joseph  Shot.t,
cull   a   press   conf®r®nc®  at   one   A.   M.,   on  ^T)ril   11.
The  ann{.uncement8  handed  to  r®|,>orterg  road  af  follovg:
W`ith   deep  regret   I   hcave   cone.?.`.ided   t!iat   General
of   th.  Army  Douglas  Mac`&rthur   is  unable   to  give
his  wholehe€irted  support   to   the  |>oliciee   of  the
Unitetl  States   Government  and  of  the  United  Nations
78Letter   by   Doug|&ff   NacArt]]ur   cited   by  Lo®®
Fia c ^r t }}ur p.   3'18.
Ye`J.trg p.   442.
8°T®Btimony  by  Douglas  MflcArthur.   rJ®aringg ,
part  i,  p.   47.
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in  matters  pertaining  to  his  official  duties.    In
vl®w  of  the   gpeclflc  r®gponsibilitieEi   im|iosod
upon  m®  by  the  Constitution  of  t.he  Unlt®d  St.ffte8
and  the  added  regponsibiliti®s  which  have  b®®n
®ntrugted  to  rae   by  the   United  Natiun8,   I  have  d®-
clded  that   I  mu!!t  ffiake   a   c}t{inge  of  command   ln  the
Far  F;a8t.     I  liav®.   therefore,  relieved  fieiicral
"acArthur  of  his  coiunmnds  and  have  d®si`qnated
I+1eutenant   f]ener&l   M`qthew   8.   £tidgew€`y  €`s   Ills
Successor.
Full  find  vigorous  debate  on  mattcr3  of  nationftl
policy  is  ti  vitcal  ele"tL.nt  ln  the  congt.itutional
System  of  oLir  free  democracy.     It   i8   fundam¢zital,
however,   that  military  commandcr8  must  be  <¥overned
by  the  policies  and  direct_iv©§   isBu®d  to   them   in
the  manner  provided  by  our  laws  eind  constitution.
In  tlm®  of  crisi,€.   th®  $1tuatlon  le  particularly
col?i]telling.
General  }iaoArtl`ur's  I.lace  in  history  &s  one   of
our  greatest  corrlmander8  1g  fully  established.'fh.  nation  otfes  }iim  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  the
distinguished  and  excel.tlonol   8ervlc®  wiLich   l`e
h&8  rendered  hi&   cocantry   ln  r>{.8t8   of   great  re-
B}]oz-i8ibility.     For   that  re&Son   I  repeat  niy  regret
at  the  fieces8ity  fol`
to   tcake   in  l`ia  case. 8ihe  action  I  feel  compelled
MacArtliur  wa®   having   lunch  in  tlio  American
F,mb6qssy   in  Tokyo  wl`en  all  aide  brought   the  n.w8   of
rl¢ACArthur's  recall   to  hie  wife.     f.he  then  whispered
the   n®ws   in   the   g{mer&1's   ®&r.      I!is   f&ce   grew  pale
afl   h®   looked  at   her  and  Btlid:      "Jeaimi®'.   .,*.e  Are   going
home  at  last.„C2
`¥eara
8[Pr®s.i  dnnouncemant  by  I.lnrry  :t.   Truman,
p.   `i49.
82state"®]it   by   Douglas  }4ac,``rthur   cited  by
Steinberg,   p.   398.
C]IAPTE;R   V
A   POLICY   DILBHMA
CIIAPTER   V
A   POLICY   DIMBMHA
In  the  preceding  f our  chapters  it  has  been  the
purpo*®  of  thi4  autJior  to  analyze  the  politiccal  and
military  phllosophl®8  of  Pr®sldent  Truman  and  Gen.ral
MacArthur,   including  a   £3urvey  of  Truman's  Korean  policy
from  1945  to  the  r®c®ll  ®f  General  MacArthur   in  April.
1951.     Chapter  five  Shall  rai8®  two  major  questions.
First,  traff  President  Tru"an'8  recall  of  General  Fi&c-
;\rthur  jut3tlfied?     Second,   did  }`lr®sid®nt  Truman  pursue
a  wise  policy  in  trying  to  limit   t.}i®  Korean  t$7ar   to  Korea?
THE   ltf.CALL
President  Truman.8  executive  power  to  recall
Gener€LI  Mac^rthur  hag  never  been  qua.9tioned  S®rlouely.
Article   11.   Section  11  of   the  Congtittition  provides  that
The   (.resl{l®nt  gIlall   b®   Cotr!mander-1n-Cl`ief   of   the
Army  filid  Navy  of   the   United  Steit®.q.   .~tnd   of  the  mill-
tla  of  the  several  st&teg,  vh®n  called  into  the
actual  8®rvic®  of   the  Unit.d  hstat®®.i
Generf`l  ?!ac,Artht]r   himself  hoe  ri®ver  questioned  Truman's
authority  to  adt  ae  h6  did;     h`-hen  asked  et   the  Senate
heflr,ingg   if  he   qtie!<tion®d   th.  power  of   the  Conunfmder-
1ri-Chief  to  retBove  his   commander  on  the  field,  MecArthur
ref,|ied!
L^rtic|e   ||,   Section  11  of  the  United  St&t®g  Cons-
I  IllustratingL`+Ourc®8   and   DOcu"ents
8®|e
titution  appearing  in
the  ^mericfin  ftevolution
_         _                                 _            __   __             -        .            .     _____       `       -_      _       _    _
L`.   Morrison
p.   3000.
Loiidon i
cia  -a-ri--a: --€-di=i ed  by  €;amuel
1923 ) ,0]cford  L'tiiversity  }'regs.
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Not  in  the   a.1ight®#t.     Trio  authority  of   the
President   to  ast3igri  or  to  rectssig,n  of±`icers  i8  c{jm-
|7l®t®   .-tnd  {:b8olute.      H®   do®B  not  have   to   give   any
::::::B±:h:::f:;B::in:EythLn8  else.    Tliat  i8  1n-
Since  Trufnan's  autt`ority  to  rectl`lL  llac/+rthur  cati-
n®t  be  questi{.nod  l®giti"®tely,   t}l®  rocurr®nt  pul}lic
debate  clearly  hlngcd  upon,  not  Truman'8  power  to  recall.
but  upon  his  judgement   ln  ex®rci81ng  that  power.     In
other  words,  could  Truman'3  action  be  justified  a8  tile
best  gtos#ible  action  in  this   circumBtanc®?     When  Truman
announced  to   the  |]ublic   th{`t  Mac^rthur  had  b®i`n  rocalle{3,
it  will   be  r®r.ie"bered,   h®   ex}.1icitly  8tflted  his  reason-
ing:
.    .    .    I   h{iv®   concluded   tli&t   Gen®r€ral   of   the   Army
Douglas  #acArtliur  iB  unable  to  give  his  whole-
hearted  sup}iort  to  the  policies  of  the  United
£:::::sf`;::::::¥:g`T¥:  :=Bt:1;fti'rc&±::dd¥:i::?§  ±n
No  m®ntlon  was  made   of  llacArthur.a  ref us.f`l   to
obey   orders.     haThen  volume   two   of   `nruman.8  m®znoirs,
Ye{irs  of  Trial  and
I  __       _  _  I_  _        ___  _  _._                    I___   I_        _  __.__I j±gp±.  wag  published  ln  1956,  however.
h®  publicly  ch€ir`S®d  }lacArtriur  with  insubordination,
citing  MacArthuz-'f]  HQrch  £4   Statement   to   the   Chin®ge
Communi8tg  as  the  decisive  factor   of  his   dlsml.q#®l.
Trulllan  declared:      "By   thl8  &ct  Mac^rthur   left  m®  no
choice--I  could  Ilo  longer  tol®rat®  I.lie  lnsubordln-
atlon,"/i
ZTestimony  of  Douglas  Ftac^rthur,   ILearings,   p€lrt
i,   p.   26.
3j\rmouncement   by  I{arry   5.   Trun&n  alxpet}ring  in
Truman , Tears p.    `149.
`±Trum`|n.
Y e il r g a.    '142.
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"1.  e:E [zj!:=± £®=e=±_±  rt®veltltl®n  eltier.  trumn..
•uppo&ed  unl-f®ot®r  r®a.®nlng  on  the  dlend®eal  to  a
bl-i.ctenr  ®n®=    fir.t,  mcArthur  Could  not  Support  the
pollcl..  ®f  the  LJnlt®d  .€t&toB  tind  the  t;'nlt®d  N.tloti.i
•®condi  h.  p`ibllcly  ®xpre..®d  til.  dl&.gr®®ment.  vlth
ehea€  I.®11cl®&.   ®v®n  when  he  had  been  ordered  not  to
do  a®,
^1thoug}i  trumn  did  not  aeke  an  ltan®dl&t®  charge
of  in.ubordin&tl®n.  *®ver.I  other  €ov®rnm®nt  offlclal.
did.     S®cr®tary   of  LI®fen4e  a.eor€®  rsereh&Ll  vaar  aek®d
at  tlte  S®net€  hearing.  vri®th®r  or  not  l*ft€Arthur  had
b®®n  ln.ubordinAt.  1n  atty  tray®     tl¢  t®etifl.a  aft
r®llov.i     «Itt  r®latlon  to  the  conduct  of  the-oaerpalen,
no,  h®  hA.  not.  not  th4t  I  Can  r*€all®     Im  relation  to
put]1ic  &tat®m€ftt&.   hD  hoe.«5     Liiter  no  Added:
B]r  hle  pltbllc  etnten®pt '  .r  .t4tem€nte  that  vere
made  1»  put}11c  ln  tlt®  ordlrLnr¥  pre84,  he  I.t  up  a
v®qr  lerLouB  r®etcti®ti  8m®ae#  our  alllel..  *hlch
thr.at®n®d  our.  coll®ctlv®  ectlolt ttlth  th®p.  and
wlilch  thr®4t®n®d  our  p®bltlen  ln  the  voz'1d  ln
::I::::: :: :£±: &¥:::t::£e::.8:¥:gv]#C:I:i::3t®n®d
lla®Arthur,  however.  wlLll®  ®dbelttln€  the  Charge
that  h®  c®t&ld  not  glv®  hle  vh®leh®ert®d  eupp®rt  to  the
pollcl®B  of  th.  unltetl  Stat®a  And  the  Unlt®d  ».tlon€,
falL®d  to  under8tend  Why  hie  tll&egr®®tbent.  I.ouLd
n®c.eBltet®  hl&  recall,  unl¢B..  pertiap&.   the  Fr®81d®nt
tfa.  pl&t`nlng  to  lnf titut®  A  n®v  policy  *hlch  he  lm®w
ELdLCArthur  would  obvlou.ly  not  .upport.    ^t  the  heerlngg.
when  a.ked  why  h®  had  b®®n  r®c&ll®tl,  14ecArthur  t..tl+
fled  a.  followe!
5Exc®rpt  from  t®Btl"ony  of  a¢org®  }inr.hall.
Ii®arlnae,  pert  i,  p.  541.
6ng..  p.  th5.
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I  can  only  interpret  th&it  order  that  the  &drminis-
tr&tioti.  knowing  the  Vietfs   I  Ii®ld,  was  gtjing  to  act
im  a  very  contritry  way,   find  believed  it  wag  achrigahl®
not  to  place  ally   stri'41n  u¥}on  my  loyalty,   if  you  mihrht
put   it  that  way,  &nd  relieved  iiie  ®f  "y  comuniand.     It
must  have  been  based  u}!on  what  they  had  in  mind  for
:I::nf{T:;=£in8r±nc:#:dp:i::.¥Ossibly  hzfav®  been  ha8®d
HacArthur'g  contention  tllcit  his  recall  muest  have
been  btlsed  on  future  plans,  not  on  past  performance,
evidences  clearly  thdit  he  believed  his  r®c&ll  was  un-
jugtifl®d.     Macj\rthur  8ifflply  could  not   icouiprehaentl  a
milittiry  dismissal  actuated  upon  one'8  public  ®xpr®88-
ion  of  policy  objections,  While  that  same  policy  wag
b®1ng  executetl  fu.1ly   in  line  t+'ith  srfecific  ®rd®r8.
In  TrumanlB  view.  rit.wever,   the  public   gtitte-
ments   of   FTacArthur  `*'el-®   sufficient   re€'{gon   t®  I.ec€fll   }`iF.I,
1`or   Trun{in   izit®rF)rated  them   to   be   t!cts   ®f   ingubordin£`.i-
tion.   Oven  overre6]cfiing  tile   strict  militt`.ry  refilm  into
foreign  p®lic,y.     Clefirly  T`ruunan  tiid  liot  il`tGri.trot   them
to   b®   e3ic:p.reggions   of  opinion  only,   &9  HacArthur  &lleg®d
them  to  be,   since  Tru!nan  Stat®d:      ''Of  courg€,   I  would
never  deny  r]enerfll  MacArthur  or  anyone  elfle  the  rl€FEht
to  dlff®r  `ifith  me   in  ®Itinions.W8    The  epitome   of  the
r®cSll   seeEHs   t®   b®,   therefore.   a   dig®r®pancy   b®tu€en
MacArth`ur lg  intention  and  Trtifesan.s   interpret&tion,
intermingled  with  a   clu&1iBtic   conflict  &s  to  what
colisti,tuted  public  ®plnit>n  find  put)llc   8tcat®m®nt  and  88
to  what  constituted  militeitry  policy  €Lnd  f®r®1fip  policy.
The  complexity  ®f   t]te  .problem  was   slco}tlified  when  Tru-
"am  charged  MflcArthur  with   lrisut]ordlncation.
7Testimony  or   nougla8  REac+\rthur.   I!efiringgi,   part
1,   p.   a$2.
8Trumfln. Y®firg p.   335.
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M&cr\rthur,   }iov®ver.   regarded  th.  charge  aB
8otuethlng  more  than  over-I)impllflcation.     At  the
5®nfit®  hearin`¥s.   when  t8sk®d   lf   he   htLd  been   in8ubor-
dlnat®,  Mac^rthur   t®stlfied  ag   follows:
There  isn't  tiny  }tosibility  o£`  roy  digagre®ing
with  any  order  I  alit.i,ht  have  received,  whether  I
reg&rdecl  it   as   fufood,   bad,   {ir   indifl`er®nt.
W-flat   I  wag   I.e{iu®estlng  was   some   directive.      'riie
lack  {.f  dlrectiv®s  w&B  whtlt   I  vac   tl`ylng  to  bring
to   tlieir  &tt®ntion  and  ask  theun  for  a  decision.
'IIad  any   deci81ong   whQtgoever  been  r®&ched,   I
would  have,   to  the  very  beHt  of  rtyy  ability,   carried
lt  out,
I  resent  with  every  1.iber  in  my  body,   any  ln-
fer®ncc   that  ccan  be   drawn  that   I  }`ave  been.   in  flny
degree.   1nsubor{Ilnat®  or   digrt!g|tectful   of  the
Pr®sid®nt   of   the   United  .qt®t®g,   or   the  }]olicie8   of
:r;i:h:°¥:i::i  £:t:::Igl.Sh®  Policies  and  dir®ctive8
It  is  evident  that   there   i8  a   discr®paiicy,   &18®.
a8   to  the  d®finltion  of  insubordination.     In  Truman'g
memoirs,   the  !\merlcan  people  w-ere   told  for  the  first
time   exactly  tthat   government  offlcial8  had  m®€int  when
t.hey  htid  charged  MmcArthur  with   insubordination.     Truman
not   only  charged  that  Fi&c+\rthur  had  been  in8ubordiriate.
but  h®  mentioned  three  Brtecific  occftsions   in  which  llac-
Artliur  had  puhlicly  expre8s®d  his  views   on  m&tt®rs   of
foreign  itolicy--an  ar®a  tJhlch  iB  traditlon&11y  defined
by  docigions  and  d®claration8  of   the  I-'re8it!®iit.     By
publicly  ®xpl-es81ng  his   own  vi®w9  on  matters   of  foreign
policy,   twice  after  he  had  received  the   »®cemb®r  6
Order  lnstructlng  hlra  to  clc€.ir  all  public   gtatementB
with   the  n®c®ssiiry  der]art".nts.   r¥1ficArthur.   Truman
alleged,  had  therein  commlttcd  acts  of  insubordination.
9T¢stimony  of  Douglas  H"cArthur.  He&ringg,  part
1,   p.   284.
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The  first  act  of  insubordintition.  Truman  claimed.
occurred  in  M&cj\rti.iur's  gtat®ment   to   the  V®teran8   ol.
Foreign  `"Tars   ill  A`igu.i!tt   1950.t°     Although  r±acArthur
claimed  ,that  l'Lig   statetrient   collcern®d  mlllt&ry  affairs
wJiich  it  w&B   hl&   pr€rogativ®   a8   Supr®n.Ie  Allied  Coni-
mander  in  the  Far  F,&#t  to  exrir®s8,1`run&n  comsiderod
it  a  gt€`tement  crltictll  of   the  official  United  .€,;tates
Fortnosan  policy.
wrote g
In  Years Trl,1| ee in, T"man
It  wtlB  ray  opinion  that  this  Statement  could
only  serve  to  confuse  the  world  ae  to  jufat  what
our  Forfflosa  policy  tfag,   for  it  was  at  odds  wit.h
my  -nnoulicemant   ®f   June   27.   cind  it  also   con-
tr€`dicted  tJhat   I  hfid  told  the  Congress.     F`urther-
more.   ci`tr   rtolicy  riad  been  r®affirm®d   only   the   dfiy
ttefore  ln  a  letter  which,  on  my  inatructlon8.
AmbaHs&dor  ^us]tln  had  ad{iressed   to   the   Secretary
Gen®r&l   ol    the   United  N&tions.   Trygve   Lie.
The   subject   of  FormoB&  had  been  placed  b®for®
the  Security  Council   by   the  ftuaEi€In  d®leg&tion,
which  charged  us  with  &cte   of  &t§sr®Esion   in  our
aid  to  Chifing  HJai-ghek,   and   I  liad  appr®v®d  a   State
L)ep&rtr£'i®nt   zjroposal   thcat   we   countt}r   thl8   chtlrge
with  a   daclcardetion  that  we  w®r®  entirely  willing  to
h&v®   tli®   United  N`ation#   investigate   t}1e   I;`ormogan
situati{}n.     Fir.   Mrilik,   the   Etusgian  delegate,  tJag
trying  to  persuade  the  `q®curity  Council  that  our
fiction  in  pl€icing  the  Seventh  J`|®et  in  the  For-
mosa   .¢jtralt  €`mount®d  to  the   incorp{}ration  of
prormosth  witliin  the  Aineric&n  orbit.     Aufit~iri.g
lQgtter   to  TryHve   Lie   had  made   it  rilain   tl`nt  w®
had  only  one   intention:     to  reduce  the  are&*  of
conflict  in   th.  I.ar  F,&st.     General  M{ic,..\rthur'a
me8s€tge.   which   the   World  mlglit  miBtt`ke  a&   en
®Xpr®8slon  of  Auterican  }>ollcy,   contradicted   this.LL
10,*e®   comit|ete   tt}xt   of   r]el}eral  M&cf`\rthur's
8t&tement   tc]   the   Vet®riing   of   Forel`gri  Wt`rg   ln  Appendix
I,   pp.   I.31-135.
1[Trunan. Years p.   555.
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In  reply  to  "um&n'B  all®g*tl®n  ®f  lnBub®rdin-
&tl®n  ln  the  m¢m®irB,   G®n€r4il  m€Arthur  lB®uf*d  a   flv®
th®u8and  word  Btat®ment   ®a[pr¢gsing  hlg   Own  vl®wg   ®n
the  c®ntrov€r.±al  18&ue8  concernln€  his  r®c®ll.     In
flnsu®r  t®  truman.B   charge  tlb®ut  the  Btatem®nt  t®  the
V©teranS  of  Foreign  Wars.  HacArtliur  d®micd  that  h®  had
any  lnt®ntl®n  or  atttlcklng  "uman.S  f®relgn  policy.    H®
rmlntalned  that  the  8tat®ment  vac  a  Study  of  the
"111tary  value  ®f  Formosa  whicLh  h¢  1md  every  right  a5
a  military  €om"and®r  t®  ®xpresB  publicly.     He  Baldg
rho  m®3B®g®  t®  the   Vet®ran®   of  F®r®1gn  Wars  wA.
a  atrat®gic  sttld3r  of  tli®  igland  of  F®rmo8a  as  a
link  in  our  defensive  chain  in  the  w®etern  P@clflc
vhlch  both  ®xplQin®d  Bud;  &upp®rt®d  Our   government+a
entmcitlt®d  policy  concerning  that  iBland.     It  w8e
a  routln®  mesBag®  which  normally  would  h&v®
attracted  little  att®]ition  other  then  from  th®g®
who  might  have  Beere€ly  harbored  the  ultimate
1nt®nt  to  currend®r  Farmoaa   ±®  Red  ChineBe
Control.12
It  1&  Qvldent  that  *lacArthur  and  truman  did  not
Ggre®  a8  to  uhat  c®n&titut®d  a  Btat®ment  concerning
matt®r3  ®f  for®1gn  policy.     Ther®1n  li®8   the  dmjor
reag®n  why  M&¢Arthur  was  I.ecall®d.
The   &ec®nd  ®ccaBi®n   ±n  whlclL  Truman  ¢lalmB
14acArtthur  ®xpre€3etl  his  vi®wB  on  f®relgn  pollc¥  vhlcll
c®iLflicted  With  ®ffioiAI  United  Stat®B  pollGy  was  his
lGarc}i  24  Statement   to  the   Chin®£®   Conrmu&ilgt3.   is.u®d
three  dnya  af tor  he  had  r®€®iv€d  a  m€88ag®  from  the
Joint  Chi®fg  of  Staff  informing  hl"  tli&t  the  Pregldent
vac  plermlng  to  13Sue  a  Statement  propo6ing  a  ceas€-
flre.15    trutmn  "g  firm  ln  dQnoun¢ing  the  }T®rch  2fe
?-2Bx®erpt  from  €t"temortt   by   Doug.1ajB  H&cArttiur
@ppet¥AFlng   i?a   The   HewL.|J York  Tines .   9  February.1956i  p.  25.
&5Se®   comLilet®   text   ®f  MacArthur.a  Harch  Z4
gtatem®nt  ln  Appendix  11,   pp.   135-156.
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&tdt®ment.       In   Y®e!tITg Trial   ifend:±±£  !±£]Z±  he  wrotei
It  v8s  a  Inost  ®xtraordlnary  gtQt®ment   for  a
milit€-±ry   comm&nder   of   tn®   tJ-nit®d  Nations   to   i®gue
on  his  own  responsibility.     It  tJ&®  fan  &ct  totally
disregarding  all  directives  to  abstain  from  any
doclarfltions  on  foreig;rn  policy.     It  w&B  in  open
d€fianc®  of  "y   ®rd®rE  caS  Presidelit  and  Com"&nder-
in-Chief.     This  was  a   ch&1l®nge  t®  the  authority
®f  the  l]r®sidelit  under  the  Constitution.     It  alB®
flouted  the  policy  of   the   [Jnit®d  givt]Lions ....
In  effect,  ¥hfat  lhacArthur  tras  doing  was  to
threaten  the  enaffiy  with an  nlti"tum--inti"iting
that  the  full  i3i.Gpond®rfinc€  of  Allied  power  might
b®   torought   to   t}¢&r  ftg&imgt  ited  Chilra.     T®  be   8ur©,
he  gaid,  this  wotlid  b®  a  poiitic&l  decifli{jn,   but
conBiderlng  hid  high  office,   tli-world  would  aBsume
that  he  lrad  advcknc®  knowledge  that   Such  a   decision
w®{ild   b®   made.
This  w@8   certainly   the   imm®ckitlt®   effect  among
our  allies.     Prom  c&pltcals  &11  over  the  world
ctlm®   intiuirie33     tr-hat   doefl   this  mean?     IS   th®r®
flbout  to  b®  a   Shift  in  Americt.:in  policy?14
In  an8war  t®  this  charge,  }Iacftrthur  rerjli®d  that
although  he  had  b®Gn  under   orders  simc®  I)®cember  6   to
clear  all  riublic  st&tement8  t¢ith  the  n®c®3sary  depart-
ments,   twice  bef®r®   had  1}®   1.q§ued   gt&tem®ntB   Similar
to   tlie   one  or  March   24  without   ffiny  indic&itl®n  tli&t  hl8
8t<.`t®m®nts  interfered  with   the  Official  United  Stflt®S
riolicy.     Ag&in.   he   reflfrlrm®d  his  c®flviction  that  hiH
was   in  acc®rd&nc®  with  the  rights  and  duties  ®r  a  mili-
tary   car:i]3!and€r.      !1®   g€ild:
The  charge   thflt   I  was   in#ubordin&te   t}®ccauEca   I
c&ll®d  upon   tile   eneeny   to   &urreLLder  and   Stop   furti`t®r
blrtodsined  i8   even  mar.e   grotesque.     T`wice   before   I
had  done  sos     after  tile  lnchon  victory  and  after
our  capture  of  }Sy®ngyalig.   the  en®ny's  c&|.`it€`1  city
lri  furorth  K®r®{a.      In  neither   ln8ttln€e  hath   th®r®  been
14Trum#n. Y ®. a r a I}P.    441-4'±2.
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the  t3lightest  whisper   of  remonstriinc®  from  any
8ourcei   lnd®ed,   qult®  the   contrary.     Alid  actually
how   cotlld   tliore   hcav®   b®®n   otl`®rwiso:      From   the   be-
ginning  of  warf{&re   it   I`as  not  only  been  a  right
but  a   duty  for  a   field  commBnd®r  to  take  ally  stop
within  his  power  to  minimize  the  bloodshed  by  the
Lqoldier`q   c®ttlm±.tt®d   to   Ills   commtc*nd ....
Mr.   Truman   fur`ther   ct)mplains   tht'`t  my  pr`opo8a|
int©rf®i-od  t.'ith  one  }ie  hinis®lf  contemitlated  making
for  an  armistice.     Such  ei  complaint  ig  unexplflin-
e`ble.     I.low   could  any  offer  of  pee`ce  I)y  in.  possibly
lnterfet~e  with\  a   Similar  purpose  or  move  on  hlg
part--unless  of  course  h®  were   B®cretly  entert{!in-
ing  the  idea   of  app®a8ing  the  R®d8   by  nn  agreement
short  of  the  declared  objcctive8  of  the  Uliited
Nations  in  the  uniflcatioli  of  Korea.15
1`he  third  example  ol.   ins`lb®rdination.   1`ruman
stated,  was  MacArtl`ur'B   letter   to  Congresgfflan  Jofl®ph
W`.  }i&rtin.     Trumafl  interpreted  this  latter  to  b®  an
attempt  on  Marj\rthur's  part   to  present   fais  c@uge  to  th.
American  people.     'rhc   letter  wag  used  by  Mtirtin  as  an
attack  &gain8t  Truman'j3  entire  foreign  policy  before
the  Consr®ss.      If  Truman  hf`d  einy  doubtg  ahout  }lac-
;``Lrthur'5  recall  I.irlor  to  April   5  wrien  Me*rtin  rei*d   the
letter.   they   {!ulckly  vani8h®d.     ]1®   described  MBc,\rthur'8
letter   to  MfLirtin  &g   follows:
The  Second  paragrAi+h  of  tl`is  letter  was  in  it-
Self  enough  ol.  a   challenge  to  existing  policy.
}t&cj\rthur  ha{l  been  fully  informed  as  to  the  reason
why   the   ¢m&jloyment   ol   Chinese  Ncitionalist   troops
had  been  ruled  out.     f[c  him.qelf ,   only  eight  months
ei!rlier,   head  endorsed   the  mt!rit   of   this   d®c±gictn.
Lfiter,   whom  lie  had  ch&ng®d  }ils   position  and  re-
op®n®d   the   subject,   h®   had  ag&]in  been  aclvised   that
this  WQB  part  of  the  overall  policy  on  which   the
r>resl{]ent  had  doc.idea.     So,   in  praising  Mr.   Ft,'}rtin's
logic  and   tradltlonal  attitude,  }ie  v€,`8  in  el`f®ct
saying  th€`t  "y  policy  wag  without  logic  and
15frxcerpt
appec-zrlng   in  1`h®
p.   25.
from   .statemen+,   by  Douglras  Mac^rthur
New   York  Times
_  ______                          ____                       _
.   9   February,1956.
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V1®lated  tradition.
"ow.  the  tri&{]ition  ®f  tfhich  he  wrote--that  ®f
"eetlng  farce  with  caaximum  con,nterfQrc®--1S  in  it-
Self  not  One   that  ®xi&t&   outgid®  milltcary   te]£tb®oka.
T®  be  8ure.   it  is  ft  &¢od  rule  for  the   ®"ploym©nt
of  troop.q,  but  it  has  Ilo  bearing  on  the  relations
between  peo|iltsE.     The   Am€r].cfln   people  h&v®  &ccoffl-
pli@h®d  much  and  fatt&ined   8r®atnesff  not  by   the  use
::y:E5Ce.  but  by  imdugtryt   ingenuity.  and  g®nero8-
a¢acJ`rthur.   of  courg®,   denied  fill   ch®rg®8   that
he   had  attem}ited.   in  any  w,+.iy,   to   g®   over   the  h®&d  of
the  2Jresident   in  order  to  ®xpresa  his  views   t®  t.he
American  people.      I[e   cL®im®d   t}1tlt  a   millt&ry   c®"m&nder
ls   r®quir®d  by  lat*   to  T7r®flent   his  vi®wg   to  CongrcB9-
m®n  whenever  he   iffi   c&ll®d  upon   to   do   8oi   and  he
cla±co®d  the   letter  to  h!&rtln  w&8  routine,  and  made
little  i"preBgion  on  him  when  h®  wrote  it.L7     |n
presenting  hlB   dGfen8e   c}f  Trufflan,'8   chprge,  hiacArthur
Stated:
'rhe  ttiird  dociim®nt  which  lip.  Truman  calls  ±n-
8ui7ordi]iqtion  wag  my  1®tt®r   in  reply  to  Congr®gs-
Hi€in  }l&rtin  &Skin&  "y  Vi€wf   on   the   eanployfflent   of
C}iin®8®   i\.ati®naligt   tl`caor.j8   which  h&d  been  Offered
for  the  Kor*&n  front.     It  l'ias  fllit-ays  t}®en  the
practice  and  h€c&f]i®  the  law  that  milit€`ry  ofriclala,
when  cftll®d  upon  by  g*I®mber#   of  Congress  for  infor-
matlon,   ghflll  {Siv®  ±t  without  re.qerwStioni   but  here
again  I;`ormoga   loomed  up  aS   the   foccal  ?®1nt   to  }tr.
Truman.     For  in  th&t  letter  I  aurreod  with  Cor}gress-
m&n  r#artin.8  logic   tli&t  the   l®y&l  Chin®s®   troops
::r:::rm::at£:a::tttt£:  :±it;:::i:.±g  supr'ort  Our  own
Tlle  very   idea   that  he  had  h®en  ins`ibordinat®
Ye4|rs 1=.    !i't6.
t?Te8tlmony   ®f   Bougla5  hi&cArthuri   H®aring@i
part   i,   r}.   ds7.
18Excerpt   fraffl
appearing  in  Th®  Now
i___.  ___._        ._       I  _T=       ,
p.   25.
r3t&±t®flifu.nt   toy   r}ouglas   Flacj+\rthur
Y®rk  Times 9   F®bru®ry,195S,
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wac  r®r)ulslve  to  MacArthur.     ills  main  d®1.ease  against
Truman'8  char8®s  of  influbordination  i8  based  on  the
ftact  that  Truman  never  publicly  mad®  Such  charges  while
he   via8  President.     He  made   them  after  he  had  left  offlc®.
.apacArthur   ®xplalned  wriy  l`e   thought   Trumcan  vt'ctlt®d  ut``.il
his   tern  of  ofl`ice  w{*8  o`rer   before   charging  lnsubordiii-
atlon  ag  follows:
Over  the  year&  many  conflicting  reasons  have
b®en  8.iven  by  Mr.   'rrumafi,   or   }iig   sup}.)orters,   for
zny  abrur}t  r®lief  wh®n  victory  was  within  our  grasp.
Now,   for  the  first  time,   he  bi*8es  lii~g  action  on
what  h®   terms   insuborclinBtion,   one  of   the  ltioBt
gerlous  of   all  mlliteSry  or£-en.qes  Cnd  one  wliic!i
tl`.roughout  our  military  &nnals  }i&g  rievor  been
made  without  the  ol'fic®r  coricerned  being   given  a
hefRring  and  the  opportunity  to  defend  himself .
Ind®e{l.   the   code  uhich   tile   Congress   Qnact®d  to
establish  the   laws  i€overning  the  military  estab-
list.iment   gT>eclflcally  makes   such   a  hearing  man-
et{)ry.      F.16`d   Mr.   Truman   rmde   such  a   charge   &gairLat
nl®  at  the  time  of  my  relief ,   or  even  later  during
}`iis   tenure  of  office  I  would  have  had  the  right
and  privilege  to  ask  tliat  a   C®urt  ol`   I]`.]uiry  Sit
in  judici{`1   juclge"ent  upon  llig  i`11eg€itions ....
The   belated   chari#``e   or   inmibordination   is  met(.te
by  him  not  o8  a   Tiublic   officlttl,   but  &8  a   private
c i t i a en. . 19
It  cam  be  said.  therefore.  that  the  recf}ll  of
{ieneral  }§{9c,``rthur  wee   ]primarlly  "t..tivated  not   by  hif!
unwillingneB8   to  agree  with  Trunan'8  Korcaan  policy.   btit
by  his  public   expre88ion  ori  matters  which  he  considered
milit.try  i>ollcy.   L]ut  which   the  President  congider®d
foreign  policy.     It  i8  true  that  MficArthur'8  un-
willingness   to  a!5rtte  With  TrLlm&n'&   |iolicy   *qtrain®d   tli®
L9F,xcerpt   from  statement
arjpearing
p.   25.
in  The   New  York  Times
_             _         _____-__        ______     _       .       __      ___==
by   Do`]g}.ag   }lacArthur.
.   9  l'`ebruary,1956.
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]`or.fflal  rel{Titions   botween   the   ComF.ijtnder-in-Chief  {'*nd
his   com"and®r  on   t}i®  field,   t>ut   thl3  would  not  have
re-`lltod  in  F!ac.ftrthur's  recall  if  both  Triun&n  And
lJi&c^rthur  could  have  agreed  on  tfh€i.t  va8  military
policy  and  what  wag   foreign  policy.     :31nco   the  Con-
8tltution  does  not  clef in®  the  ujLff®rcnce  b®ttJeen
foreign  policy  find  military  policy.  the  contrasting
interpr®tatlonB  of  Tr`uman  and  Mact\rthur  fire  legitimate.
The  Constitution  does  provide,  however.   that
the  r>resident   8hall  determine  the  dlfferenc€  bctt!een
th®  two  areas,   that  h®   Shall  define  that  dlfferenc®
when   neceggary,   and   that   h®   zBllt±11   `roice   t.he   Ltig!i®e!t
militftry,   ag  well  ad   t}le  hitfh®st. foreign  affairaE
8tateme]]tg.     It  i6  altogether  po®gible  that  the
J`'r€sident's  definiti{]n  of   the  two  €*r®a8   fr`ight   b®
incorrect.  but  it   i8   his  decision.   ,~S`"d  must  there-
fore  be  acce|jt®d  &s  adrfutinl8trative  policy.
TruJr.an  beli®V®d  that  hi8  d®finitlon  claflsified
M&cArthurlB   throe  p.ut]lic   s€at®m®nts  a8  being  con-
cerned  with  matters  of  foreign  policy.     t`ccording
to  M&cArthur'B  d®finitlon.   thlg  wag  not   so.        Tl`e
ultimate  decision,  however,  wac  'rruman'g.   not  Mac-
Arthur's.     Thus,   in  view  of  1`rumai.'8  constitutional
prerogcT`tiv®.a.   tli®  r®c€ill  of  "€icArthur  was  perfectly
justifl®d.     This   does  not  mean,   however.   that  Truman'8B
definiti'on  of  foreign  |>olicy  is  or   iB  iLot  correct!   it
simply  moans   that  Mac^rttlur  hat.I  no  choice  ln  the
"attGr.     Tile  President   and  Cozamand®r-ln-Chief  had
spoken .
10?
PO,SS;IBLE    0TIIl-;jl   FACTORS
The  preceding  a"Ily4qis  of  G®n®ral  Macf\rthur's
recall  has  been  based  on  the  assumption  that  all  of
tile   fQct8   Surrounding  Trum&n's  action  have  been  re-
leased  to  the  public.     Tliore  ls  a  poBBibility.  how-
ever,   tha't  tlii8  is  not  8o.
In  MtlcArthur's  five  tliou8and  word  reply   to
Truman.a  memoirs,   he  cl`arg®d   that  Trumaii  had  not  r®-
1e{iBed  €`11   of   the   f€ict8.      1]®   pointed  to   the   f€ict   that
Truman  mentioned  nothing  in  his  fiten]oire  about  ex   l®tt®r
h.hich  he  had  sent   to  Trun]iin  ln  January,   1951.     The
con€entg  of   the   letter  tfere  de.qcribed  by  }i€icArtliur  ©8
follows :
But  what  may  hnv®  wall   tr`igg®r®d  my  removal   wca.i
"y  r®cof}ti3§end&tlon  ratid®   in  Jfinuary   Shortly   b®for®
my  r.lief ,   that  a  tr®&gon  trial  b®  initiated  to
break  up  a   Spy  ring  rosrjoli8ibl®  for  t,he  purloining
of  my  toti   Secret  reports   to  b./a8hington.     My  cam-
paign  pl€in8,   including  those  of   the  F.1ghth  Array.
w®r®   trflnsmitted  daily   to  b'ashington.     G®ner&l
Walker  co"pltlin®d  constantly  to  in.   that   the  enemy
wtl8  receiving  ririor  information  of  his  fiiovem.ants.`giv'e  could  find  no  leaks   in  Korea   or  Jarian.     Then
suddenly  one  of  my  dis|iatche8  col`corning  the  order
of  battle  tfaa  publlfl}i®d  in  a  Wa8hlngton  paper  with-
in  &   few  hours  of  its  r®c®ir2t.      I   insi&t®d  thtit
tho8®   responsible   b®   st®i]ped,   but   the   ccage  uas
novor  processed  and   I  w&8  shortly  r®lieved  of  my
c ommttn(I ,
It  was  not  ulitil   the  recent  ¢xp®sure  of  the
i}ritish  spies,13urgess  and  licLe€`n,   that   tl}®   true
facts   b®¥&n   to  unl`old.     These  mom  trlth  acce6ti   to
Secret  fileg`  were  undoubtedly  link.   in  the  chain
to   our   eriem}'   in   Kor®&   thr`.jugh   }l®king   by   wt`y   ol`  Mos-
cow.      1  believe   that  my  domi-`nd   that,   this   sltu&tion
be   exposed,   coiniz`g  Sifter   t}i®   j``lger   f!1sg   and   l`ia&-ry
I)®xter   '.`.hits   sc€indal.i,   caused   the   d®o|i®e]t  r®s®nt"ent
t.tlld   that   it  waB  probat)ly   branded  a   political  Clove
10(;.,
to   embarrer8£   the   dduninistr€`itiori. 20
Thins  &utiior  twas  unable   to   find  any   evidence  that  'rruman
evf.r  att®"pted  to  &nBwer  this   chars:a.
/*noth®r   incid®nt„   which  r&i8€g   8om®   doubt  ag
to  whether  all  of   the   fcactg   `qurroulidlng  Ffi*cj¢`rthur'B
r®c®.1l   }i€2ve   been  fl`ade   puhlic,   ucc`irred   ®n  a   t@ieviaion
pr®`ngram   ln   Chlc&go   ®n   nec®mbcr   17.   1960.      [{&,Try  Truman
was   being  interviewed  by   I`rv  lturti]ic€t,   a   columni.fat  for
the  chicca8®  se Tinlc8 .   on  the   S.rogr¢|m  entitled   ''..&t
i?,&ndom.`'     T}l®   following   is   &n   ©xc®rpt   {`rom   that   inter-
view   ®Ei   r®nort®d   ln   The   fny®w   York  Tiliie8:   i r port®d   ln  The  fny®w_                __        I_               _
Mr.    Kupi[LciQt.       Spetjk±m&      'trt..`tis   there   any   }>reg8ur€3
®n   y{>u   to   I.¢1ea.¥e   the   A-!i[3mb   figmin   in   the   H®r®utn
conflict?
}£r.    Tru±`tdiBI®  F!a£©iils±.mgg]    fur®.i ,    rpiitc.`'\rtl`tlr   wcanted    t®
d®  that,
I.Sr.    rLu¥*tinccat.     [fi¥€acArt}tun]  {ti{]?
Fir®   Tru#}din.      Y€.q,   he   wf±nted   to  bomb   China   and
Ea8t`®rn  Hu$81a   &fid   everything  ®18e.
5ir.   Kupincet.     tJ8e   the   atomic   bomb?
}tr.   Truinari.      'ue7hy,   of   c®urge,   that   w&S   the   only
we&pom  we  had   trtat   they  would  understtind.2l
"iis  wag   the   first  time  Trum{.in  head  ever  chcarfbed
!¥&cflrtr`.ur  i+'ith   i`TreEsturi*ig   hiffi   to   ugc   riucl®t*r  wear.>®nfa
in  the   Hor®t`,±n  war.     ti!hen   later  asked  wily  h®  had  not
fflentioned   i+his   in  his  ffi¢moirg,   Truman  r®|.]lied:      ''1
dldn't  want   to   do   H&cArthur   &ny  d&m€ig®,   but  when  a
que8tio(1   ig   &gk®d   poirit-h|&nk   I   have   to  aTigwer   it.w22
a°F.xcer!Bt   from   st€ttemant   by  Douglas  MacArthur
appc&ring  in  E± New   Yorlc   Tim®8
2tExc®rf`t  of  interview
Hupinc|*t   fiT]Fi®€aririg   in  The   Newl96o' p.  7.                _-
9  February,   1956,   p.   2.5.
of  IIi`rry  S.   Trumaan   by   lrv
Yo|.k   EB`if!.itss 23   r}ecermb®r,
22Stfrtement   by  f|&rry   a.   Trurafin  €ipi>e&ring  in  The
__..
El±±i  ¥±=!S  I±E=£.   a5   December,   186o,   p.   7.
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Although  this  interview  provoked  little  curiosity
from   tlLe   American  peoi`1e,   it   !>rovoke(I  rage   from  G®iieral
M.~icj\rthur.     From  his  apfirtment   fit   the  trfllii®rf-A.qt®ria
Hot®11n   New   York.   Mac^rthur   i8Hued  a   Btat®ment   d®-
®crlbingTruman'g  cnarg®s  &s   Wcompl®tely  false."     I.le
said  in  part:
The  records  are  &vnildble  and  will  gh®w  that
atoul   bombitig   in   the   Kore£&n  i+Tar  wt`s   never   €Zis-
cuggtja{l  either   by  my  h®&dquarterB,   or   im  €`ny
communication   to  &iid  from  Wca8hlngton ....
We  did  not  need  the  atoln  bomb  here  any#iore   than
`.a   did  in  th®  war  cag&in8t  Ja|jtln.23
}€€`c{\rthur  also  de8crib®d   ca&   t'equally  fant&stie"
Trumi«|ii'8   charge   thflt  h®   had  wanted   to  bomb  iSitierlii.
harho  was   t®lli)ig  the   tr`it,h?     Per)laps  nobody  will
ever  know.     At   the  gen.i`te   he&rings  LngacArthur   testified
t!`at  he  l`ad  not   r8ci}"mended   thtlt   the   bomb  be  uB®d,   but
he  had  r®qu®.ted  lnformotlon  about  whether  c®n8ideration
w€is   being  given   to  its  use.     The   following  1g  an  ex-
cerrit  from  the  h®aring8:
adv::::::rtg:H:::[`;f[g£:dig:t::%|c":i;:by;:;:u=n¥h::¥:.?
Gen®r&1   MacArthur.    [itieal{intJ    ®f   the  atomic
bomb?
S®nj`tor   }fcHalion.      Yes.
Gon®rgtl  Mac+\rthur.     The   lil,'iit   of--
Senator   Mcrsah®n. rco\t`qh]   I`arclon  me.
G®ner&l   }l&c^rthur.      'i`il®   limit   of  what   I   dit]  wag
to  "|sk  for   informtit,ion  as  to  wliether  there  wore  any
plans   to  u8®   the  catomic   bomb  in   the  F`ar   I:&8t.
Senator   MCMahon.      i)id   y{]u   recomfi3®ncl   its   `iEe?
General   MacJ\rthur.      I   did  not.     +^`s   I   uncl®r8tand
23Hxcerpt   1`rom  st¢ltem®nt
appearing 1n  1`hc   New   York  Time.q
_   __   _                _    __   _       _         _     _    __I_         __        _   _
by   D{)ugla8   N&c..\r`thur
.    231.)®cember,    1960,   p.    7.
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it,   th®  ua®  of   the  atomic   bomb  has,   by  fi&t  rind
Order ,
States,¥&en  limited  to  the  President  of  the  United
It  is  quite  p¢ssiblG  that  Tru!3}caii  might  have  ln-
terr,r®t®d  ljflcArthur's  req`.®st  far  information  Ss  a  re-
quest  for  the  bombls  use.     E}ov®v€r,   this  is  highly
specul@tlv®  calid  vitltout  v€rifiabl®  found4ition.
Whether  or  mat  fill  of  the  f®ct8  concel`ning
M&cArthur.g  recall  have  b®en  released  to  the  ptibllc,
this  thesis  must  c®n&ider  tthat  lia8   b®®n  made  ¥iublic.
If  any  facts  hnv€  been  kept  c®nfidcntial.  they  may.   ®r
mcay  not,   b®  rel®asod  €ome   time   in  th®   futur®®
THE   PCiLICY
ThiB  author  now  turns   to  the  Bec®nd  major  ques-
tion  to  be  &n&lyzed  ln  chapter  five:     did  Pr®Bld©nt
Trum&n  pur8u®  the  wiB®st  policy  hy  trying  to  limit  the
Korean  k``'ar   to  fioreca?     The   &nBwer  to  this   riueff tion  Would
be  alj8®1ut®   if   there  was  mo  &lt®rn&tiv®.     But,   th®r®
wag  an  &1ternfltiv€*.      It  Vfag   offered  L9y  fieneral  F9flc-
+\rthur.     Thus,1n  order  to  dealde  whether  TruB]an  did
pursue  the  wis®Bt  policy,   it  will  he  nece8esary  to
am2lyp.a  that  policy  in  contrqEt  to  the  alternative
policy  offered  hy  G®nerfll  MficArthur.
When  Truman  had  first  mgid®  the  decision  to   de-
fend  *qouth  Korea.   he  had  decl&r®d  that  the  limited
obj®ctlve  ®f  the  tjnited  Stgivt®8  &nd  the  United  Natlona
wag   to  repel   t.h®  asgr®8#or9  from  5®uth  Korea.     H®  had
therefore  ordered  rlcneral  M&cArthur  not  to  engage  in
any  activities  north  of  the  thirty-®1ghth  riar&ll®1.
24Testimony  of  Douglas  Ma¢Arthur.   in  r®spongc
to  questions  by  Senator  "cREahon,   *l®uring8,  port  1,  p.   77.
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But.   `ITumants  major  obJ®ctlv.  wac   to  d®fBon&tr&t.   to   the
C®ununistB   that  aggr€g8ion  on  their  part  Would  not   be
tolerated,  thus  dl8couraging  them  from  attacking  cl8e-
wller®.     This  approach.   reagon®d  Truman,  wag   the  only
was  to  prevent  a  third  world  war.     t*ith  this  obj®ctiv®
MacArthur  w®8   in  comp|.te  agreement.25
MacArthur's  eucce88ful  landing  at  lnchon  on
Set)teraber  15.1950.   gave  Truman  r®af[on  to  change  hi.
Ibind.     Inat®&d  of  ffler®ly  drlvlng  the  North  Kore@ne   out
of  South  K®r®a.   Truman  decided  that  the  beet  Way  to
pr®v®nt  a   third  World  *€!+r  in  Korea  I.ould  be   to  r®-
unlt®  tli.  country  under  the   gov®rnm€nt  of  South  Kor®6i.
H®   ord®r®(I  N&cArthur  to  destroy  the  Worth  Korean  armed
f orc®8  which  Would  nece&81tat®  cro8ging  the  thirty-
®ighth  ptlrall®l.     With  that  objective,   rl&cArthur  vaB
in  complete  agretln®nt.
The  great  conflict   betw®®n  Truman  and  Mac^rthur
bcg&n  when  the  Chinese  Cormiuni8tfl   entered  the   rior®eLn
War   in  lot.  Nov®rmb®r,   1950.     M®c.trthur  was  Still  under
®rd®rg   to  destroy  the  North  Korean  Ar"®d  Forc®8  and  unite
North  and  South  JCor®a,   but  Truman  vtlB   deter.mined  that
his  mcajor  obj®ctivo.  that  of  pr®veliting  a  third  world
War,  would  not  be  S&criflc®d  even  at   the  ®xpens®  or
allowing  the  Conmunlstg   to  keep  North  Korea.     His
im.medlat®  goal,   theref®r®,   vtis   to  prov®nt  a  widening
of  th®  conflict.
MacArthur  agreed  with  Truman  that  all  st®p8  should
be  taken  to  prevent  a  third  world  wari   all  st®pB.  that
i8.   short  of  8urren{l®ring  North  Korea  to  the  Cormunl®,ts
again.      He   b®liev®d  that  Truman  had  made  a   conrmltm®nt   to
25see  comr.`|®te  t.xt   of  MacArthur's  address  be-
fore   the  JoiJ`t   Seg8ion  ol'   Congr®B8   in  ^ppendlx  IV,
pp.   144-151®
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the  H®r®ans  to  re-unite  their  country.  and  any  ab&n-:
donment  of  thctt   &o&l   woLild   be   €|}pefts®memt.
In  order  to  Stop  the  advancing  ChineB®  Com-
munist   forces,   M&cjArthur   had   sugg®gted  four  pror;I®Bflls3
th€it  he  be  Given  p®rmis8ion  to  pursue  enemy  plan®B
across   the  Y&lu  it|v®ri   that  n®  be  given  p®rmisaiofi  t®
bcimb   Chinese   b&&e8   in  }ianchuria!   thffit  an  ®conamic
t}1ockade  of   the  mainland  of  Chin&  he  institut®di   €ind
that  Cliiang  Ktli-gh®klg  Nditionali©t  f®rceB  he  utilized
in  Gn  attack  cag&inest   the  £hln@3®  REthlnl{md.     Trumfln
li&d  ±8jected  mll  ®1.  the&c  pro,posalg  on  the  grounds  that
the  ri3kfi  entailed  would  be  too  great.
In  Years of  Triifel
_      __                 _    _     __          _       .:          __.     _ ±=j±  j!gE±  Trumcan  Bt&t€d   thtlt
the  Joint  Chi®fB  ®f  Staff  hfld  alB®  &g]-eed  that  ,the
rigkB  would  b8  too  grS&t.     They  !tfld  recommended  that
Every  ®ff'®rt   Should  bt*  ®xpftnded  as  ft  matter  of
urgericy  to  settle  the  prot}l®ffl  of  ChineB®  inter-
v®ntlon  in  Korea  by  ,p®litlcEil  menng,   pr®fcral}ly
through  t!l®  `tJnit®d  Natian8,   to  include  r®a8&uran-
cos   t®   the  Chin®s®  C®mmunlgts  with  r®Bpe€t   to  our
intent.   direct  n®goti&tlonB  through  our  &11ies
::£i::aft:::::::n::in:::t:;::hth€rt#:a:¥::::eflt::::.26
Heverthel©as.   to  ELcacArthur   the   risks  w®r®  not
too  great.     He  argued  that  if  his  propo8al8  were  not
acc®ptedt   tlle   only  altern&tiv€  h®   could   gee  wag  e*pp®fi8e-
m®nt,
Trumtln  had  rejected  Hacfirthur l3  itrop®Sals
8p®cifically  b®cuage  he  felt  they  would  result  in  a
war  with  £'{ed  China.     Although  Red  Chln&   did  not  have
nuclear  w®apong,  vht`t  Trtiman  f®&r©d  wac   the  Soviet
Uni®n'8  pog`€ible  entry  into  the  conflict.     If  thiB  had
26Bxcerpt from  recormn¢nd6*tion  hy  the  Joint  ChlSf4
of  Staff  cited  hy  Truman. Ye&rg p.   378.
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happ®ned,   Trum&n's  major  obj®otive  would  have  b®®n  lost.
Therefore,  the  big  question  wag  wlLether  or  not  Mac-
Arthur'8  itropogalB  tvould  have  brought  f{uB®ia   into  the
war.     TruffLa[i  vaB   certain  they  Would.     He  did  not  b®-
11®v®  1t  traB  a   risk  worth  taking.     REac^rthur.   orl  the
other  hand.  believed  that  it  wa.  a  rl8k  vhlch  had  to
b€  taken.     lie  felt  that  too  mfany  Amerlcan4  had  been
killed  and  were  being  killed  to  Warrant  anything  eh®rt
of  compl.t®  victory.
At   th®  S®nate  h®aring8  MacArthur  explain®d  why
hl.   i.jrppo8alg  were  nec®s8ary  t®  bring  the  Korean  hfor
to  a  halt.     11®   said:
I  Stat®d  that  under  the  preei®nt  co[lditions,   th.
IOB±jeg  w®   are   gu8taining  of  j\merlcan81n  Hor®&,
cannot  &`o  o]i  iftdefinitely,  vlthout  bleeding.  thlg
country  white ..,..
I  g&y  that  lf  }ton  are  trying  to  buy  time,  you
are  doing  it  in  the  i.orst  way  you  can.     You  fire
baying  tinie  at   the  cxp®zi8e  of  Aberlcan  blood.     I
think  that  i®  too  ®xpenBive.
Thor.  i8  no  certainty  that  Ru®gia  will  coffl®  in.
Th®re  is  no  cort&inty  that  RuS&i.  will  not
come  in,
Tli®re  ia  no  certainty  that  anything  that  happ®ng
ln  fior®a  will  influence  her.
That  le  8pecul.`tlve.
You  have  to  tak.  a  cortcain  dogr®®  of  riBk3   on
th®8e  thlng8  one  way  or  another.
All   I   know   ig   thut   {.ur  m®n  &r®   cngoing   b`7'   the
thoug®ndB   over   th®r®,   ®v®ry  montli.   find  lf  you
keep  this  thing  on  indefinitely,  nothing  could
happen  that  could  L}e  wor8e  than  tliat.
Therefore.   I   Bugge8t  that  some   I)lan   be  c&rrl®d
out  that  will  bring  this  slaughter  to  a  clef inite
=:di8t::: ::p:t::¥:: :::utc:;t::::tt:fb:¥®::¥? ....
2?Testimony  of  DouglaB  nacArthur.   II®&rings.     art
i,  p.  66.
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fi®m®ral   MacArthur  and  Trumtln  both   r}id  not  w&nt
!3u.qsian  lnt€rv€ntiori.     t`he  refal   qu®etion  wcL@  what
wonld  b®  the  1iklihood  of  {{usE5ian  intervention  if  Mfic-
j\rthurl€  proposals  ver®  eLdopted.     It  hcas  &1re8dy  been
noted  Bev®ral  times  in  this  thesis  thflt  Truman  con-
91d®red  lt  quite  likely  that  frlacArttiur.a  propoB&ls
would  result  in  ftua.ql&n  intervention.     Secret&i-y  of
State  Dean  Achoson  8upport®d  Trtlmaii'8  contentions  at
the   ,t5en&t®  he&ringB  when  he  teSt,ifl€d  ae  followBs
W-a  knorr   of   Soviet   influ®nc®   im  N®rth  Kor®&,   ®f
S®vlet  a8gi&tance   to  the   IN®rth   XoreanB  cLnd   t®  Com-
muni8t  China,  and  w®  know   that  tlndtsrstandingg  must
have  acc®"p{^nled   thl8   assgi#ttince.      't*'e   alg®  &mov
that   ther`®   ig  a   treaty 'tietweL*n  the   *Soviet  Union
and  the   Chln®8e  Cammunl8tjB.
`     But  even  lf  the  treflty  did  not  ®xi8t,   Ch±nB
is   the  S®viet  Union'8   l&rgB#t  and  most  important
Satellit®.     }\`uBglan  8elf-iutt®r®Bt  in  the  Ftlr  East
and  the  necessity  of  maintaining  |irestig®  in  the
C®mmunist  Sphere  ca&ke   it  difficult  to  see  hotr  the
::I:::GU::::i::¥:88i8n°r®  tlirect  attacks  upon  the
ln  his  reply  to  Truman.8  menoirs.  F.iacArthur
maintained  tllat  although  there  w®}b®  risks  in  his
proljos&ls,   the  PresidtEnt  had  accepted  these  rlsk8
the   d[{y  America   ®nt®r®d  the   Korean  conflict.     flo
further  maint&in®d  that  the  chancefl  of  Russian  int®r-
v®nti®n  trer®  m®gt  unlikely.     Hc  g&id  ln  pnrt!
Hr.  Truman  further  att®"pt8  to  justify  his
®xtra®rdin&ry  military  |jolicy.  which  litercally
placed  our `arn8   in  a   str€3it-jflccket.   I)y  arguing
the  I+o®sihility  that  if  tf®  had  followed  Our  tr&-
dition  and  had  fought  t®  will,   it  might  htive  Fro-
cii>itfited  Soviet  ltusgi@18   e&itry  into   the  wai-.
nut   t?}e   entry   o£.   .S®vlet   .!ttSsgsi&,   ®r   lr!ed  China,   w&&
a  risk  1.th®rent  in  his  original  decl#ion  to
inttOrvene  in  Korea.     Then  is  when  he   3houltl  h&.ve
28T®stimony   pf   L}¢®n  Achegon.  L#earingge   Pfrrt   3.
p.   1719.
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w®igh®d   the   pos5ibl®   consequ®nceH  and  ttlkeen  hla!
deciBion  with  full  acc®pt&nce  Qf  all  the  cir-
cumfltaiiccB  involved ....
For  myself ,   I  have  never  f®1t  becthu8®   ®f   tli®
r®&|iti®s   involved,   that   th®re  u&g  sSriomB  dans®r
{]f  active   ~5ovi®-t  int®rv®ntion.     In  Hor®&   the  fiovi®t
would  have  b®®n  at  his  weak®Bt.     The   long  and
tenuous  suH|y  lines  and  other  dlfficulti®s  in-
h®i.ant   in   fighting  a   FQr  ffi&gt®rn  frorar  tSere   coupl®d
With  tlogcow'8  pgychologl€al  tendency  to  btlck  down
b®for®  A  determined  &h®w   ®f  force.     n¢or®over,
[{ussial8  p®11cy  13  not  to  Bacriflce   its  own  tr®op&,
but   t®  use  thog®  of  its  fri€nd8.     The  en®rmou8
€xpthnsion  of  5';oviet  influence  `glnce  the  end  of
#::::aiia:®=:1::8f¥:::gb:O:#::.%§out  vittiout  t|,a
At  thlg  point  it  woLLld  be  trl8e  to  examine  what
other  governffl®nt  officifils,  military  cadvis®r8.  find
politlcianB  had  t®  gay  concerning  the  chcano®8  that
General  ifacArtl`ur'S  vi®w8  Would  bring  ttussian  in-
t®rvqntion,
coHGlurss
In  the  rloua®  of  lt®}]r¢sentative,   G®ner&l  Mac-
+\rthur.®  views  were  vig®r®u81y  d®bat®d.     His   Supporters
and  his  critie&  tJere  dlvid®d  finarply  accordln#  t®  party
lln®8.     The   J{®publica"3  seized  tl&®   opr'A®rtunity   to  ua®
Mncj\rthur  as  a  #®ap®n  with  which  to  attack  the  Truman
admln±stration.  while  the  D®mocr&ts  went  on  tb®  de-
fenBiv®  in  order  to  ®upp®rt  Truman.a  action.
In  the   Hou8¢  M&cArthur's  vi®w8  were   defended  ®n
April   11,   the   day   of  HIS   r®cflll,   by  Congr®fl@ffl&n  tb`&ltor
Judd  of  Hinne©ota   who  vi®w®d  Truman'®   decision  ag   a
29F:xcerpt
cappedring  in  ee
25®
from  gtatern®nt  by  Douglas  MacArthur
it'®w   York  Times
I      ---..-.-                                                                                 __         ___
.   9  F.ehrtlflry.1956i   p.
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gr®tlt  Victory  for  CormunisB®     Judd  Said:
The  removal  oil   G®neral  MacArthur  r®pre8ont.
the  Xr®mlin's   gr®fltest  Victory '®inc®  I.`lta.     That
d®&1.   too.   looked  a8   if  lt  brought  peace  with  the
Kr®bllni   but  lt  brought  War  ln&t®ad.     It  weakened
the  free  world  and  built  up  the  Soviet  world.  and
led  Btraight  to  the   1nval31on  of  Jfor®a.     necau&e   it
was  at  Yfilta   that  tl`®   l{uBgians  `.ere   brought   into
I.1anchuri®....
There  18  no`rLlng  ve  can  give  them  in  a  political
def*l  or   coqi.ro"1B®  which  will   end  the  w&r!   it  v®L4ld
only  move  the  conrllct.  to  another  country  and  bake
it  more  difficult.     "|`hlB  act  of  tli.  Pre81dent's  will
so  w®dken  our  poBltion  in  ABiQ  and  tlie   strength
built  up  at  .Such  territtl®  coat  ttiat   lt  will  b®  a
rriiracle  lf  war  do®g  not   8oon  g.¥]read  all  over  the
tlr®a.     In  Short,   I  fear  the  action  will   do  just
the  opr3osit®  of  whi&t   tli®   Pr®8idel`t   is  trying  to  do.
That  it  Will  e][p&nd  the  war  ln  Asia,  rather  than
contain  lt  ln  Kor®®.30
Many  R®publlcanB  rallied  to  support  Judd  ln  his
contention  that  the  ronov'al  ol   Hac^rthur.  rather  than
MflcArthur'®  proposals,  would  bring  Sovl®t  Russia   into
the  War.     The  Democrctt8  ver®  in  a   majority  in  the  flou8e.
but  moBt  of  th®p  preferred  to  remain  €ilent  for  fear
®t`  polltlcal  cone®quenc®e.     The  few  brave   Boul8  who
did  Join  the  debiitet]  ®upport®d  Truimn'8   contention
that  a  vBr  vlth  China  Would  bring  the  Soviet  Union
rushing  to  lt8   def®n.®.3L     C®ngr®8gdan  Y®rty   of
California  attcack®d  the   R®publlcan&   on  the   ba®is   tJiQt
they  had  not   8u[>ported  }1acArt*iur'8  c.indidacy  1`or   the
i-{o!>ublican  nomination  for  Presid®lit   in  1948®     I]e   ®aid:
General  MacArtl`ur  and  many  others  apparently
feel  we  Bhould  take  the  risk  of  s®elrlg  the  con-
trolled  f ire  ln  Korea  expt`nd®d  into  a  uorld-wide
30
^r)rll  11,1951.   p.   3684.
Hxc®rpt   from  8Tteech   by  Valt®r  Judd.   Congree8-
ional  Record
r®8slonal  Record
3675-3687
April  11,   1951,   pp.
117
confla€gratlon  by  launching  dirc®t  attacks  ag&1n8t
China.   th®r®by  bringing  into  oit®ration  the
Chinese-Sovl®t  agre®m®nt   for  nututal  aBHi3tance
tfhlch  wo  ballav®  to  oxiEt.52  .
In  the  Senate  the  two  chief  ft®publican  Bpok®8-
men  w®ra  Senatorg  William  F.   Hnowl&nd  of  California
atld  Iloder  Capehart  of   lndi&nB.     ^lthougiv  noBt  L)eno-
crate  pr®ferr®d  to  remain  8ileiit.   t!L®1r  cause  vac  .
brilliantly  def€nd®d  by  l{obart  Kdrr  ®f  oklahoma.     Herr
debated  With  the  Republlcang  almost  single-handed  for
the  ®ntlrc  afternoon  of  ^prll  11.     He  I.r®8®nted  the
1gsuee  clearly  mud  ®void®d  going  out  on  tangents.
Iile  def®nB®  of  Truman.8  action  wft.  ao  succ®8gful   that
Tirme     magazln®  referred   to  him  &&   ''l]oratiu®   on  the
=r.w33    Herr  said  in  part:
Mr.  }]r®8ldont,   I  do  not  b®li®ve  that  another
world  war  18  inevitable.     I  flm  optto8ed  to  any
political,  dipl®"atlc,  or  military  policy  on  the
part  of  my  gov®rnm®nt  which  ffiBeuna8  fataliBtlctllly
that  ®n  all-Out  war  with  either  Soviet  i{u.sla
or  Red  Chlne   1®   1n®vitabl®i   a.id   I  am  or}f]o8®d   to
any  act  on  th.  part  of  any  r®®ponelble  govern-
ment  offlclal  calculated  to  encourage  or  permit
such  an  all-Out  .truggl`e.
We  Are  not   in  K®rea   today  to  Start  a  World  War,
or  Start  t®  engage  in  an  all-out  vcr  With  lied  China.
We  and  many  other  c®untri®g  who  are  our  allleg
are  1n  Korea  for  a  very  dlfinit®  or  &peciflc
purpo6®.     tw`®  are  th®ro   to  atop  aggreB81o]i,   to
::nLti:  :I::f£Eg=e::::..aa¥t:1:: :::I:n:a:?§4Bpr®ad
But.   as   Herr  and  the   r®Bpon8ibl®  R®publi®anB
debated  issues.  others  mt.rely  Sought  to  use  Tru"€`n'g
32Excorpt   from  sp®®ch   by  Corlgre8gman  Yort}.
res8ional  i{®cord .   April   11.1951.   p.   3683.
33wrhc  Little  Man  Who  Dared,"  E±.   I.VII
(+Sglril   23.1951}.   26.
34Ex,;©rpt   from  8pe®ch  by  ltobert   Xerr  app®arlng
1n   Con roseloiial  Ftecord .  April   11.1951.   p.   3640.
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aetit.n  aS  a  political  tteapon  fez-thetBBelv®8i   t[iey  oho8®
to  I)lace  ®motion  b®for®  the  facts.     Such  was  the  cage
of  Jo®®ph  Raymond  Mccartliy  of  W.iscongin.     Although
Mccarthy  had  an  amrtle  8u]3ply  of  facts  with  uhlch  to
d®bata,  he  choB®  tc  corrupt  the  f€*cts  and  mke  lt  ap-
pear  a3  though  MacArthur'g  roccall  was  an  act  ®f  tr®agon.
H®   ®ald!
Mr.   President,   the  r®&8on  I  am  asking  the  Senator
to  yield  at   tl`1e  time   18  that  lt   le  n®c®e&ary  for
m®  to  leeive  the  floor   ln  a   rev  mlnute8.     Before   I
leuve   I  3hou.Ld  like  to   say  tEiat   I  hope  the  fact
that  w®  are  not  digcugglng  tod&y  on  the  floor  of
the  S®nat®.  at  least  ®t   this  tl"®,   the  gr®&t  vie-
tory  Which  the  C®mfflunlst6   Sustained  last  night
does  not  moan  that  wc  are  not  a*ere  that  they  have
won  Such  a  victory.     The  reason   I  €`8  nut   diBcu®8ing
lt   i.   that   I  £]m  goi)ig  to  the  town  which  w€Ls  the
forlner  home   of  the  gr®at®8t  American  I  kno".   r`en-
ercal  Douslns  }IacArthur®     I  intend  to  discuss   there
the  fact  that  tile  fflidni8ht  potency  of  bourbon  and
ben¢dictllt®  may  well   lLave   condemned  thousands   of
Jlm®rican  boys   to  d®tlth,  @nd  mtly  well  have   con-
de"n®d  western  clvllization.
I  intend  to  dlBcu®8  the  fact  thflt  the  only  crime
of   L}ouglaB   MacArthur  va8   that  he  li&B   &1wayB   b®®n
against  Conununl8m  rind  would .not  go  along  with  the
Yalta  crowd  for  the  &®ll-out  in  Asia.     I  intend
to  dl.qcu88  the  fact   that  his  principal  crime  1n
the  ey®&   of  the  State   DepartQ:opt  1&  that  h®  felt
and  8tlll  f®el8  that  it  was  right  and  riroper  that
oth®r8  than  American  boys   should  }lavo  the   o}tportunity
to   dl®   in  the  fight  agalnBt   lnt®rn®tion€il   Commiinigm.
I  intend  to  diBcugs   th®Be   8ubject8   1n  I.illwaukeei
WleconBln.   tlie  former  hoBi®   of   General  Douglee  Hflc-
Arthur.     That  1®  why  I  am  not  di8cus81ng  it  on  the
floor  of   the  i;enat®  today.
I  Would  .ay  further,  Mr.   rre8id®nt.   that  I)®mo-
crate  have  a   glpriou.  o};portunity  today,   1f  they
will  rise  to  the   occa81on.     Unle88  tlt®  I)edocrate
in  the   Senate  emd +House--after  all   they  &r®   1n
control--Stand  up  Lstnd  let   theJn8elv®B   b®   counted
aB  beillg  ngfllnst  tr®asoll  tll®y  will  forever.   and
::g::;:i.§;ve
119
labeled  their  pflrty  a8  the  party  of
A&   a   wh®l¢,   the   Congr®8sl®n&l   tl®b&t®a   €onc®rning
Qen®rtll  }!flcArthur'8  vi8wB   helped  clarify  the   iea!u®B   ln-
volv®d  ln  the   g®n®ral'8  recall.   but  at  the  Same  tlm®,
the  debcates  failed  to  produce  any  conclu$1ve  evidence
to  indict  or  Support  Truraan'B  Korean  policy  ®f  pre-
venting  a  wid®nlng  of  the  conflict.     The  m®mber8  of
the  Hou&®  and  .Senate  were  really  not  a3  yet  clear  ag
to  what  M®cArthur.B  vlew8  r®&lly  w®r€,   and  they   did
not  po8&®s3  the  1nformatlon  nece3Bary  to  ®valu&te
properly  Truman'3  polity.
Trim    t}EFEHSE    Dfr`pAnTREEHT
S®cr®tary  or   Def®nBe  fieorg®  lthrshall  wag   called
before  t}it#. S®nat®  h®arlng8   to  ®xplaln  whether  or  not
he   gup77orted  ®r  rej®ct®d  TrLrman'g   Hor®t±n  policy  and
his   subsequent  r®ctill   of  Gen®rfil  M&cArthnr.     Wh®n
aBkod  lf  he  had  disagreed  with  the  I.r®aident   ln  any
wfly,   Mar8hall   testified  aB  £`ollowa:
From  the  very  bcglnning  ®f  tlie  Korean  confllot.
down  to  the  pr®8ent  moment,   ther®  had  been  no  dig-`
agr®ement8  b€tw®tin  the   President.   the  S®cretary
of  Def®nge,  &nd  the  Joint  Chi®f8  of  i;toff  that
I   elm  &"&re   o£,
There  li®ve   been,  how®v®r,   and  continue   t®  be
basic  differences  ®f  judg®m®nt  between  General
a4acArthur,   on  the  one  hand,  and  the  &tre3id®nt,
:.¥:ffe::a:a:yo:£e::g8nffe.  cand  the  Joint  Chi®fg  of
55stat®ment  by  jo3®ph  Mccarthy  app®&ring  in
rei!fiional   .R®cord .   April.    11,1951,   p.   3640.
36Excerpt   from   testimony  by   George  }l&rshtill®
I]earings,   pnrt   i,   I).   325.
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He  later  cxplain€d  the  ar®&8  ®f  di8&greement
between   the  F'r®flidGnt   &nd  MacArthur$
Our  ®bjectlve  in  Korea  continues  to  be  the  de-
feat   ®f  aggr®s81on  &r]d   the  r®8t®r.1tion  ®f  p®&ca.
keJ®  have  p®rsist®ntly  Sought  t®  confine   the  con-
flict  to  Kor®€i  and  to  prevent  its  spreading  into
ca  tl.irid  world  war.     In  this  effort,  wa  Stand  allied
with  the  great  m@jorlty  of  our  fellow  me»`bers  of
the  rJnited  Nations.     Our  ®ffortE  have  succeeded
ln thrarting  the  aggr®flfaora,   in  Koretl,  and   in
8t®mming  the  tide  of  &ggres8ion  ln  8outh®ast  Aeia
ftn{l  elsewl`er®  throughout   the  world.     Our  efl`®rts
in  Korea  have  giveti  u8  some   Sorely  needed   tlm®  and
lmpetua   to   caccel®rfat®   the   tlulldlng  ®f  our  dBfengeg
and   tho8®  of   our  &11ieB  ff sainBt   the   thre{itened
onslaught  of  hqov1®t   I"p¢riali®m.
G€nertll  Macj\rth"r.   on  the  other  hand.  would  hflve
ug,  on  Our  initiative,  carr.y  the  confli®t  t)eyond
Korea  agaim3t   the  mainland  ®f  Communist  Cl&ina,
both  from  the   gem  and  from  t±ic  air'.     ££e  tfould  helve
ua  accept  the  risk  involv®fa'ient  in  an  extension  of
the  wflr  with  S{®d  Chinfl.   but  in  an  fill-out  war  witli
tile  Soviet  Union.     Irf®  would  do   thiB  even  at  the
®xpen8e  of  loBlng  our .allieE  arLd  wrecking  the  co-
alltion  of  free  people8  throughout  the  world.    I.te
would  have  uo   d®  thlB  even   thoug!)  the,-'®ffect  of
Such  faction  might   ®xf,]oBc  kr®8tern  Europe   to  atttlck
E¥s:::nm:::::::3¥f  S°Viet  troops  in  middle  and
Harshall's   teBtlmony  evidences  that  what  he
and  Trufmi`i  r®olly  f®ftred  wag   the   threat  of  Soviet
intervention.     That  le  the  big  question  that  must  b®
considero{]--would   thB   S®vlet  Union  l`av®  intervon®d?
}±arahfll]   shared  Truman'g  view  tliiJit  the  only  tray  to
really  find  out  would  b€  to  tfrke  the  ri8k8  inv®lv®d.
Both  b®11®v®d  thtlt   th®g®  rlaks  wore   too   gredit.
In  liifa  reply   to  Trumfln.S   rmefi¥.oirs   MflcArthtar
37Bxcerpt   from   t®sti"omy  by  G®orga  H&rsh&1li
Hearin#sl  part  li  pp.   52&-335.
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mi`intaln®d  that  G€n®ral  Har8}]all  But7ported  Trunan'a
views  for   two  r®as®ns:     first,Ilo  owed  hi.  appolntm®nt
a®   Secr®t&ry  o±`   l}®f®nse.  and  previous  artpoint"ent  a.
secretary  of  State.   to  Truman|   second,   he  had  alway®
been  ho8til®   to  HacArthiar  b.cau®®  of  MticArthur'8
rapid   |>ronotiong   &ft®r  `v'orl{l  War   I,   wher®a®  }Iflrsl]all
himself  b®cfm®  a   g®n®rca|.   twenty  y®car8  after  M®cArthur®
Thug   M¢ic^r€hur`   conaid®r®d  Mtir3ha`\ll I.   Support   of   Trumen's
action  baaed  upon  loyalty   to  Trufflt`n  and  jQdlo`isy  of  hi®
own  positi{.n. 58
TilE   joINT  cillrsF`s   OF   s'rAFF
General   Omar  13radley,   Chelruan  ot-   the  Joint
Chiefs  of  .Staff .  was  .i.o  called  to  testify  at  the
S®nat®  h®arlmgs.     I[i€   t®8tlmony  va®  extremely  repeti-
tious   or  vh®t   G®n®ral  MarBhQll  liad  already  .aid,   be-
cauee   Bradley,  a.  v®11  a.  Mar.hall.  t7ae  ln  coDpl®te
agreement  with  T`runan'8  p®11cy  ol   limltlng  the  war
t®   Korea,
When  a8k®d  what   he  felt  w®r®   the  main   iB!¥u®.
1n  the  debate  for  and  agalnBt  Truman'B  policy,   Hradley
rct*d  a   pr®pf`red  t€8timony.     Hc   said  ln  parts
The  fund€im®ntal  ltillltary-1sgue   that  has   arl.®n
i8  whether  t®   incr®age   the  riake`of   glot}&1  vcr  by
taking  additional  measurc8   that  are  open  to  the
United  States  and  its  allies.     We  nowr  have  a  local-
i7u®d  conflict  in  Korea.     Some  of  .the  military
mea8ur®s  under   dlBcuB£!ion  might  Well  place  the
Unit®d  Stat®8  in  the  po.ition  of  re8[`onsibllity
for  bro®d®nlng  the  war  and  at  tlie  8am®   tlm®  l®.ing
most  if  not  all  of  our  allies.
General  tyacArthur  has  Stated  that  th®r®  are
38Doug|ag  MacArthur .  l±±  ±!S!±  I£±S
February.   1957i   p.   25.
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certain  ^r.€ii]itlonal  mea3ur®s  Which  can  end  ehould
be  taken.  and  that  by  doing  so  no  unacceptable
incrc&ged  risk  of  global  war  will  r®8u|t.
The  Joint  Chi®fB  of  Staff  bellev®  that  th®8®
Same  m®tieuz~e8   incr®a8e   the  risk  ol.  global  vcr
and  that  Such  a  rl£k  Should  not  be  ttlk®n  unnecegg-
arlly.     At  the  eam®  tlb®  ve  recognl2;®  the  military
advantag®8  that  migl`t  accrue  to  the  United  N&tion8
position  in  Korea  and  to  the  United  Stat®e  pogltlon
in  the  Far  East  by  these  measures.59
The  most   int®r®8tlng  aspect  of  Bradl®y'e  4tate-
ment   18  that  he  recognl£e{l  that   tli®re  wag   some  valldlty
ln  MacArthur.a  propo8Al&  frod  a  flllitary  eteindpolnt.
Bradley.   however,   gupi`}ort®d  Trufnan  and  Mt`rehall'&
contention  that  the  politlc€`l  rigk8  inherent  in  th®8e
propoHal8  uere   too   groat.     Wl`yt     Bocnus®   they  might
h@vo  resulted  ln  a  *ar  with  China,   thue  c&u£1ng  Sovl®t
intervention.     Again.  the  i]rlmtlry  concern  wag  Sovl®t
intervention.
In  his  reply  to  Truman'8  memoirs  N&c.Arthur
mdintalnt!d  that  h®  and  Br&dlcy  had  been  ho€tlle
for.  a   long  tlmo.     nurlng  World  War  11  Har&hall  had
recommended  Bradley  f or  the  poet  of  Senior  grouz)d
commander  ln  the  Paclflc.     MacArt}iur  had  refused  thl8
recommendation  in  favor  of  one  ®f  hl8  own  men.     Thla.
1n  addltlon  to   tli®  fact  that  Br&dley  had  been  appointed
Chairman  `}f-tti®  Joint   Chiefs   of   Staff  by  Truman,   c®n®-
titutes  MacArthurle  juBtiflcQtion  of  nradl®y.a   agr`eem®`nt
with  the  Ilregldo]itial  policy. to
39Excerpt  ff on  te8tinony  of  Ouar  Bradley,
Hctirlng8,  part  2.   p.   730.
4°Doug|as  rlacArthur.
February.   1956,   p.   25.
The  New  York  Times
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TllE   STATE   DEPAlt"l`:NT
Llttl®  dl8cueBion  1&   needed  t®  ®xpltlln  liow  the
State  n®]iartm®nt  felt  about  Truman'8   Korean  rtolicy.
That  rtolicy  was  based  largely   ur+on  lnfornation  and
advice  handed  to  T"man  by  tl`o  State  D®p&rtmelit.     In-
deed,  many  times  oppo8ition  agtlinst  Truman'8  riolici®B
va&  rna)ilf®st®d  ln  bltt®r  attackB  against  S®cr®tary  of
Sttit®  Ach®8on  rather  than  agaln8t  the  PreBldent.`"     In
Years  of  trial.           _  _  _           _       _I__      _______  __   _ eE±  ±!e±2±i_  Trucoan  described  his  relation.
ship  with  Ach®son  ag  follows:
There  wa8  nov®r  a  dtly  during   the  f our  yoar8  of
Dean  Achegon'&   .®cr®tnry8hlp   that  anyone   could  have
sflld  tliat  he  and  I  dlffor®d  on  policy.     H®  was
mt)tlculou8   in  ke®pin8  m®  posted  on  every  develop-
m®nt  Within  the  vld®  area  ®f  hle  reeponBlblllty.
H®  had  a   d®®p  und.rstnr.ding  of   the  Pr®8ident'.
position  in  our  con.tltlonal  Bclleme  and  reQllr.od
to  the  full®gt  that.  vhil.  I.leaned  on  him  for• constant  advice,   the  i]olicy  had  to  b®  mine--
it  was.42
T[lE   UNITED   NATIONS
Th®r®   18  no  qu®8tlon  thtit   the  Communlgt   bloc
natlonB  and  the   h®utral8  v®uld  llav®  oppoBed  General
HeicArthur'g  propo8ale  had  they  been  brought  up  for
dlf)cu8sion.     The   qu®etion  1g  how  did  the  alll®&  of
the  United  States  feel  about  them.
G®n®ral  l'IarHhnll  wag aaifed    at   t}i€   Senate  hear-
1ngg  if  the  proT}oBal   to  blockade  the  coo.t  of  China
had  been  diecu$8ed     among  unlt®d  Stat®B  alllo8.     I]e
Yetlrs p.   428.
42ng..  p.  43o.
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My  r®colloction  to  that.  Mr.   Chairman.   18  that
ve  have  b®en  dlBcus$1ng  it  with  them  lnfordally.
:::)'::i::::  =::  ?I:::8::  :):®in:::E§  uP  ae  a  formal
Since  }Iacj\rthur'S  |iropo8als  were  never  officially
introduct®d  for  di®cu8slon  in  the  united  Nations    Se-
curity  Council  or  General   A4Eembly,   there  i®  n®  ®f-
f lclal  evldcnc®  ln  The
_     i__     _
United  Nations  Yearbook  to
indicate  wh®th®r  or  not  Unlt®d  Stat®®  alli®a  would
hQv®   eupport®d   th®b.     f1®wever,   S®cr®tflry   of   State
Dean  Ache8on  tJa8  certain  they  tJould  not.     H®  t.gtifi®d
®t  the  `ienate  hearing  ao  follov8:
To  our  ®mbeg81e.  in  certain  countrioB  we  trap.a-
mltt®d  a  "e88ag®  .ayl]i8  that  et  an  early  date  ve
might  permit  United  Stat®®  aircraft  to  defend  thein-
selves  ln  the  air®pace  over  the  Yalu  itiv€r.   to  the
extent  of  p®rrnitt.1ng  hot  purBult  of  ®n®"y  alrcrf ft
up  to  two  or   three  miriut®B  flying  timt*  over  enemy
territory,,,,
Tliey  dl8cugs{..d  the  question  with  thogc   `gov®rn-
pentc,  and  in  all  ca&e8  they  got  Btrongly  neg&tivo
:£:`r::::e:tf::: :L]:g:::::n:::t:t:t 8:::::a :¥:?44
When  G®n®r&l  Hac^rthur  wa. aebed  at  the  hearlngs
whether  h®  thought  tli®   Uziit®d  Nations  would  .Support
his  propof)ale,   h®  an&¥®r®d   that  what   they  thought
*ae  lrrel®vent  in  .h8plng  United  Statc8  volley.     Un-
like  Truman,Ilo  v{i4  not  afraid  of  going  it  alone.     II®
saidi
I  can  give  no  testimony  about  the  United  "atlons.
Senator ....   "y  hope  would  b®   of  court;a   that   the
43Bxc®rpt from  tegtiDony  of  George  Mar8ILall.
Hearings.  part  1.  p.   3£8.
44Bxcerpt  from  t®gtimony  of  Dean  ^cheson.
Hearlng3,  part  3,  p.1?23.
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United  Nations  would  see   the  wisdom  and  utility
of  that  course.  but  if  they  did  not.  I  still  be-
11®v®  that   interegtg  of  the  United  St®t®s  being
the  i3redominent  one  1n  Korea  would  require  our
action.   .   .  alone,  if  n®c®Bsary.     If  the  other
natlonc  of  tl]®  v®rld  htlv®n't  got  enough  gens®   to
ace  wh®r®  app®a8ement   lead&  after   the  app®agecaent
vblch  led  to   the  £}®cond  World  War  in  Euror+a.1f
they  can.t  Boo  exactly  the  road  they  are  following
i:dA::aitw:Zo::I:¥5W®  ]1ad  better  protect  ourge|veS
Tlm   VEitr+ICY
Although  Truman  and  MacArthtir  differed  ®n
8ev®ral  Blnor  points.   tl`®r®  wag  only  one  major  r.aeon
why  tr`man  could  not  agr®®  to  Mec^rthur'8  propoHale  to
pursue  en®fty  ba3e81n  Manchuria.   t®  blockade  the  Chin-
ese  malnlQnd.  and  to  unleash  Chiang  Hal-eh®k.     Tliat
ov®rrldlng  r®aeon  wag  the  fear  ol.  Soviet  lnterv®ntl®n.
If  th®r®  va#  no  fear  of  Sovlot  lnt®rv®ntlon,  there  13
little  doubt  that  }!tlcArthur'.  propoflfils  t¢ould  have
been  quickly  carrl®d  out.     rienoral  Marshall  tef.tlri®d
to   thiB  fact  at  the   £}®nat®  he®ringB.     The  following
i8  an  ®xc®rpt  from  hl8   te®tlm®ny3
yous::::a:i::::g::®Jt!::finEE ;a:o::Eel:::u::dagk
that  Soviet  rauf.Si&  woLild  not  come  into  the  action
ln  Korea,   the  war  ln  Korea,  would  you  L}e   diapoa®d
to  favor  th.  r®comm®ndatlon  of  f.®neral  MacArtliur
in  the  hope  that  lt  inight  bring  a  8p®®dy  termina-
tion  ot.  the  war  ln  Xor®a?
Secretary  Har8hell.    rsp®aklng]   Cinc®  the  Chin®ee
CommunlBt   tro®p8  had  dpp®&red  in  force   ln  Manchuria.
and  if ,   from  eL  hyp®th®tlcal  point  ol`  view.   th®r®
45Te8t|t8®ny  of  Douglae  MacArthur,  HearingBi
part  I,  p.   42.
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wag  no  dtlng®t``  whatever   from  Soviet  intervention.
the  bombing  Would  bets-1n  intwediate|y.46
In  order  ta  evfiluate  Trllman'g  Xore{*m  policy.
therefore,1t  ig  ncc®ssary  to  know  wh®thBr  the  Soviets
would  hfive   intervened  in  Korea.     That   qu®gtion  ri&E
not   b®®n  defiiiit®ly  answered  and  prohably  never  will
be.     Tl`i®  ultinlate  decision  ®f  whether  or  not  the
Soviet  Uni{jn  woLild  have   intervened  if   the  h-®rean
War   had  gpr®£id   to   the   Cinin®g®  ma£.bland  wag  a   deci81on
tll&t   only  Josep.h   Stalin  could  }iflvo  tusidei   and,   unless
ho   discussed  triis  question  `xp.ith.  other  Soviet  ®rficials.
his   secret  died  with  him     ln  I.larch,  1953.
Nevertheless,   the  {iuestion  €fln  b®  put  another
way:      F,ven  if  there  -..was.,  no  way`  of  knowing  wh®thor  or
not  the  fovi®tB  would  have   int®rven©d,  Hag  that  risk
"orth  taking?
Trum€m  w{}uld  say  no.     In  that   contention  lie
would  b®  Supported  by  all  major   gov®t`nm®nt  officials
€,Lnd   the   United   N&tiong.      TrumaTi  t+'o`]ld  n®   doubt   $8`y
th.-it  history  has  proved  him  right.    Althougli  North
Korea   i8  not  free,   World  `#¢ar   Ill  has  not  become  a
tragic  realityi   and  slnc®  Korea.   the  C®nrmunlst  world
had  not  attemptetl  to  s`ihjug&te  fflilit&rily  a  nation
8upport®d   by   the   bereBi:.
Macr.Lrthur  believed  these  rlsk5  t€er®  worth  taking.
qt.,rith   the   exception  of  Republici]}1  }*olitici&n8,   h©   Stood
al®n®.     F,van  though  he   8t®od  alone,   h®  profotindly
believed  and  g;tllJ.  btlli®ve8  that  history  will  prove
him  right.     }le  hag  stat®ul  his  rBa8olig  why  .Trunan'g
policy  must  t3e  r®gard®d  ®€  a  ftlilure  aa  follows:
46frxcerpt   from  te8tlmony  of  G®org®  }4tir8hall'
=L,n   rc8T2onae   to   questionB   from   Sen&tor   George.   [fearingg,
part  I.  p.   397.
|a7
Mr.   'rrui`fi'un'g  relief  ®f  lne   on  Apri.lil,1951.
was   importc'Snt  not  because   ®1.   the  |>®rsQnalitles
involved  but  &a  €`   symiJ®l  of  a  basic  change  in
his  attitude  toward  Asia  81nce  entering  ut.jen  the
K®r®{An   ky.fir   can{!   the   calS'.\mitous   ®Vont8   which  r®~
gulted  there from.     It  8et  off  a  crLain  of  reactions
whicti  has  prejudiced  to  its  very  foundjition  the
Struggle  between  tile  free  and  the  i}ed  W{jrld.     Ilr.
Trumcan's  decision  to  meet   Comutunlst  ag€r®gslon  in
its  militf`ry  effort   t®   Eeiz®   H®r®&  would  have   t}®®n
a  nob].a   one   inde{3d  had   it   been   imiilem®nted  with
unswervering  cotir&ge  and  d®t®rmin{`tion.     nut  1`®
proved  liimself  uli®qual   to   the   t®gk.     After  }3etl
China  enteret]  the  conflict,  he  yielded  to  council&
of  fetir  and  ab+indoned  |}ledged  commitm®rits   to  re-
store   to  the  r,eo]tl®   of  Kor®dt   tH   nation  tJhich  was
unified  and  free.
Such  abandonment   of   pri&icirileg   hy  a   Pr®Bld@nt
im  whom   the   peoi3l®   of  Asia   had  pltac®{'l   Such   faith
ant.I   trtigt  wa,a  a   catastr{}phic   1.,low   t.a  the   hopes   of
the   frGe  world.      Its   digr]stroLL8   cong€querLceg  ware
r®flected   throu{nghout  A8ia.     §`ted  China   promptly
w&8   ceyngid®red   the   mllit&ry   €oloB`ngug   of   the   ..act.
Korea  was   left  ravie[ht}d  and  divided.     Indo-C±iina.
was  paititio`ietl  by  the   Sword.     Tibet  wag  ttlken
on   det{tltind.      Other   m&tionB   I.®&4*n   t®   treft}blo   toward
neutralism....
Ail  of  t}iig  destroyed  oriental  faith  in  our
fortitude,   in  our  d€t®rmlnatlon  tlnd  Our  I)elief
that  t}ie  Far  East  was   comparable  in  importance
to  Eurog}®.      It   confirmed  th®1r   f®flra   ®f  &11ied
concentration  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  a  much
lower  priority  1`or  the  r''acific  {}cean  Area.     This
lzirgely  cost  ug  the  pgychologic
World  tw+ar   11  victory  ln  the  Far
SUH}]AttY
al?a:::i;it8  Of  the
Tl`®  r}r®ceding   gurv®y  and  analysis   ®f  Truman.a
Korean  |tolicy  €,ind  tile   f&`cts  and  circumst€`nce8  r®8ulting
in  t}ie  recall  of   GGner&1  M+*cArthur  have   led  this  author
47r;#c®rr!t   from  8tatenlent
a|}r]ecari]ig   in  The   ltew.   __ I     i____  I___
I,.   2rj.
York  Times
{]f   DcuglaB   }tacArthur-
9  F®t}ruary.1956,
128
to   two  major  con`cluJ5ions:      flr8t.,  J'resident  Trumanls
I-ecall  of  General  MacArthur  was  fu`lly  jugtifi®d  in
accordance  with  h|8  executive  liouer&  and  hlB   right  to
lnterr>r®t   the   cliff.r®nce  between  m`iLlteiry  policy  and
foreign  policyi   fiecond.   history  will   eventu€3lly  draw
the  most  accurate  conclusion  as   to  wh®th®r  Truman  or
nac^rthur  &dvocated  the  wisest   Korean  policy.     All
other  conclusions  ar®  highly  speculative.   or.   &t  l®a8t.
mcz.ely   r>roblom&tic.
Because  it  is   the  purpose  of  this  thesis  to
survey  and  analyze  the  facts,  not  to  present  definite
conclugl®ns   conc€rnilis`  the   effects  of  1`ruman'3   cleci8ion
on  history,   the  render  may  tend  to  feel  a  genge  of
a#Ibiguous  frustration.     Nevertheless.   this  aiithor
maintains  that  a   thol.ough  und®rBtandlnng  of  the  r`®r-
sonalities  and  phlloao{>hi®8  of  Truman  antl  MacArtllur,
ag  *®11  aa  a  knowledge   of  United  States-Koreem  r®-
lati®ns  from  1945  to  1951.  are  essential  prerequlsltes
to  formulating  conclusionH.     It  is  the  I.urrio8®  ol`  this
thegi8   t®  provide  tlie8®  prerequisites.     Indlvidufils
must  reach  th®i±  o`iirii  conclusions.
At  son-  future  date,  atlditional  inl`orm&tlon
may   b®  made   r^vailat>1e  Which  will  make   it  p®SE±ble   for
individuals   to  roach  Bound  and   definite  conclugictns
concerning  Truman's  Korean  r]olicy.     Until  then,   thlB
€tiesi8   ia  an  attempt  to  guide  iridivichi&lg   in  that
'] ir e c t j'. on ,
AFTEunTH
AFTEItM^Tfl
After  }iacArthur's  r®c€`ll  Truman  announced  theit
the  United  St&teg  vac  ready  to  begin    truce  talks  in
Koreti.     Both  Truman  and  United  Natiolis  Secretary  {i®neral
Trygve  Lie  felt  that  a  c®&8e-fire  approxlpately  along
the  thirty-eighth  parallel  would  fulfill  the  purposes
of   thca   United  Nationsi   nQfn.ly.   to   "repulse   the  ag`q.reg-
8ion  BgainBt  the  ltepublic   of  Korea."I
0n  July  7,1951,   truce   talks   began  ®t   Ka®song
near   the  thirty-eithth  rtar®ll®1.2     It  Boon  bec&tne
obvious   that   the   J{ed  Chim®Se  repr®aeritatlveB  ver®  not
®qg®r  for  peace.     Their  demands  amounted  to  a  virtual
gurr®nder  of  South  Koreft.     The  negotlatlone  were  also
Strained  by  frequent   d<±cltlratlon8  frofn  Syngman  itli®®
tri&t  he  would  not  accept  1®sa   than  a  unified  Kore€].
As   the  n®gotiation®   continued.   the  Communi.¥t8
gtall®d  1`or  time  by  refusing  t®  compromise  on  gev®ral
i88u®8.     T]ie  Hiost   important  of   the3®   issues   involved
the  r®r`atrlation  of  priS®ner8  of  war.     Tli®  Conununi8tg
inglgted  that  all  priAon®rg  of  war  bo  returned.     Truman
felt  that  those  North  Korean3  and  ChlneBe  Who  did  not
vlBh  to  be  returned  to  the  CodrmunlBtg  vhould  be   c4|Ven
an  ®ppor.tunity  to  retain  their  freedom.     }I®  later
®xpl&lne{l  his   fe®11ng8  &8   follovBi
Communism  1g a:ByBtou  that  has  no  regard  for
humtln  dignity  and  human  freedom,  and  no  rigrht-
thinking  gov®rnm®nt  can  give  its  cong®nt  to  the
Ye{*rs p.   45J.
aEEi£..1„   ,`58.
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A&   the   p®®Lc®   talkf]   contlnu®d  throughout   1952,
the   Korean  War  reached  a   Stalemate.     One   #ide  Would
remain  on  the  off®nslv®  only  until  its  Supply  lincg
w®r®  over-extended.     It   soon  became  obvlou8   that  Korea
could  not  b®  united  and  that  a   cease-fire  would  b®  the
only  liop®   for  pe®c®.5
L3y  the  winter  of  1952  the  Amerlctin  people  were
extremely  fru8trat®d  by  the  failure  of  the  truce  ttilk8.
In   tl`®   r're8id®ntit`l   ®1®ction  {}f  1952  Truman'g  party
3uf{`®r®d  an  overwhelming  d®f®at  ag   Dwlght  Ei3®nhowor
t}ecam®   the   fir&t   K®publlcan  Pr®Gid®nt   ln  twenty  ye&rB®
The  K®rean  '"'ar  proved  to  b®`a   decigiv®  factor  ln  the
outcome  ®f   the  el®ctlon.
On  Janucary  20,1953,   Truman   turned  the  Pr®81d®ncy
ov.r   to  Els®nhower,  w`ho  htid  r]rofniaed  in  his   ctimt>algn  to
end  the  Korean  W.ar.     There  Will  alvays  b®  a   groat  deal
of  controv®r8y  concerning  Bisenhow®r's  influenc.  on
the  peace  t@1kB.   but  .o®n  after  hi.  el®ctlon  the
Communl8t8'   atubbornne®S   dli  the  r]rlaon®r  of  war   isau®
b®gan  to  1®es®n.     A   c®a8e-fire  vafl   fln&11y  signed  on
July   27.1955.7     The   Korean  L`ar  had  come   to  an
end   {ifter   thrca®  y®arB.
Ye€lrB p.   `160.
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THXT   0F   CIBNER^L  MACARTIIUR'S   STATE"BNT   T0   THE
VBTBRANS   0F   FORF,ION   WARS
APPF,HDIX   I
TEXT   OF   GF,NERAL   MACARTHUR.s   5TA'rBMENT   TO   THE
vETERANs   ur-   FORElen  wAHs[
TO:  .     CLYBF.   JL.    Li3WIS.    CGMF!ANl}Z3ft-IRE-CHIEF.
VETEtt+LN,S    8F   A.0}`tl£IfiN   *+ARS    OP   Tl+F,
UNITl}D   STATHS,
CI]ICAGO.    ILLINOIS
Your  illspiring  meg®age  of  the  17th  hfag  moved  me
deeply  cand  I  trust  that  you  will  convey  t®  all  of  my
comrades-in-arms  of  the  Veterans  of  Foreign  WarB  a8-
sBmbled  on  the  occasion  of  our  518t  Annual  Ncationeil
Encampment  "y  caBsurance  that  their  confidence  and  ffuI]-
port  will   &1ve  this   CofRE`cand  much  added  Strength   to
meet  the  tests  of  battle  w}iich  lie  imraediately  ahead.
Tell  tl`®m  that  I  am  happy  to  report  that  their  8uc-
ce88ors   in  arms  now  ®ngtlging  the  enemy  along  our
battle  lines  in  South  Kor®&  are  exemplifying  that
8&m®  high  standard  of  devotion.   fortitude  and  v&1®r
which  charflcteriz®d  their  own  march  to  victory  when
they  themgolves  eng&g®d  in  combat  in  the  field.     From
g®nior  comimndorB  down  through  all  rands,   th®1r  t&ct-
i€al  Skill.  thclr  invincible  determination,  and  their
fig`hting  qualities  against  a  fanatical  foe.  v®11-trained,
expertly  directed  and  heavily  armed.  hqv€  tlpheid
our  country'8  finest  traditions.    Totfard  victory.  how-
ever  difficult  the  roa{±.. they  are  giving  ®n  afcount  of
tliem8elv®g  which  Should  make  every  4Inerican  heart  beat
With  pride  an-a  lnflnite  8ntigfa'ction.
In  view  of  misconc®|ItionB  currently  being  voiced
concerning  the  rolation&hir3  ®f  Formosa  to  our  €trateglc
pot®nti{il  in  the  Faciric,   I  bell®v@  it  1€  1n  the  public
interest  to  &v&il  myself  of  thl8  opportu.nlty  to  8tat®
my  vlew8  thereon  to  you.   €tll  of  wli®m  hfiving  fought  over-
aea8  underBtdnd  broad  gtrateglc  c®ncept8.
Tp  begin  with,  any  &ppr&iBal  of   this  strategic
potential  requires  an  &p|tr®ci&tion  of  the  ch&riges
wr{+ught  ln  the  course  of  the  past  war.     Prior  thereto
the  weestern  str{ategic  frontier  of  the  United  States-.
|u,   sc
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lay  on  the  llttornl  line  of  the  AmerlcGe  With  an  ex-
posed  if]land  8all®nt  extending  out,  throtigh  liawaii.  Mid-
way  and  Guam  to   the  rhlllr*plne€.     That  B&1ient  was  not
an  outpost  of  atr®ngth  but  an  avenue  of  w®aknes8  along
which  th®  enemy  could  and  did  attack  ug.     The  }'aciflc
Was  a   pot®ntlal  area   oL`  advfince   for  e.ny  |>r®d®tory  force
intent  upon  8trlklng  at  the  bordering  land  areas.
All   of  this  w®o  chang®d  by  our  P&clflc  victory.
Our  StrBte.Sic  frontier  then  Shifted  to  embrace   the  ®n-
tir®  Paclflc   Ocean,   which  ha8  become  a  vast  moot   to  a
prot®ctlve  3hield  for  all  of  the  Ab®rlcae  and  all  free
lands   of   tli®  ]3acific   Ocean  fir®a.     h`e  ..on`trol   it   to
the  8hor®B  of  Asia   by  a   chti±n  of   18lands,   extending  in
an  ar.a   from  the  A|oiitians  to   the  MtirlBnas,   hold  by  us
and  our  allies.
From  thlB  island  chain  tte  can  doBlnBt.  vlth  air
po`..er   every  Asi&tic  |jort  from  Vladivostok  to  Sing&poro
and  p.revent  any  hostile  piovem®nt   into  the  Pacific.     ,`ny
pred£]tory  attfick  1`rom  Agi&   must   b®  all  nmprilblou8   ®fl`ort.
No  amrihiblou8  force  can  be  successful  witliout   control
of   the  setl  lan®B  and  the  air  over  tl`o3®  lanes   1n  its
avenue  of  advaiic®.     h'ith  naval  and  air  €`iprenacy  and
mod®8t   ground   ®lementB   to   defend  b.q6c8,   any  mchjor  attack
from  continent{il  Asia  towf`rd  uB  or  our  frlendB   of   the
Pticlflc  would   b®   doomed   to   f&11ur®.
LJnd®r   Such  c®ndltioii8   the  r]dciflc  no  longer
repr®8ents  menacing  fivenue8  of  a!iiiroach  for  &   prospect-
ive   invader'--1t  as8u"eg   lnst®ad  a   n@tLiral  one   aiid  can
be  maintained  with  a  mlnibum  of  military  effort  and
eJcp®n8e.      It   ®nvi81on8  no`attack  ®g8inet  anyone  nor
does  it  provide  the  bastions  ag`qential  1.or  off®n8ive
oper€itlong,   but  `r}rop®rly  fnalntain®d  wtiuld   b®  an   ln-
vlnclble   defense  ag{iinst  aggro&&ion.     If  ve  llold  tliis
lino  ve  may  have  peace--l®B®  1t  and  war   1&   in®vltable.
Tll®   geographic  location  of  Formosa   is   #tlch  that
ln  the  hands  of  a  power  unfriendly  to  the  United  States
it  con®tltute8  an  enemy  eallent  in  the  very  center  of
this  defensive  perim®t®r,   loo-150  miles  cl®8er  to  the
adjacent  frl®`ndly   Bogm®nt8--Oklnava  and   the  Phillppin®B~-
thtln  any  point   ln  cot`tili€rit{.il  Asia.
At   the   pr®gent  time   there   1g   on  F`ormo.a  a   con-
centration  ol.  operational  air  and  ni*v.il  ba8e8  which  ls
potentially  groe*ter  than  ally  gimllfir  concentration  on
the   AJ¥1atic   m@1nlond   b®twe®Ii   the   Yellow   S®a   and   the
.fT.trait   of  Halacca.     Ailditional  btiBe8   can  be   developed
in  a  releitively  short  time  by  an  aggr®8givo  exploita-
tion  of  all  World  War  11  Japaff,e6e  fQcllitieg.
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An  enemy  force  utiliz5±ng  t,hose   in^qtallati®n8
currently  available  could  increase  by  loo  per  Cent  the
air  efl`ort  which  could  be  directed  agalnat  Okiriawa
as   compal`ed   to   oper;&tlona   bag®d   orL   the  "alnland  and
at   the   same   time   c{}uld  direct   dtim&ging  ttir  attacks
with  fighter-tyrte  &1rcraft  again.t  frl®ndly  in®talla-
tiong  in  the  rhllippin®8,  tghich  flr®  currently  beyond
the  range   of  fighters  b&B®d  on  the  mainlant±.     Our  air
Supremacy  at  once  would  become  doubtful.
A8  a  result  of  its   geographic  loctition  elnd  base
potential,   utlliz&tlon  of  F^_ortB®8a   by  a  xpllit&ry  power
hoBtlle   to  the   United  Stat®f!  may  either  €ounterb&lance
or  overshadow  the  gtratetilc  import€mce  of  the  central
and  Southern  f lahk  o£.  the  United  States  front-line
F}ogition.     Formosa  ln  the  hands  of, such  a  hostile
power  could  be   c®Iripared   to  an  uri&1nkabie`  eiircraft  .
carrier  find  8ubmarine  tender  ideally  located  to
accomr7lish   offenglv®   str{&te,#y  find  Qt   the   same   time
ch®c}rmate   defenfliv®   or   counter  ®ffdnslv€  op.erati®ns   by
friendly  forces   ba8®d  ®n  Oklnawa  and  the  I.hilipr,tines.*
This  unBinkable  carrier-tender  has  the  capacity
to  op®rtht®  frorm  10  to  ZO  air  groups   ol.   types  ranging
from  jet  flghterB   to  8-29  tyr]®   bomber8  aB  vJell  a8   to
provide  f®rtircard  op®rdting  facilities  for  short-range
coasteLl   submarin®E.     In  acquirllig  thi'S   forvard  sub-
marine  base.   the  efficacy  or  the  Short-range  Sab-
marin®  Would  be  go   ¢norm®usly  lncreiLaed  by  the  addi-
tional  r®cliu8   of  actlvlty  a&  to  threaten  comTtletely
sea   traffic  from   tll®   6®uth  and  interdict  all   ffi®&
laneB   in   the  WeBtern  P8ciflc.     Submfirin®  blockade  by
the  enemy  with  all  its  d®structiv®  ramif icationg
would  thereby  become  a  virtual  certainty.
Should  F`ormosa   .fall   tlnd  ba&ea   th®reaft®r   come
lnt®  the  l'innds  of  a  potential  enemy  of  the  United
St&teB,   the  latter  Hill  have  acquired  an  adc.]itional
I.f|eet`'  wliich  will  have   been   obt&itied  and  can  b®  mcain-
tained  at  &n  incomparably  lower  coSt  than  could  itfl
equivalent  in  fiircraft  ctlrri®rg  alid  Bub"€irine   t®nders®
Current   eBtimat®8   ®f  air  and   8ubmarin®  r®z5ource8   in
the  Far  E;ast  indicate  the  capability  of  Ouch  tl  poten-
tial  enemy  tb  extend  hle   forces  iiouthw&rd  and  Still
maintain  an  lmpo®ing  degree  of  military  Strength  for
®mriloyment   ®lsewh®r®   1n   the   r*acific   area.
Historically.  F`ormo8a  haB  been  used  a3  a   spring-
board  for  just  eucli  mllltary  agtsresgion  directed  against
areas,to  the  8outh.     The  most  notable  and  r®c®Iit   €Jcample
was   the  utiliz&tion  of  it  by   the  Japanese  in  tr'orld  h'nr
||.     ^t   the  outbretlk  of  t}i€  It@cific  War  in  1941.   it
z>layed  an  lmportdnt  part  a8  a   ettl&1ng  area  and  Support-
ing  base  for   the  v8riou®  Japaii®Be   invasion  convoys®
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The   Buppor.tiLng  air   forces   of   Jap@n'8   Army   And  Navy  i.ere
baaed  on  fie|df!   situated  along  Southern  Pormo3e.
From  1942   t[lrough  19'14  Formosa  was  a  vit#l   link
in  the  J&pan®8e   def®n®e  schom®.     Should  Formosa   fall
into  the  hands  of  a  hostile  power.  history  would  re-
peat  itself .     Its  mllltary  potential  would  agtlln  b.
fully  exploited  ®8   the  mean.  to  bretlch  end  n®utrtlli23e
our  b-est®rn   rJ&ciflc   d®f®nBe   &yBt®m  and  mount   a   War
of  conquest  agalnet  the  fr®®  natlon&   of  t.hc  l'aciflc
the a in ,
soothing  could  be  chore  falltlcious   than  the   thread-
bare  arg.dment   by   th®8e  wiio  advocate  appease«ient  and
defeatism  in  tl`e  Pacific   that   if  w®   d®f®nd  Formosa  we
nli®nate  continental  Asia.     Those  who  sr>eak  thus   do
not  undergt&iid  the  Orient.     'rliey  do  not   grasij   that
it  ig   the  pattern  of  Oriental  psychology  to  respect
and  follow  aggressive,  r®8olute  and  dynAmlc   1®ad®rship-~
to  t]ulckly  turn  from  a  lead®r8hlp  characterized  by
timidity  or  vacillation--and  they  underestimate  the
Oriental  mentality.
'Nothing  ln  the  last  five  y®ar8  hoe  8o  insplr®d
the  F®r`  East  a3   the  Afn®rican  determination  to  preserve
t!ie   bulwarks  of   our  Pacific  Oc®ali  str®teglc  pogltion
from  future  oncroachm®nt.   for  few  of  its  p®opl®s  fall
accurtltely  to  apprtlle®   the   3afegutlrd     such  d®t®rmirLa-
tion  bring8  to  tholr  fr®®  in8titutlon8.
To  pursue  any  other  course  would  b®  to  turn
over  the  fruits  of  our  Pacific  victory  to  a  rtot®ntlal
®nefny.     It  would  Shift  Any  future  btlttle  area   5.000
miles  eastward  to   the  coa3t8  of  the  American  contln-
ent§,   our  own  home   c®a8t8:   it  would  completely   ®xp.ose
our  frlendB  ln  the  ]thilippin®8,   our  friends  in  Au®tralla
and  N®w  Zealand.   our  frlendG   in     li,idon®sia.   our   frl®ndB
ln  Japan.  and  other  car®a8.   to  the  lustful  thrugt  of
tlio8®  Who  &tand  far  elavery  a.  against  liberty,   for
atheism  &8  against  God.
The   decision  ol'   r>re81dont   Truman  on  Juno   27th
llgrited  into  f lofn®  a   labtp  of  hope  throughout  Asia   that
vac   burning  dlthly   tow®rd€   ®xtinctlon.     It  m&trked  for
the  F`®r  I;a8t   the   focal  an{I   turning  point  ln  thlB  ar®a's
struggle  for   fr®edoB.     It   Bw®pt  u8id®  1n  one   gr®tlt
monumental  Stroke  till  of  t.h®  hypocrisy  and  the  sophistry
whi.,t`  has   conftigod  and  del`ided   so  many  peoril®   distant
frol±]   the  actual   Scene.
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TEXT   oF   Gti+NEnAL,   FL!hcAIt"ult.s   MAitcH   24   STAi`i?,H*;«T
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Operations  continue  according  to  8chedul®  fliid
plfan.     We  have   now   Bub8t{`ntially  cleared  South  K®r®a
ol   orgfinlzed  Communist  forces.     It   i8   b®coulng   ln-
cr®&61ngly   ®vid®nt   ttLet   the  heavy  d®6tructio)i  along
the  en®my's   lines  of  gupply,   cau®od  hy  our  round-the-
clock  ma881v®  air  and  nav{*l   bombardni®nt,   haft   left  his
troops  in  the  rorvard  battle  ar®tl  d®ficlent   ln  r®qulre-
mcnt8   to  &uataln  hig   ®perationsi     Thie  v®akn®eB   1.   being
brilliantly  explolt®d  by  our  ground  forces.     The  eneny'B
human  wave  tectlcg  liav®  definlt®1y  fall®d  him  a8   our
ova  force8  have  bccom®  8®a8oned  to   this   form  of  warfarei
his  tactlc8  of  lnflltration  are  but  contributing  to
hl8  piecemeal   log8e8.   and  l`e   i8   Showlng   less   Stamina
than  our  own  troo])8  under  the  rigors  ol.  climate,   terrain
and  battle.
Of  even  greater  8igriiflcanc®  than  our   tactic{il
3uccea8e9  hna   b®®ri  t}ie   clear  revelation  that   this  nev
®n®my,   l{®d   China,   of   Buch   exatfg®rated  and  v&unt®d  mlll-
tary  pow®r,   lackS  the  industrial  ccapacity  to  provide
ad®qufately  many  critical   lt®m€  n®c®ssary  to  the   conduct
of  modern  v&r.     £to   ltickB   the  rna)iuf&cturing  btlse  and
those  raw  m&teritll®  n®ed®d  to  I.roduc®,   maintain  al`d
operate  even  mod®rat®  Air   and  ntlval  power,   alid  he  can-
not  pr®vid®  the  ee.entidl8  for   3ucc®#f]ful   ground  op®ra-
tion&,   Such  ae   tanks.  heavy  artillery  and  other  rofln®-
"entg  science  hag  1ntroduc¢d  into  the  conduct  of  mili-
tary  campalgnS.     Formerly  liig   great  numerlct`l  potential
might  well  liave  f illed  this  gap  but  with  the  dev®lon-
ment   of   ®xiBtlng  m®thodB   of  iBa.iig   d®structlon.   numbers
alone  do  not  offB®t  the  vuln®ratiillty  inherent   in  Such
d®fici®ncie8®     Control  of   the  aea8  and  the  air.   which
ln  turn  medina   control   over   Buppli®e.   cotpmunicationB,
and  transportation.  are  no  less  eBBential  and  d®cleive
ndv  tl`an  ln  the  pact.     *'hen  thl&   control  ®xi&te  a8   in
our  ca8®,   and   i8.c®urjled  with  an  inferiority  of  ground
fire  power  oe   ib   the   eneuty'e   ca&®.   the  result],rt.tr  alis\-
parity  18   Such   that   it  coi'inot  b®   ®vErcop®  by.  brav®ry\.
however  fan&tical,   or  the  most  grosg  lndifrer®nc¢  to
[Tr.uman. Y e fl r a pl`.   440-441.
136
human   l®8s.
ThGgG   military   w¢&kn®&8®8   £Lave   been   clecarly   and
d®flnltely  revealed  @iiic®  Red  China   entered  uriom  its
nnd®clcared  war   in  ffior®a.     i}vt!n  under   the   inhibiti®ng
which  now  rogtrict  the  activity  ®f  the  United  Nati®Iis
forc®#  nnd  the  corre8}.'i®ndin&  military  &dv6intageg  trhich
accrue  to  Red  Chi.na,   lt  llas   t>Ben  ghown  its   complete   in-
ability  to  accomplish  by  farce  of  arfa8  the  conquest  of
ffore&.     Tile  eneny,   therBfor®.   must   by  now  be  painfully
aware  theLt  ca   decision  of  the  United  Nations   to  d®partt
from  its  tolerant  effort  to  c®ntaln  tl`®  wjir  to  the  area
of  Korea.   through  an  expansion  of  Our  military  operations
to  its  coastal   ar®fig  arid  int®rlor  ba8eg,   would  doom  fted
China   to  the  rl8k  of  1"minent  military  collcapse.     These
ba&ic  facts  being  egtablighed.   th®r®  should  be  no  in-
&up®rabl€  difficulty  ln  arriving  at  dccislon8  ®ti  the
Korean  problem  if  the  i3Hue8  are  re8olv®d  om  their  own
tberit8,   without   bei}i#  burd€.netl  by   extrtlli€oua  matters
not   directly  r®lat®d  to  Korea.   such  as  Formosa  or  Chlna'g
Beat  ln  the  Unlt®d  Hationst
The   Korean  nation  and  peo¥91e.   which  hc*ve   been
so  cruelly  r&vaged.  must  not  be  sacrificed.     This  1g
a  parflmount  concern.     Apflrt  from  the  fbi.lltary  arefl   of
combat,   the  fundafnental  questions  €critinue  to  be
politlce*l  in  nature  and  muBt  find  their  answer  in  the
diplom&tlc   BplL®re.     Within  tti®   area   ol.  my  authority
as   the  military   cormman{ler,   however,   it  tJould  be  me®d-
l®gs  to  Scay  that   I  gland  ready  tat  any  time  to  confer
in  the  f i®ld  with  the  cormand®r-in-chief  of  the  enemy
forces  ln  the  earnest  effort  t®  find  airy  mllittiry  m®&n8
whereby  realization  of  the  political  objectives  ®f  the
United  Ntltionf   in  Hore`q,   to  which  no  ncati®n  may   juf#tly
take  exceptions.  might  be  accomijlished  without  further
blood€hed.
AI,r`BNl)IX   Ill
Tr;XT   0F   PHH.till)BNT   TrtuRAN.a   TflLBvlsloN  Aul}ItBss
AFTBIt   mcAH"ul{.a   i{p.CALL
APPENDIX   Ill
TEXT   oF   pltBslDBNT  TItu"AN.S   THLr3Vlsltm   Ai}i}[tEss
AFTEit   mcAltTHUR.s   ltF.CALL
I  vent  to  talk  plainly  to  you  tonight  about
What  we  are  doing  in  Korea  end  about  our  policy  in
the  Far  East.
In  the  8ippl®8t  term..  what  *e  are  doing  ln
Korea   is  thi®!     h'e  are  trying  to  pr®v®nt  a   third  world
VHr,
I   think  most  p®opl®   in  thl8   country  r®co€nl7.®d
that  fact  last  Juno.     And  they  wtlrmly  supported   the
deci.lob  of  the  Government  to  help  the  Republic  of
Kor®e   agalnBt   the  Communlet  eggr®e8or8®      Now.   many
pere®n®.   even   gofb®  wlio  ap|>lautl®d  our  decision   to   d®-
ferLd  Korea,   htlve   forgotten  the   ba€ic  r®®8on  for   our
action®
It  ig  right  for  us  to  b®  in  Korea.     It  tra8  right
last  Julie.     It  ie  right   t®d&y.
I  want  to  remind  you  shy  this  i8  true.
1`he   Communist.   in  tli®   Hr®mlin  are   engaged   ln  a
mon8trouB   con6pir®cy   to   8tofBp  out   freedom  all   o+.er   the
world.     If  th®y  wore   to   Bucc®ed.   the  United  States
v{>uld   b®   i'Lumb®red  autong  th®1r  principal   victimH.      It
must  tie  cl®Dr   to  everyone  that  the  United  St&te8   can-
not--and  will  nor--81t  idly  by  and  await  foreigri  con-
quest.     The  only   question  ig:     W}`en  18   the   best   tim.
to  meet  the  threat  and  how?
The  beet  tlm®  to  fpeet  the  threat  ls   ln  the  be-
ginning.     It  ls  ®ari®r  to  rtut  out  a  fire  1n  the  b®-
91nning  when  lt   i8   Small   than  after  lt  has  b®com®  a
2-oaring  blaze.
And  the  best  Way   to  meet   t'he  threat   of  aggru8-
sion  ls  for  the  pe&c®-loving  liation8  to  act   together.
If  they  don't  act  together,   t,hey  are  likely  to  b®
picked  off .   one  by  one.
If  tl`®y  had  followed  the  right  policleg  in  the
res8ional  Tt®cord
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1930'Si   lf   the  fr®®  countri®g  had  acted  together.   to
Crush   the  aggrr®8Bi®n  of   the  dictator.;   and   lf   they
had  acted  in  the  b®ginnlng,  vh®n  the  aggression  was
z3mall.   thel.e   |jrobeLbly  voula   h€`v®   boon  no  World  h`ar   I.I.
If  history  ht`3  tauglit  uB  anything.   1t   iB   that
aggreeBion  anyt.~here  ln  the  *-orld  ls  a   tl]r€at   to  p®tlce
everywhere  ln  the  world.     h'hen  that  ag&res.ion  ie  sup-
ported  by  the  cruel  and  GelfiBh  rulers  of  a  powerful
nation  Who  are   b®nt  on  conquest.   it   becomeg  a   clGtqr  and
pro.ant  danger  to  the  Becurlty  and  indepcnd®nce  of
every  fr®o  nation.
This   le  a   l®gsoli   that  most  p®oT.I.  in  thl.  coun-
try  have  learned  thoroughly.     Thld  le  the  baelc  reason
why  w®  joined  ln  creating   the   United  NationB®     And,
Since   the   end  of  World  to'ar   1],.   we  have   been  putLlng
that   lesson  into  rlr8ctice--w®  have  been  vorklng  With
other  free  nations  to  check  the  aggressive  de8igne  of
the  Soviet  Union  before  they  can  result  in  a  third
world  war.
T`hat   le  What  ve   did  ln  Greece,   when  that  nation
va.  threatened  by  the  aggr®e6ion  ol   international
c omenun i a ib .
The  attack  against   Greece  could  h€Ivc   led   to
general  war.     But   thlB   c{}untry  ctl"®   to   tlie  aid  of
Qre®ce.     The   U`nit®d  rvatioli8   ®uprort®d  fireek  resis-
tance.     tTitli  our  help,   the   det®rmlnation  and  ®ffortB
of  the  Greek  people   d®f®tlted  the  attack  on  the  8|>ot.
Another   big  Conununist   thr®ftt   to  petlc®  wag   the
Berlin  blockade.     That  too  could  have  led  to  War.     But
ag&1n   it  was   e®ttl®d  beca`i8e   l`ree  toen  woul{l  not   back
down   ln   on   ®m®rg®ncy®
The  aggr®flsion  agaln8t   Korea   ig  tLie   boldest
and  moot   datigerouB  morre   the  Communl8tB   have   y.t   made.
The  attack  on  Korea  vaB  part   of  a   +`.£reat®r  plari
for  conquering  all  of  ABia.
I  would   like   to  r®tid  to  you  from  a   ®®cr®t   in-
telligence  report  Which  came  t®  u&  after  the  attack.
It   1&  a  re|]ort   of  a   ®pcech  a   Communist   €irmy   off lc®r
in   North   Korea   gfiv®   to  a   group   olL   spies   an{I   saboteurr*
last   }]ay,   I   month   I)®fore   SoutlL  fi®r®jl   vtl®   1rtveided.      Trie
r®pbi-t   8how8   1n   gr®tit   d®tall   hbv   t}!1$   1ri`.t{*ffilon  wa8
t]flrt   of  a   ctlrerully  pr®}Tflr®d  plot.     IierG   .t®  a  pflrt
®1   what   the   C®thmunl8t   officer.   who  h£*d   tje®n   trailied
in   Moscow.   tolt]   Iiig   mc9n:       .tjur   rorce8..   he   Bald.    :
'flre   Scheduled   to  attack  South  Kor®,an  forces   about
the  mlt]dle   of  June.     The   c(}ming  atttick  on  `q{.nth   K®re&
mt`rks   the   fir.qt   .qtep   towtlr{l   tl`e   libe!-f`tic>n   t]±`   .\ij..I.I
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Wotlce   that   he  u8®d   the  word   ..ilberatlo)I..
Th€lt   is   C®mmtiniBt   double-talk  meRnlrL.q   'conqu®gt. I
I  have  another  g®cret  intelligence  report  here.
This  One  tells  what  another  Communist  officer  in  the
Far   li:a8t   told  his  fl!®n   Several  H.onth5   b®for®   the   in-
vasion   of   Korefl.     I+ere   is   what   li®  E&idg      'In   order   to
successfully  undertake  the  long  a.valt®d  world,revolu-
tion.  we  must   first  unify  A8ia.     Jav&.   Iiido-Chi"`,
M&ldya.   Itidia,   Tibet,   ThailarT.a.   Phili!`.!pin®s,   €ind  Japan
are  our  ultimate  targ®tB.     The  United  States   is   the
only   ob`qtt±cle   on   our  ro&d  1`or   the   liber&tiom.o£+  all
countries   in  southeast  A8ia.     In  other  words.   w®  muflt
u]lify   t}1d   peoril®   of  AB1&   alid   cruBIL   the   United  States®'
Ti`at   iB  wli{it   the  Communist   leaders  tire   telling
t}l®ir  peo|}1®,   and   that   is   what   t}`®y  have   he®n   trying
to  do,
They  want   t.a  control  &11  Asia   from  the   Rr®mlin®
This  plan  of  conquest  iB  ln  flat  contr&dlction
to  what  \we   b®liev®.     W®   believe   that   H®rea   belongs   to
the   Koreang,   the-t   India   b®longE  *®   the   I)idianE--tiiat
all   the  riationB  of  Asia  should  be  fr®®  to  work  out
their  affcall.g  in  their  own  way.     This   i8  tli¢   basis
®r  peace   in   the  F.'tr  Ecaat  and   ev®rywh®re   dice.
The  whole  Conmunl8t   imperlalifm  ie   back  of  the
attack  on  peace  ln  the  Par  EaBt.     It  wfla.the  .Sovl®t
Union   that   tr€)1ntSd  and   ®qt&ipped   the  N®rth   Koreans
for  aggr®saion.     'rl}e   Criindft?   Communi&t8  masst!d  44  *ell-
trtiin®d  ant:i  well-equippe€d   divislong   on   the   Hor®®n
frontier.     'l`he8e  were   the  troope  they  threw  i.nto
battle  when   thd   North   Kor®i!n  Comriuniat8  v®re   beaten.
'1`he   f!ueBtion  w®   hahe  had   to  face   i&   whcather   the
CormiuniBt   plan   of  conqu®Bt   c€`n  b®  stopped  without
general   war.     Our  f]overnm®nt   and  ®th'®r   countri®e
associated  with  u8   in  the  Uriited  N&ti®n8   heli®ve   that
the  best   chcanc®   ®r  8toppins  it  without  gendrBl  war   iB
to  jmt!et   the  attack  in  Hor®&  &rid  defeat   it  t.h®rQ.
That   i3  what  we  have  b®cn  dolng®     1t   i8  a   dif-
ficult  and  bitter  task.
But  go  far  it  has  tieen  Bucc®sSful.
So   far.   w®   h&v®   |]rev®nted   W®rld   be`&r   11`1.      So
far.   by  fighting  a  limited  wcLr  in  K®rea,  *®  have  pre-
vented  aggreBeion  from  gucceedin&.  find  bringing  on  a
generfll  war.     4\nd  the  abl.1ity  or`   thtf  whole  .free  world
to  r®si8t  Co"munigt  a#gression  nag  been   greatly   im-
prove,I.
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W.e  have   t.ught   the  enemy  a   l®8gon.     He  hag   found
out   that  ®ggr®ssion  i8  not   cheap   or  easy.     Mor®ov®r.
m®rl  all   over  the  world  who  want   to  remain  fr®®  h®v®
been   given   new   courtig®  and  now   hope.     They  know  now
that   the   champions   of   freedom  ®&n   stand  uri   dnd  fit;rht
and   that   they  Will  stand  up  {,}nd  fight.
Our  r®8olute   stand  in  Korea   ls   hel}ilng  the  1`orc€8
of  freedom  riov  fighting  in  lndo-China  and  other  c{iun-
tri®s  in  that  part  of  the.  vorld®     It  hag  already  .lowed
down  the  time-table   of  conqu®8t.
In  Korea  itself ,  there  are  Signs  that  the
enemy  ig   building  up  his  ground  forc88   for  a  new  lnaBs
off®nBlve.     tt®  also  kno'v   th€`t   there  have   been  large
increc.see  in  the  ®rieny'g  available  air  forc®8.
If  a  now  attack  comcg.   I  feel  confident  lt  will
be   turned  back.     The  United  N&tion®   fighting  forces
are   tough  a]id  ab   le  and  well-®qulppe{l®     They  are  fitsht-
ing  for  a  just  cau8®.     They  are  i7roving  to  all  the
world  that  the  princlril®  ol`  c®1lectiv®,  security  will
work.     We  are   proud  of  all   theJ!e   £`orce8   for.the  rfia8ni-
ficent   job  they  have   done  agiiinBt  heavy   odt,18.     We  pray
that   their  efforts  imy  ®ucc®®d,   for   `ipon  their   Bacce88
"y  hlng®  the  peace  of  the  world.
The   Communist   side  ttiust  now   choose   its   cour8®
of  action®      The   Cormiiunl&t   rulers.may  pr®s€   .t}`i®   Bttack
agalnet   us.     They  may.take   further  dcti<)n  which  Will
®pr®ad   the   conflict.     They  h&v®  that   choice,   and  with
lt   the  awful  re3pongibllity  fol.  What  may  follow.     The
ComuniBt8  also  have  the  choice  of  a  peaceful  .qettl®-
m®nt  which  could  lead  to  a   general  relaxation  of   ten-
81on81n   tli-Far   'ri:aBt.     The   d®ciBiori   is   t.heir.i.   because
the  forces  of  the  Unlt®d  Nations  will  strive  to  limit
the  conflict  if  pos31ble.
tw'e   do  riot  want  to   See   the   conflict   ln  Korea
extended.     We  are   trying  to  pr®vont  a  World  war--
not   to   Start   one.     TJ]e   best  way   to  do   that   1&   to  toak®
it  plain  that  w®  and  tile  other  1`ree  countri®B  t.ill   con-
tinue  to  rGsl8t  the  attack.
But   you   may  ask.  wily   c.a.n.t  we   take   other   Steps
to  punish   the   aggr®geor.     Why   don't  we   bomb  14&nchuria
And  Chinfl   itself?     tvhy   don't  w®  assist  Chinos®  Nation-
alist  troop.  to  land  on  the  mainland  of  Cttin&?
If  w®  were   to   do   these   thinxH,   we  would   becoln®
entangled  ln  a  va.3t  conflict  on  the  colitinent  of  Aala
and  our  task  would  become   immea.urably  more  dirflcult
all  over  the  World.
Ill
What  would   Suit   the   ambitions  of   the   Krem].in
better  than  for  our  qhilltary  forces   to  be  corEimitted  t®
a  full-Scale  war  with  Re`]  China?
It  may  veil  be  that.1n  eplte  ol   our  best  efforts.
tlle   Communists   may   8pre.t(I   the   war.®      L3ut   it   would   b®
wrong--tragically  wr'ong--for  us  to  t&ko  the  initiative
1n  extending  the  Uar.
1`he   dctngerg  are   Sr®at.     Maik®  no  mistake   about
it.      Beliind   the   North   t[or®&ns   and  Ctiinese  Communists
in  the  front  lines  Stand  additiontll  niilllons  of  Chinese
8oldierg.     And  behind  the  Chino8®  stand  the   tanks.   the
itlaneg,   the   subm&rin®g,   the   goldlerB.   and   the   schelz]ing
rulers   of  the  Sovl®t  Union®
Our  aim  i8   to  avoid  tli®   Spread  of  the   conflict.
The   course  w®   liav®  been  following  is   th.®   one
best  calculated  to  avoid  a-n  ail-out`var.     1t   1€   tl`®
course  con.qistelit  with  our  obligation   to  {Jo  all  w®
can  to  maintain  interntltlonal  rieace  Atid  8®curity®
our  ex|ierienc®  in  Gr®ace  and  Berlin  8how8   that  lt  ig
tli®   most   effective.  cour8®   of  action  ve'-'ciAn  f®lL®w.
First  of  all.1t  18  clear  that  our  effort81n
Kor®®   can  t]lunt   thes  vlll   of   t]i®  Chinese   Communists
to   continue   the   g1`ruggl®.     The  United  Natlone   forces
caBualtief  on  the  enemy.     our  forces  are  stronger  now
than  they  have  been  before.     These  are  L`lain  facts
which  may   discourage   the   ChineB®  Coiiiniunlstg   from   con-
tinuing  t.heir  attack.
Second,   the  free  u®rld  as  a  Whole   le   growing  in
n]illtary  vtrength  every  dtly.     In  the  United  States.
in  twestern  I;urope.   and  throughout  the  wol.ld.   free  men
tir®  alert  to  the  Soviet  trireat  and  care  building  t]ielr
defenBe8.     This  may  discourage   the  Coununist  rulers
1`rom  continuirlg  the  war  ln  Korea.   alld  from  undert&kirig
new  acts   ol   etggreBglon   eleewli®re.
If  the  Communist  authorities  realize  that  they
cannot   d®f®at  us   in  Korea.1f  they  realize  it  would
be   foolhard)r   t®  triden  the  ho6tlllti®S   beyond   Korea.
then  they  -ay  recognize  the  folly  of  continuing  their
aggr®gglon.     A   p®ac®ful   Settlement   may   then   be   possible.
The   door   18   always   open.
Then  w®   fl]tly  achieve   a   S®tt.lament   in   Xor®a   which
will  not  compromi8®   the  prirlcl[}l®.  and  purpo-ea   of   the
United   Natlon8.
I  have.  thought  long  and  hard  about   this   {]ueation
of   extending  the  v&r  ln  ^sla.     I  have  dlgcu€g®d   lt  many
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tlfne.  vlth  tli®  ablest  mllitery  ad,viB®r8  in  the  cpuntry.
I  believe  with  all  my  heart  that  the  cour8®  w®  are  follow-
ing  ls   the  best,CourB®.
I  b®|iev®  that  we  unu8t  try   to  limit  the  Tar  to
Ror®a   for   t(ie8®   vital  rea8Lon8:      t®  raak®   duro..that   the
precious  llve4  of  our  fighting  men  dro  not  wagtedi   to
see  that   the  Security  of  our  country  and  the  free
world   ls   not  ntpedl®ssly   j®opar{11zedi   and   t`o  pr.vent  tl
third  trorld  w6ir.
f\  number   of  events  have  in.Ida  it  evident   that
General  MacArthur  did  not   agr®o  with  that   p®licy®     I
have   th®r®fore   conBlder®d   it  ®E.®ntial   to  r®li®v®   Gen-
Sr&l   MacAr.thur   go  that   thel.a  would   b®  no  doubt   or  con-
1`u8ion  as  to  the  real  riurpos..  And  aim  of  our  policy.
It  wag   with   the   de®p®8t  personal  regret  th&t   I
found  myself  codp®11ed  to  take  this  action.     General
MocArthur  ia  oiie  of  our  greatest  «tllltary  cobrmandel.a.
But   the   ccius®   of  tf orld  p€£`c®   is   more   important   th4in
tiny  individual.
`rhe   change   in   commands   in   the  Far  r}iist  means
no  change  whatever  in  th.  rjolicy  of  the  United  States.
W®  will   carry  on   tl`e   fight   in  Xor®&  *ith  ,vigor  and
d®t®rmination   in  an  efl`®rt  to  bring  the  War  +.o  a
8pe®dy  and   8ucc®s3ful   conclu31on.
W®  are   ready,   at  .ny   tlm®.   to  n®goti&t®   for   a
restoration  of  p®thce  in  the  ar®e.     But  ve  vlll  not
engage   in   a|7p®{i8ement.     We  are   only   lnt®re®t®d   ln
r®&|  peace.
Iteal   peace   can  b®   &cl]1®v®d   through  eL   &ettle-
m¢nt   based  on  the  following  factors:
OrLe.      .Tlie   flghtlng  must   Htop.
Two.     Concrete   st®pB  muet   lie   taken   to   insure
tliat   the  f ighting  will  not  br®ak  out  again.
Three.     There  must   b®  an  end  to  the   aggro.eioi`.
A   Settlement   founded  urton   th®S®  elements  would
open   the  way   for   tl]e  uniflcation  of  K®r®a  and   th®  with-
drawal  of  all  foreign  forces.
In  the  me£`ntime.   I  w.tnt   to  b®   clear  tlbout   our
tnilltary   objective.     te'®  .B®   fig!itilLg  to  reglat  an
outrag®ous  aggression  in  Xore&.     b''®  are   trying  to  keep
the   `Koretln   conl`11ct   from  Bpr®Fiding  to  other  areas.
Jjut   at   the   aiamt3   tlftie  w®  must   conduct   our  military
activitlea  so  aB  to  insure  the  8®curity  of  our  forces.
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Thl$   1s   ®8eentlal  lf .they  are  to  continue  the  fight
until  the  enemy  abfindong  its  rutliles8  attempt   to  da8-
troy   th®  I{®publlc   of   Korea.
That  i®  our  military  objective--to  repel  attcack
and   to   restore   p®®c®.
In  the  hard  fighting  in  Xore&.  we  are  proving
that  collective  action  am(}n8  nations   i3  not  only  a
high  princi|>le   but  a   work&bl®  th®ans   of  reslgtirig
aggression.      Defeat   of  ag`gr®3Bi{}n  in   Hor®a   may   b®   the
turning  point  in  the  world'B  8e&rch  for  a  practical
way   of  achieving  p®&c®  atitJ   Becurlty.
'rhe   etruggle   of   t±ie   Unlt®d   NationE   ln   Koro&   13
a  etruggl®  for  peace.
The  free  nations  have  united  th®1r  strength  in
•`n  ®fl.`ort  to  pr®v®nt  a   tl`ird  world  war.
That  wfar  can  cottte  lf   the  communist  rulers  vent
lt  to  come.     But  thlB  nation  and  itf]  alli®g  will  not
b®  r®8pon81ble   for  lta   coming.
Wo  do  not  want  to  widen  the  conflict.     We  will
use  ®v®ry  ®ffort   to  prevent  tliat  dlga8ter.     And.   in  8o
doing.  tfe  know  that  w®  are   1`ollowilig  the  great  princi-
ples   or   p®ac®.   fr®eflom.   and   ju8tice®
APPEtt»IX.  IV
THx`r   oF   GLENBit^L   ilAc^ItTtiuft.s   ADDREss
Bz!;r`oftE   coNGi:tEss
Ar`pBNi)Ix   IV
TEx'r   OF   GL;FTBItAL  "ACAftTI]un's   ADDHB§s
B}iF0fflB   CO!touBSSL
Mr.   r'r®gident,  "r.   Sp®&ker.  and  distinguished
M®mberg   ®f   the   C®ngreBfl.   I  at&Itd   on  this  roBtrum  with
a  Bense  of  deep  humility  &rid  great  pride--humility
in  the  unke  of  thos®  great  American  architects  of  Our
history  who  hfive  Stood  here  b®f®r®  m®.   [tride   ln  the
reflection  that  this  forum  ®f   1®giBlative  debate  r®-
present8  humali  liberty  in  the  purest  form  yet  davi®ed.
I  d®  not   Stand  here  nB  an  advocate  for  any
partisan  ccause,   for   tl`®  igsu®8   are   fund&m®nt&l   and
reF*ch  quite   beyond   the  realm  ®f  peirti8tln  conslder&tion®
They  mu#t  be  resolved  ®n  the  liigheSt  I.lane  of  nat-
ional  interest  if  dur  course  i8  to  prove  Sound  and
{}ur  future  £trotected.     I   trust.   th®r€}fore.   thcat  yon
will   tlo  in.  tile  jugtic®  of  receiving  tii£`t  which  I
h€av®   to   say  &8   gol®ly   ®xpr®gfling  the   con81d®r®d  vl®w-
point   ®£   a  fellow  Am®rlctln.     I  addras!8  you  with  neither
rancor  nor  blttdrn®&g  in  the  fading  twilight  ®f  life
but  witli  one  p`irpoe®  in  mind--t®  serve  a)y  country.
The   18gu€B   are   globcal  and   sa  interlo¢k€ck   thfat
to  consider  the  }irot]lemH  ®f  tti€  one   S®ctor,   obllviou8
t®  those  ®f  flnoth®r.   iB  but  t.a  court  {Ii8®ster  for   the
wllol a ,
W}iilo  Asica   i6   cotnmonly  referred   t®  as   the   gate-
way  to  i+:ur®pe.   it   is  no   le8g   true   that  Europe   ig  tht§
gateway   to  Asia.   &nd  the  br®&d  influence  of   the  one
c@nriot  fail   to  hfive   its   lmpac€   upon  the  Other.
Ttier®  are   those  w]}o  cltqim  Our  Strength   i3   in-
adequ&te  to  protect  on  both  fronts--that  t¢G  cfinriot
divide  our  effort.     I  can  think  of  no  gr®at@r  ®x-
pre8Bion   of   d®f®£`tism.      rf  a   t*ot®ntial   enemy   can
divide  his  8tz-ength  on  two  fronts.   it  18  for  ua  to
counter  his   Off.`ort.
The  Communl.+t   threat   18  a   global   One.     It8
@ucce8Si.ul   tidv&nc®   1n  one   Sector   threfttena   the   des-
truction  of  every  other  gcctor.    ,You  c&rLnot  appe&Se
or  oth®rwi8e   surrender  to .®ommunigrli  in  Asia  wlt}]otlt
r€sBional  it®cord
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Binultnn®ou8ly  underlnining  our  efforts  to  }lalt   its
advance   in  Huro!,]®.
I`3®yond  pointing  out   these   general   truisms.   I
shall  confine  my  dlscuBgion  to  th.   general  areas  of
Aaia.     r}efor®   one  may  objectively  a8se8s   the   situation
now  existing  there.   h®  must   comT}rehend   Bom!thing  of
ABia'g  past  and  the  revolutionary   ch&ng®S  t.hich  hav®
m63rked  her   ct.urge   up   to   the   I,+r®8ent.      Long   ®xploit®d
by  the   so-called  cola.r)1ol  pover8.  with  little  op!jor-
tunlty  t®  achi®v®  any  degree  of  social  Ju8tic®.   in-
dlvldual  dignity.  or  a  higher  8t&ndard  of  life  Such  .a
guided   our  own  noble  administr&tion  of  the  1'hllipr.ines,
the  I,`eopleB   of  ^8i®   found  their  op`portunity   ln   the  w€±r
ju`qt  past   to  throw  off   t.he   Shackles   o±`   coloril&11sm.
and  now  see   the   deiwn  or  new  opportunity.   a  lier®tofore
un felt  dignity  and  t,h®  self-respect  ol   political
freedom.
nu8ter`ing  htilf  of  the   earth'g  popul&tion  tend
60  [iercent   of   its  natural  r®8ources,   th®go  tpeorjle8
are  rapidly  congolid&ting  a   ii®w  force,   botli  moral  and
material.   with  whicti   t.a  `raige   tlie   living  Bt@ndard  alid
erect  adaptations   of  the   deeisn  of  i]!od®rn  |>rogreB®
to  t.heir  own  distinct  cultural  environments.     hheth®r
one  adli®res   to   the  c®nc®i]t  ot.  colonir,dtion  or  not,   thi8
18   tli®   direction   of  A&1can   progress   attd   it   zzz&y   I'i®t   be
gtop|>ed.     It  i8  a   corolltlry  to  the  Shift   ol-   I,h®  world
economic   frontlerS,   fl.   the  whole   efjlcenter  ol.  world
affairs  rotates   back  toweird  the  ar®®  whence   it   Btd4rted.
In  this   Bltuatlt?n  lt   b®com®s  vital   th+]t   our   own  country
erie.`.t   its   I)olicle8   in   coilBo)tf``nc®  g'1ttl   this   basic
evoluti{}ntlry  condition  re`th®r   tlitln  pursue  a   course
blind  to  t.h®  reality  that   the  colonial  era  ls  now
past  cand   the  Asian  peopleB   covet  the  right   to  8h&pc
their  own  free  destirly.     What   they   Se®k  now   is   1`ri®nd,ly
guidanct3.   underf]t&nding.   and   support.   not   imp®riou8
dlroctioni -the   ¢ignlty  of  equality,  not  the  8hafu®  of
gubjugatidh.     Their  preewir  3t.indard8  of  life,  ]`titifully
low.   is   infinitely   lower  now  in  tl`e  devastcati®n  left
in  vtlr's  wake.     h'orld  ld®ologi.3  plcty  little  i>art   ln
A8ian  thinking  and  are   little  `ind®ratood.     What   the
p®®plt!8  Strive  for   is  tlie   oriportui`ity  for  a   little
more  food  in  their  8to"}ch3,  a   little  hatter  clothing
on  their  back.g,   a   little  fil`m®r  roof  over  t±ieir  he&de,
tlnd  the  realizeition  of  the  normal  nationalist  urge  for
i]oliticc^l  ffe®dom.     Tlle8e   political-social  conditions
htlve  but  an  indirect  bearing  u|.jon  our  own  national
Security.   but   do  form  a   backdror}   to   contemrtoi.Ary
planning  which  ffluHt   be   thoughtfully  considered  lf  we
are  to  avt]id  the  pitfalls  of  unro€`1ism.
of  more  direct  and   intn®dlat€  bearing  upon  o`ir
natlon&18®curity  are   tlie   changes  wr{}ught   in   the
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Btrat®gic  potential   of   the  17&cific   {)ce€ln   in   t)t®   courBe
of  the  past  war.     Prior  thereto,  the  western  strategic
frontier  ®f  the  United  Lstntea  lay  on  th®   littoral  line
®f   the   Am€rlcil8  Thith  &n   exp{]ged   island  Salient   ®xtelid-
ing   out   thrtjugh   I]awaii.   FTidw{iy.   find  Guain   t®   the   }'`hilip-
pines.     Thtlt  gallent  proved  not  an  outpo8t  of  Btr®ngth
but  an  nvenue  of  weakness  along  which  the  enemy   could
and  did  attack.     The  Pacific  wafi  a  potentl&l  area   of
advance  for  {i[ty  pred®t,Cry  force  intent  upon  gtrlklng
at   the  bordering  land  arefl8.
All   this  was   changed  by  Our  I;&cific  victory.
Our  Strategic  frontier  thelL  ghlfted  to  embrace  the
er)tiro  Pacific   uc®am.  which  b®caEi®  a  vast  moat   to  pro-
tcct  us  as  long  as  we  hold  it.     Indeed.   1t  act8  &3  a
protectlv®  Shield  for  till  of  the  Americ&g  and  all  free
lqnds  of   the  Pacific   Oc®ari  area.     'nJe  control   it   to   the
sfi®re8   of  Asia   by  a   Chain  of  i81fands   extending  in  @n
tlrc  froca   the  A|eutianB   to   the  }fdarlannas  held  by  u€  and
our  free  &lli®8.
Pram  triis   ialo&id  chain  we  can  dominate  with   Bee
and  fair  powe+  every  Asiatic  rtort  from  Yladivostok  to
Sins.apore  aii{l  !irev®nt   any   hostile  rmovem®nt   into   tri®
I.8ciflc.     Any  pr®da,tory  attack  £`rom  A81a  must   b®   an
&mphlbiouc   effort.     'No  &mpltlbloug   force  can  b®   8uccesg-
ful  without  control  of  the  Sca  lanes  find  the  air  over
those  l&nd8  in  its  av®nu®   of  advance.     With  naval  alid
fair  supremacy  and  "odegt   ground  el®m®nt3  to  defend
bases.   any  major  attfick  from  continental  AEla   towfird
us   or  our  frl®nds   ®f  the  Pacific  would  bo  doo"®d  t®
ftlilure.     Under  Such  cond±tion8   the  I-'acific  no  longer
repreHente  menacing  av®nu®s   of  approach  for  a  proBpec-
tlv®   invader--it  agaumc3   ingt®a{J   the   friendly  &gT}®Ct
of  a   peaceful   lake.     (».ir  line  ®f  d®f®n8e  i&  a   natur®l
one  and  can  b®  m&int8lned  with  a  minimum  of  militory
effort  and   exI>en8®.      It  ®nviBioiiB  no  flttack  against
flnyonca  nor   does   it   I.jrovid®   the   ba@tioliB   ®s8entitil   for
offenslv€   operatlon8,   b`J,i   itrap®rly  maintained  wo`Lld   b®
an   invincible   d€fenB®   €ig&1rLjit   aggrc4Bion.
.The  holding  of  t.tli$   littoral  defenj¥e   llIie   in
the  Western  7laclfic   is  entirely   de.¥j®rLdent  upon  tlolding`
all  segrentB  thcareof .   for  any  major  bre&ch  ol`  that  line
by  an  unfriendly  power  evould  r®nd®r  vulnBrf+ble   to   de-
tern]in€d  attack  every   oth®r  fflfljor  8egm®Iit.     T}iig   is
a  militt*ry  estimate  fig   to  whicli  I  have  }-et  to  f imt]  a
military  leader  Who  will   take  exception.
Pop   that  rGa8on   I  have  strongly  recomrzt®nd€d  in
the  pagt  a8  a  matter  of  railitcary  urgency  that  under  no
circumgt&nc®s  niu8t  Formosa   ftill  under  Communist   con-
trol®     St]ch  tin  eventuality  would  at   once  thr®&ten  the
freedom  of  the  Jlhilippines  and  the  loss  of  Japan,  and
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mlg-ht  veil  force  our  western  frontier  back  t®   the  coasts
of  Ctllifornitl,   Oregon.   and  Wa8hlngton.
To  underst€Ind   tlie   clianges  which  now   app®car  upon
the  Chlne8e  mninl"nd.   one  niutSt  understand  the   changes
in  Chin®B®   char€tcter  and  cultur.a  over   tllt3   past   50  y®t`rs.
Chi]la   up   to   50  years  ago  wngr   completely  nonhomogeneou8,
being  com[iarment®d  into  group.   dlvlded  .igaingt   ®fich
other.     The  war;-making  t®ndem-cy  wae  almost  nonexistent.
£iB   they  gtlll   followed  the  telietS  of  the  C®nfucitln
ideal  of  p®cifi.t  culture.     At  the  t`urn  of  the   century
under  the  r®gim®  of  C!]an  So   Lin,   e]`fort8   toward  greater
homogeneity  produced  the  start  ol`  a  nationalist  urg®®
This  was  further  and  more   successfully   develoiT®d  under
the  lead®r8hlp   of  Chalng  K£&1-Ehek,   I)ut  has   been  brought
t®  its  greflte8t  fruition  under  the  preBorlt  regime.   to
the  !>oint   that  it  hag  now   taken  on  the  cha+ecter  of  a
united  nationt`118m  ol`   incr®a8ingly   domin(tnt   {iggr®seiv®
tend®.ri{lieg®      Through   the8o  past   50  years.   the  Chinese
people  have   thug   b®com®  militariEr,ed   in   their   conc®pttl
and   ln  their   ideals.     They  now  a(}neltut.a   excellent
soldiers  With  coznp®tent   &taff3  and  commanders.     This
has   ]'jroduced  a   new  afid  dominant  pouer   ln  Aeia  which  for
its   own  puri]os..1s  allied  with  Soviet  rtus8ia,   but
which   ln   its   own  conce]its  and  m®thod8  ha8   become  ag-
{5reBslvely   ilbperlali3tic  With  a   lust  for   ®xpBn.ion  and
lncr®aeed  power  normtll   to  thl3   tyT]e  or   imp®riall3m.
There  18   little  of  the   ideol®glcal  ®once|7t  either
one  Way   or  {]nother   ill   t}ie   Chime8®  make-up.     The
standard  of  living  is   Bo  low  &Iid  the   ca]jital  accumula-
tion  has  been  so  thoroughly  dl$8ipated  by  war.  that   the
maB8e8  are   deep®rate  and  tlvid  to  follow  any   l®ader8hlp
which  3®eme   to  I.romls®  the  alleviation  of  local  strin-
genci®B.     I  have  from  the   beginning  believed   tliat  the
Chinese   Communi8t..   Support   of  the  North  Korean4  wal
the   domintint   one.     Their   lnt®r®8t8  are  at  pr®ftent   Tiar-
allel  to  tt!o#e  ol'   the  8ovi®t.   but   I  believe  that  the
aggreB8iv®neBE  r®c®ntly   dlsT)1ayed  not   only   ln   Korea.
but  alBo  ln  Indochina  and  Tibet  and  r7o±nting  poten-
tially  toward  the  vo`1th.  refl®cte  predominantly  the
8ame  lust   for  the   ejcpan8ion  of  power  wlilc}i  hag   animtlt®d
®v®ry  would-b®  conqueror   Slnce   the   beginning  of   timc®
The  Japan®s®  rieopl€   t]inc®  the  war  have  undergone
the  gr®at®8t  reforfnatlon  recorded  in  modern  hi8tory®
With  a   cofrm®ndcablo  Will,   ®agerneeg   to   learn.   t3nd  marked
cfipacity  to  und®rB.and,   they  have  from  the  afil`®e   left
ln  wnr'e  wake.   erected   ln  Japan  an  ediface   d®dlcoted
to  the  primcacy  of  individual  liberty  and  I)®rBonal
dLgnlty.   and   ln  the   eriguing  F]roc®8s   tli®re   hag   been
cre€``ted  a   truly  reiire8entatlv®   €overn&3ent   committed
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to  the  advance  of  politictil  morality.  freedom  of  econo-
mic   ®nt®rprl®®  and  Social   Ju®tio®®     I>olitlc8lly.   econo-
mically  and  socially  Japan  is  mow  abreast  of  many  free
nations  of  the  efirth  and  uill  not  again  fail  the  uni-
v®rs®l.trust.     That  it  may  b®  counted  upon  to  `'i®ld  a
profoundly  b®neficltll  liifluence  over  the  course  of
®v®nt8   in  A.iia   1g  i`tte®ted  by   the  magnlfic®nt  m&nn®r   ln
whlcl`   the  Japen®se  i.®opl®  h&ve  met   the  recent   ch®lleng®
of  tJar,  uur®st,  end  confuglon  surrounding  tliem  fron
tlie   out81de.   and  ch®ck®d   communism  within  their  own
frontier.  without  the  8light®Bt  el&ckening  in  their
forward  progress.     I  sent  all  four  of  our  occupation
divi8iong  to  the  Xor:an  battle  front  wittiout  the  8light-
e&t   qualun8.&s  to  the  effect  of  the  r®8qltirig  potJer  va-
cuum  upoii  Ja]t&n.     The  resultf   fully  justlfi®d  m}'  fai,th®
I  know  of  no  nation  more  serene,   orderly,  and  indu8-
trlou8--nor  in  which  higiver  hop®g  can  be  entertained
for  future  constructive  service  in  the  adv€inc®  of  the
hu"n  race.
Of  our  former  wards.   the  I;hilippines.  w®  can
look  forward  in  confld®nce  that  tlie  ®xiBting  unrest
will  be  corrected  and  a  atron`q  and  h@8lthy  nation  will
grow  in  the  longer  aftermath  of  war'8  t®rrlbl®  des-
tructiv®fie8s.     W®  mug t   b®  patient  and  u.nd®r3tanding  and
never  f€ill  them,  aB   in  our  hour  of  need  they  did  not
fail  us.     A  Christian  nation.   the  }Jhllippin®s  fitancl
as  a  mighty  bulwark  of  Christianity  in  the  Far  BaBti
and  ltg  capacity  for  high  moral  lead®rehip  in  Asia
i8  unlimited.
On   Formosa.   t.I}e   rlovernment   o£`   the   n®ptiblic   ol`
China  hag  had  the  opportunity  to  refute  by  action
much  of  the  malicloufl   gossip  wliich  8o  und®rmlned  the
8trerigth  ol.   its  leader.hi]]  on  the  Chin®g®  "dlnland.'rhe   Formosan  I;®opl®  are  receiving  a   just  and  enlightened
administri`tion  with  majority  repr®8®ntation  on  the
org&na   ol-   gov®rn"cnti   and  ijolltlcftlly,   economically
and  socially  they  appear  to  be  advancing  along  Sound
and  con&tructive  line8®
With  this  brief  insight  into  the  gurroundlng
area&   I  now  turn  to  the  Korean  conflict.     Whll®  I  wac
not  consulted  prior  to  the  lJrosiderit'8  decision  t®
intervene  in  support  of  the  ltepublic  of  Korea.   that
decision.  from  a  military  standpoint.  proved  a  Bound
one  as  we  hurled  back  the   1nvadera  and  decim&t®d  his
forc®8.     Our  victory  wa.  complete  and  our  objectives
vlthin  reach  when  rted  China  lnterven®d  with  nuln®rlcally
8up®rior  groutld  forc®8.     This   created  a   n®v  war  and
an  ontir®ly  new  situation--a   ®1tuation  not  contamplat®d
wli®n  our  forces  were  committ®cl  against  the  North  Ko-
rean  lnvad®rB--a   Situation  which  called  for   new  d®-
cisione  ln  the  diplom@tlc  sphere  to  perinlt  the
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rc{±listic   t`djustm®nt   or  military   str&teg,y®.    .`;uch  doci-
sions   have  not   b®en   forthcoming®
Whll®  no  man  in  hl8   right  tnind  wo`,lid  fidvocat®
S®llding  our  ground  forc®S   into  continental  China
and  such  was  never   .given  a   thought.   the  new  situ€i-
tion  did  urgently  demand  t`   drafltic  r®vlBion  of
®trat®gic  plalining  if  our   political  tJim  wi)8   to  dGf®&t
tlli8   new   ®nelny  .e  ve  had  def®at®d   the  old.
A|.art  fro.tn  the   military  need  a8   I  86Iw   it   to
ncutrallz}®   the   gdnctuAry  r]rot®ction  glv..n  the   enefiiy
riorth  ol   the   Yalu.   I  felt  tli€it  niilit£Jry  ncco8gity  in
the   conduct   of   the  war  made  thandatory!
i.     The  int8ll81fication  of  our  oconor[Iic  block-
ad®   agt`inst   Chintli
2.     Tl`e  imposition  of  a  naval  blockade  a€aln8t
the  China  coasti
3®     Removal  of  reaitrlction  on  air  r®connaieBanc®
of  China's   coo.t  &reae  anTI  of  Ht.nchuriai
4.     tt®moval  of  reetrlctlonB  on  the  forc®8   of
the  ltepublic   of  Chin€`  on  Formosa  with  loglgtic   sui`-
port   to  contribute  to  tlieir  ®fl`ective  ®p®ration8
agaln3t   the  common   enemy.
For  ®ntertalning  th®s®  views.  all  profeBeionally
d®.igned   to   8upport  our  force8   c®rrtmltted  to   Korea  and
bring  hostllltleB   to  an  end  vlth  t}ie  l®aBt  possible
delay   £Ind  at  a   8Qving  of  countlec8  Am®ricon  and  Allied
lives.   I  have  been  8dv®r®ly  criticized  in  lay  Oil-clog.
princiI)ally  abroad.   d®8plt®  my  understanding  that  from
a   mll.Ltary  Standpoint   the  above  viewB  have   b8®n  fully
Shared   in  t[i®  past  by  rjractically  every  leader  con-
cerned  with  th®   Korean  cflllli]aigll.   including  our  own
Joint  Chiefs  ®f  Staff .
I   called  for  reinforcements.   but  wfi$   1nform®d
that  r®lnforcemelit8  w®r®  tiot   avallthtil®.      I  made   ol®ar
that  if  not  permitted  to  d®atroy  the  build-up  baa®.
north  of   t}ie  Yalu!   if  not  I.`®rmitt®d  to  utilize  the
friendly  Chinese  force  of  some  600.0{)a  men  on  Formosai
if  not  perGiltted  to  blockade  the  Chlnca  coast   to  |ire-
vetit   the  Chlne8®  kode   from  getting  Succor  from  wltl'iouti
and   if   there  w®r®   to  be  no  hope  of  major  r®inforce-
m®nts.   the  posit,ion  of   I,h®   conm®nd  from  the  military
Standpoint   forbad®  victory.     W-a   could  holu  in  Korea
by  constant   man®uv®r  cind  at  an  a[.proxlmote  area  vli®r®
our  supply  line  advantagee  were  ln  bal.'`nce  with  th.
Supply  line   dl.advantage  of   the   ®n®fiiy,   but  ve  crjuld
hope  at  best  for  only  {]n  indecisive  campaign.  witll  its
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terrlbl®  and  co)istarit  attrition  upon  our  forc®8  if
tl`®  ®n®my  utlllzed  his  full  military  potential.     I
have  constantly  c&ll®d  for   the  rl®v  polltlci.I   declsione
e8sentical  to  a   8olutioli.     F.ffort®  have  been  made   to
dlgtort  my  position.     It  h&8  b®en  sflid.   in  effect.
that   I  am  a  wnr"onger.     Notl`ilig  could  be  further  from
the  truth.     I  know  war  a8  f ew   otli®r  nien  now  living
lmow   lt.  and  nothing  to  m®  i.  more  revolting.     I  have
long  advocat®d   itB  com])lete  abolltlon  aB   lt®  very
deetructlvenefle   on  both  frl®nd  alid  foe  has  rendered
lt   uBel®Be  a8  a  means   of  e®ttllng  international  .dis-
putes.      Indeed,   on   the   =Ild   of  September  19`15.   just
following  the   surfer)dor  ol`   the   Jap&n®8e  Nation  on
the  battle.hilt
f o 1 i oW g i
|ti®souri .   I  formally  cautioned  a8
'M®n  since  the  b®glnning  ol   time  have  sought
peac®®      Vflrloug   methods   thrt>ugh   t.h®   ag®e   have   been
attempted  to  devi8o  an  intcrn®tional  process   to  pre-
vent   or   8ettl.  dlsput®e   b®tw®en  nations.     From   the
very  .qtart.  workable  methods  ver®  found   lnsofar  a8
1ndivldual   cltizen3  w®r®  concerned,   but  the  mechanlc8
of  an  instrumentality  of  leirger  international  flcor)e
have  never   b®en   succ®s8ful.     Ililitary  alllanc®8,
balances  of  power.   leagues  of  nations.  all  in  turn
failed.   I®avlng   tll®  only  pat]`   to  be  by  Way  of   the
crucible  of  war.     1`he  utter  d®structiven®Bg  of  war
now  blots   out   thiB  alternative.     T#'®  have  had   our  last
chance.      If  we  will  not   d®vlBe  some   greater  find    more
equitable   syet®m.   +^`rmca8®ddon  will   be  at   our   door.     The
problem  basically  le  theological  and  lnvolveg  a  Spirit-
ual  r®crudeBc®nce  and  iquprovement   of  human   character
that  will   8ynchronlz®  with  our  almost  matclil®g®  ad-
vcanc®B   ln   gclence,   art.   Iiter®tur®,   find  all   mat®rlal
and  cultural  dev®lopmont.  of   the  paBt  2.000  years.     It
must  be  of  the  Bf`iirit  if  v®  are  to  gave  the  flesh.I
r}ut   once  war   iB  forceti  upon  u8.   there   i8  no
other  alternative  than  to  aprtly  every  avf]ilabl®  I"e`.+ns
to  bring   it   to  a   Swift   end®     tL'tlr's  very  object   1S
victory--not  prol®ng®d  indeci.fjlon.     In  war.   indeed,
there  can  b®  no  Substitute  for   victory®
There  are   some  t.'ho  for  varying  r¢asonB  wotild
&prte6`g®  Ited  China.     They  are   hllnd  to  llistory.a   clear
l®sBon.     Par   history   teaches  with  unml8t&kable   ®m-
phaB18   that   app®a8ement   but   b®get8   new  and  bloodier
war.      It  r]ointg   to  no  81ngle   lnBtance  tvh®re  the   ®nd
has   ju8tlfied   that  mean.--w}ier®  appeaBom®nt  htle   led  to
more   than  a   sham  p®acc.     I,ike   blaclmlalL,   it   lays   the
basis   for  new  and   BucceBslvely   gr®at®r   demands,   until.
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a8   in  blaclonail,  violence  becom®B  the  only  other  alter-
n&tiv®.     Why,   my   Boldl®rg  asked  ol   me.   8urrendor  mili-
tary  qdv€intages  to  an  enemy  in  the  field?     I  could  not
answer.     Some  may  Bay   to   avoid  S|>re&d  of  the   conflict
into  an  all-out  war  with  Chincai   others.   to  avoiq  Soviet
intorv®]`tion.      Neither   oxplcanntiun  8®®m®  Valld®     Par
China  ig  already   ®ng¢`ging  with  the  maximum  power  it
con  codrmlt   an{]   the  5ovi®t  will  not  necee8ariLy  mesh
its  actions  wit.h  our  "civos.     Like  a   cobra.  any  rl®w
enemy  will  more  likely  strike  wh®n®vor  it  feels  that
tli®  relativlty  in  "ilit€iry  or  other  potential  is  in
its   favor  on  a  vorld-ttld®  baBIB.
The   trttgedy   ot`   Korem   i£   1.urther  h®ighten®d  by
the  fi'ict   that  a8  enilitary  actic}n   1g  conf-lncd   to   lt8
territorial  limits.1t  condemns  that  nation,  which  it
ig   ot&r  purpose   to   8€ive.   to  ®uffer   the  devastating  im-
pact  ol.  full  naval  and  air  bombardment,  while  the
®nemy'8   8anctuarle8  are   fully  prote6t®d  from  Ouch
attack  and  d€vastcation.     Of  the  natlon3  of  the  world
Korea   calone.   up   to   now.   is   the   Bole   one   which  h&8
risked   its  all   agalngt   coramunlBm®     The  m®8nlflcenc®
of  tli®  courage  and  f ortltud®  of  the  Korean  r.eople  de-
fi®a   de8criptlon.     They  liav®  chosen  to  risk  d®t!th
rather  than  8lav®ry.     Their  last  words  to  mt]  w®r€
•non.t  scuttle  the  }>acific..
I  have  ju8t  left  your  fighting  Bone   ln  fcor8&i
They  have  met  all  test8  there  anu   I  Can  report  to  you
without  re8ervtltion  they  are  8r`l®iLdid  in  every  way.
It  wac  my  conBtant`   effort   to  rtr®eerve  thou  and  end
thlB  Savage  conflict  honorably  and  vitli  the  least  logo
of  tlm®  a)id  a  mlnlmun  eacrlflc®  ol   life.     Its   growing
bloodshed  hag  cauecd  m®  the   deep®4t  angul8h  and  anxiety.
Those  gallant  men  will  r®maln  often  in  my  thoughts
and   in  my   pray®r&   &lwaye.
I  &m  closing  my  52  y®ar®   of  military  8orvice.
When  I  jt}ined  the  Army  even  before  t!t®  turn  of  the
century.   it  wag  the  fulfillment   or  till  my  boyish
hop®8  and   dr®em8.     The  world  hag   turned   over  many
times   since   I  took  the  oath  on  the  F]laln  at  W`®.t
I]oint.   and   tlle  hop®g  and  dreams   have   long  silice  van-
ished.     But   I  Still  remember  the  refr®1n  of  one  of
the  most   I-]opular   barrack  b&1lada   of  that   day  vhlch
procltiimed  m®tt  proudly  that--
'Old  soldiers  never   di®i   tli®y  just   fade  avay®'
And  llk®  tli®  old   Soldier  of  that  t]allad.   I  now
close  my  military  c€`reer  and  just  fade  away--an  old
goldler  w-ho   tried   to  do  Ills   duty  a8   God   #t`ve  liim  the
light  to  gee  tl]at  duty.
GO®d-by.
A.l'pBHDIX  V
IA|,a
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